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
ABSTRACT 

The objective of this thesis is to examine the effect of pension system design on saving.  
Chapter II analyses the relationship analytically, in a two-period two-generation partial 
equilibrium Samuelson-type of OLG model in the logarithmic format, augmented by design 
of the public pension system and by the mandatory funded pension programme with the 
displacement coefficient. The model predicts higher household saving for countries with a 
lower contribution rate, higher redistribution within the public system and greater 
importance of private pension savings, i.e. systems that could be classified as ‘Beveridge’. 
Partial derivatives of the model are numerically simulated.  
Chapter III first deals with the measurement issue, defining the set of ‘pension design 
indicators’ that will be used later for the empirical analysis. Then it tests the ‘convergence 
hypothesis’ of pension models using several methods. The results unambiguously suggest 
that, despite a convergence in pension policy goals, convergence of pension models has not 
occurred i.e. the pension systems around the world are still influenced by their historical 
paths. 
Chapter IV empirically investigates the effect of pension system design on saving rates. The 
first part of the analysis closely follows work in Disney (2005), with somewhat differently 
calculated public pension design variables and with data for the 2000s. I also tested the 
impact of private pension component on household saving. The overall pension system 
3 

design was estimated using principal components composite indices. The results obtained 
using a number of estimation methods have not confirmed the predictions of the 
theoretical model, and are actually counter-intuitive. In addition to methodological issues 
related to household saving data, a possible explanation for this could be the complexity of 
household saving behaviour that needs to be adequately controlled for. 
The final chapter summarizes the findings, discusses limitations of empirical investigation 
and sets forth directions for future research. 
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Glossary  
ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) test: a test for a unit root in higher order AR process, which 
includes lagged changes of the variable as regressors.  
AMECO: The Annual Macro-Economic Database of the European Commission's Directorate 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs. Contains data for EU-27, candidate 
countries and other OECD countries (United States, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, 
Norway, Iceland, Mexico, Korea, Australia and New Zealand) 
Balancing mechanism: the automatic indexation system used in the Sweden public pension 
scheme – if pension assets fall below liabilities, the standard indexation is corrected by 
the assets/liabilities ratio.  
CV (coefficient of variation): is a normalized measure of dispersion of a probability 
distribution. It is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. 
DB (defined-benefit): a pension plan where benefit is predetermined, calculated on the 
basis of a formula that accounts for a worker’s years of service and earnings; sponsor of 
the plan bears the risk. 
DC (defined-contribution): a type of retirement plan in which the amount of the employer's 
annual contribution is specified, and the benefit depends on the contributions paid into 
the individual account and the earned rate of return; the risk is borne by the 
beneficiary.  
CWED (Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset): compiled by Lyle Scruggs (University 
of Connecticut) and consists of six datasets on institutional features of social insurance 
programmes in 18 countries spanning much of the post-war period. 
13 

EC (European Commission): executive body of the European Union, which is responsible for 
proposing legislation, implementing decisions, and manages the day-to-day business of 
implementing EU policies and spending EU funds. 
ESA95 (European system of national and regional accounts): collects comparable, up-to-
date and reliable information on the structure and developments of the economy of 
the Member States of the European Union. The system is broadly consistent with the 
System of National Accounts of the United Nations (1993 SNA) with regards to 
definitions, accounting rules and classifications, but it also has some specificities, 
particularly in its presentation, which is more in line with EU practices. 
EUROSTAT:  the statistical office of the European Union, based in Luxembourg.  
EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
EU-10: Ten countries that accessed the EU in 2004 (Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, Estonia,  Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary). 
EU-8: Eight ex-communist countries that accessed the EU in 2004 (Slovenia, Estonia,  Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary). 
EU-25: EU-15 and EU-10. 
EU-27: EU-25 and Bulgaria and Romania (accessed in 2007). 
FE (fixed effect): estimators used in the panel data analysis obtained by applying pooled 
OLS to time-demeaned data.  
GDP (gross domestic product): market value of all officially recognised final goods and 
services produced within a country in a given period. 
GLS (generalised least squares): an estimator that accounts for a heteroskedasticity, serial 
correlation, or both, via transformation of the original model.  
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GMM (general method of moments): an estimator based on the population moments 
conditions.  
HDI (household disposable income): the sum of wages and salaries, mixed income, net 
property income, net current transfers and social benefits other than social transfers in 
kind, less taxes on income and wealth and social security contributions paid by 
employees, the self-employed and the unemployed. 
LHC (life cycle hypothesis): model of individual consumption patterns developed by 
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954).  
IRA (individual retirement accounts): a form of retirement plan that provides tax 
advantages for retirement savings in the United States.  
IRR (internal rate of return): the interest rate at which the average present value of the 
stream of contributions paid is equal to the average present value of the stream of 
pension benefits. 
Kaiser criterion: the number of factors equal to the number of eigenvalues of the 
correlation matrix that are greater than one. 
KPSS (Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin) test: a one-sided right-tailed stationarity test, 
where the null hypothesis is trend-stationarity against the unit root alternative 
hypothesis. 
NPISH (non-profit institutions serving households): non-profit institutions which are not 
predominantly financed and controlled by government and which provide goods or 
services to households free or at prices that are not economically significant. This sector 
includes such bodies as charities, trade unions and churches. 
MISSOC (Mutual Information System for Social Protection):  a prime source of information 
on the status of social protection in Europe; produces regularly updated comparative 
tables covering all areas of social protection.  
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NDC (notional defined contributions): a variant of an earnings-related scheme that 
combines a defined contribution system financed on the pay-as-you-go basis. 
Contributions are recorded in an individual account and they earn a notional interest 
rate (wage bill or GDP growth). At retirement, the accumulated notional capital in each 
account is converted to a stream of pension payments using a formula based on life 
expectancy at the time of retirement.  
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development): is an international 
economic organisation of 34 countries founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress 
and world trade. 
OLG (overlapping generations model): popularised by Samuelson (1958) is a dynamic 
economic model, which contains agents born at different dates and with finite 
lifetimes. 
OMC (open method of coordination): a form of EU soft law, which aims to spread best 
practices and achieve greater convergence towards the main EU goals. 
PAYG (pay as you go): the method of financing pension where the benefits are paid directly 
from current workers' contributions and taxes. 
PCA (principal component analysis): a mathematical procedure that transforms a number 
of correlated variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables called principal 
components, which account for most of the variance of the observed variables. 
Pension variation: a variable that measures ‘intragenerational redistribution’ of the pension 
system. It is calculated as the coefficient of variation of replacement rates across 
several household types. 
Pension tax: an indicator devised by Disney (2004) to capture the absolute ‘tax component’ 
of the contribution rate. It is calculated by multiplying a ‘pension variation’ by the 
average effective contribution rate.  
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Point system: a variation of defined-benefit pension system, where benefit is defined as a 
product of a number of personal points and the pension (general) point value. Workers 
earn pension points based on their individual earnings for each year of contributions. At 
retirement, accumulated pension points are multiplied by a pension-point value to 
convert them into a monetary payment. 
RE (random effects): a feasible GLS estimator used in the panel data analysis, where the 
unobserved effect is assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.  
RR (replacement rate): the ratio of the first post-retirement income to pre-retirement 
income. 
SOCX (Social Expenditure Database): the OECD database with social expenditure data 
stemming from the 1980s. 
SNA 93 (System of National Accounts 1993): a coherent, consistent and integrated set of 
macroeconomic accounts, balance sheets and tables based on a set of internationally 
agreed concepts, classifications and accounting rules. 
TSFA (tax-favoured savings accounts): a variety of options for receiving tax benefits for 
retirement saving. Tax-favoured accounts fall into two broad categories: those offered 
through an employer and those established by an individual.  
WDI (World Development Indicators): the primary World Bank collection of development 
indicators, compiled from officially recognised international sources. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The reforms of pension systems around both OECD and developing countries have been at 
the top of the agenda since the second half of the 1980s and there is no sign that the issue 
is gaining less importance. Hence, reforming pension systems around the world has become 
an ongoing process.  
One of the important arguments for the choice of a particular pension model is its 
contribution to the increase in national saving. Using this, among other arguments, during 
the 1990s, the World Bank (1994) promoted the concept of pension reform based on the 
Chilean experience – the so-called multi-pillar model, which in turn was inspired by the 
Anglo-Saxon Beveridge pension model. Its side effect — the increase in national saving — 
has been seen as one of the important arguments for the introduction of this type of 
pension model. Thus, the effect of the pension system on saving is of the utmost interest.  
The theory linking a pension system and saving is not straightforward though. A standard 
life-cycle hypothesis predicts a one-for-one displacement effect of a pension programme on 
household saving. When additional assumptions are introduced into the LCH framework, 
such as myopic behaviour – one of the arguments for a public pension intervention, liquidity 
constraints, income uncertainty, bequest motive, etc., the offset is no longer expected to be 
one-for-one, and its size becomes an empirical question. 
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In the ‘extended life cycle model’, Feldstein (1974; 1976) shows that the displacement is 
less than one due to the ‘induced retirement’ –additional wealth brought about by social 
security would induce individuals to retire earlier than otherwise, which in turn leads to 
higher lifetime savings needed for a longer period of retirement.  
When it comes to the empirical literature on effects of the size of the unfunded (PAYG) 
pension system on saving, there is a large body of literature. This literature can be classified 
into the time series analysis, cross-country and cross-section analysis, and usually looks at 
the effect of magnitude of a PAYG pension programme on aggregate saving.  
The most influential work in this area is Feldstein’s (1974) time series analysis of the social 
security effect on savings. He estimates from annual time series US data for social security 
wealth (both gross and net) the impact on consumption for the period 1929–1971 and finds 
that social security depresses personal saving by 30-50 percent per dollar of benefit, 
depending on specification. 
This article is perhaps the most famous in the PAYG and saving literature, but it also 
produced a good deal of controversy. Many authors critically responded to his analysis, such 
as Barro (1978) and Leimer and Lesnoy (1982), while Feldstein also continued to build on his 
seminal work. In his 1996 paper, he addressed the issues that were subject to criticism, and 
confirmed his results.  
There are also a significant number of cross-section studies of the pension system effect on 
saving rates, including Feldstein and Pellechio (1979), Novos (1989), Kotlikoff (1979), Gale 
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(1995), as well as cross-country studies: Barro and MacDonald (1979), Feldstein (1980), 
Edwards (1996) etc.  
In general, findings of this vast literature suggest that reducing the generosity of pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) systems is likely to stimulate a small increase in private saving, but this effect 
depends on many factors – such as the demographic composition and economic institutions 
of each country. 
However, the debate on pensions and saving has focused on the effect of the size of an 
unfunded programme on saving, but as argued by Disney (2005; 2006a), the design of an 
unfunded programme may also matter. Disney introduced the analysis of the effect of 
design of social security programmes on saving into the empirical literature, arguing that 
the household behaviour depends on the pension programme design features, such as how 
closely a particular social security programme mimics private retirement saving 
programmes and the degree of ‘intragenerational redistribution’. 
When it comes to the analysis of private pension programmes on saving rates, the literature 
is mainly focused on the effects of voluntary (tax-favoured) private pensions on savings and 
rarely deals with the effect of a mandatory fully-funded system. Furthermore, it mostly 
utilises cross-section analyses within a country, and single country studies (time series), 
rather than cross-country analyses. The reason may be data availability, since the collection 
of cross-country data is a demanding task.   
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Motivated by the relevance of the pension-saving relationship, and inspired by Disney’s 
(2005; 2006a) work on the effect of the design of public pension (social security) 
programmes on saving, I chose to investigate the effect of pension system design on saving. 
I look at both the public and private component of pension design.  
Firstly, in Chapter II PENSION SYSTEM DESIGN AND SAVING: TWO-PERIOD PARTIAL 
EQUILIBRIUM MODEL, I embark on the theoretical analysis of the effects of both the design 
of the social security system and the private pension component on household saving. 
I derive a two-period two-generation partial (household sector) equilibrium Samuelson-type 
of OLG model in the risk-aversion logarithmic format, including a design of the public 
pension system as in Disney (2005; 2006a) and further augmenting it by the mandatory 
funded pension programme with the displacement coefficient. The novelty of this model is 
derivation of saving rate and looking at two types of offsets from household saving – 
induced by public pensions, and induced by mandatory saving programmes. At the end of 
the Chapter II, I numerically test the partial coefficients of the model.  
Prior to getting on to the empirical analysis of the effect of the pension system design on 
saving, it was important to define a set of measures of the design of a pension system, and 
to test empirically whether it still makes sense to regard pension models as Beveridge vs. 
Bismarck, as it has been done in the analytical Chapter II, following Disney (2005; 2006a), 
Lindbeck and Persson (2003), Pestieau (1998; 1999), Casamatta et al. (2000). The question 
of convergence vs. path dependence is of great importance, both for further empirical 
testing of theoretical model obtained in Chapter II, as well as for policy implications when it 
comes to pension design reforms.  
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Chapter III PENSION SYSTEM DESIGN: MEASUREMENT AND CONVERGENCE first deals with 
the measurement issue. There are various indicators of ‘pension system design’ measured 
in the literature, though there are no readily available datasets. Section 2 of Chapter III 
describes and measures various pension indicators and explains in detail what the pension 
indicators are, how they are calculated and what are the data sources. This set of indicators 
is later used in the empirical analysis of pension system design and saving.  
As the proposed indicators overlap and correlate, I have also performed principal 
component analysis to identify commonalities on indicators in line with the typology of 
pension programmes – Beveridge vs. Bismarck, and to create composite indices that can be 
later used in the empirical analysis.   
The empirical analysis of this Chapter answers the question whether there have been 
convergences in the design of pension systems around the world or are pension models still 
influenced by their historical paths. 
Pension systems around the world originated with the choice between two models – 
Bismarck, with the aim to provide income maintenance, or Beveridge, aiming to alleviate 
poverty across the whole old-age population. The decision toward a pension model was not 
made at once, but was rather a result of ’longer and sometimes inconsistent history from 
the 1880s up to the 1950s‘ (Ebbinghaus and Gronwald, 2009:6). Nonetheless, at the end of 
the 1950s, countries could be quite easily classified according to original pension policy that 
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prevailed at the time into ‘Bismarck’ or ‘Beveridge’. This division is used as a base for the 
analysis throughout the Chapter, translated into the ‘Bismarck dummy’. 
However, the evolution of pension systems since the beginning of the 1960s and the latest 
developments – the retrenchment policies caused by growing pension deficits and the issue 
of an aging population, as well as the European Union’s ‘Open Method of Coordination’ – all 
this together brought the question whether the convergence in pension models occurred, 
or historical origins are still important.  
I have tested empirically the ‘convergence hypothesis’ in section 3 of Chapter III, using a 
number of estimation methods. Firstly, I pursue a Disney (2000a) type of  estimation to test 
whether ‘Bismarckian’ countries tend to hinder the development of private pension 
arrangements – a form of ‘crowding out’ hypothesis, using longer data series and a slightly 
different set of variables. Then I use Bonoli`s (1997) ‘two-dimensional approach’, which 
classifies welfare regimes according to two dimensions of social policy, and apply it to the 
pension models. I look to see if countries still tend to group as ‘Bismarck’ and ‘Beveridge’ 
according to the pairs of pension policy dimensions.  
Finally, I formally test the ‘convergence hypothesis’ by testing the stationarity of the 
difference of selected pension indicators for the ‘Bismarck’ and ‘Beveridge’ group. This is a 
method that has been used in the literature testing convergence of various topics, for 
example by Harvey (2002) for economic growth, Affinito and De Bonis (2008) for 
convergence of the banking sector, etc. I also follow Johnson (1999) and investigate 
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whether there has been a decrease in the coefficient of variation of pension indicators 
across countries over time.  
The contribution of this Chapter is developing a defined and calculated set of pension 
design indicators, including composite indices, which can be used for the empirical analysis 
of pension design and its effect on various variables, including saving. Furthermore, it 
includes the empirical testing of ‘convergence hypotheses’, using a comprehensive set of 
measures and a number of estimation methods. These results are of importance both for 
testing the relationship between pension system design and saving, as well as for general 
pension reform recommendations. In case of non-convergence, policy makers should be 
more carefully in choosing reform options, and consider more the adequacy of each option 
in relation to the existing pension system set up.  
Finally, I look for the empirical evidence on the effect of pension system design on 
household saving in Chapter IV PENSION SYSTEM DESIGN AND SAVING: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE. 
Since the empirical analysis of saving is quite challenging due to the problems of saving data 
availability and quality, after the literature review and theoretical framework, section 4 
deals with the data and estimation problems, in particular with the methodological issues 
concerning household saving data.  
The empirical analysis, given in section 5, splits into three parts. The first part closely follows 
Disney (2005, 2006a) in an attempt to investigate the effect of public pension design on 
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household saving. I try to replicate his work with somewhat more comprehensive data and 
for a longer time period. In the second part, I estimate the effect of the private pension 
component on the saving rate, proxied with the stock of private pension assets as a share of 
GDP. In the third part I attempt to model the overall pension design, taking into account 
both the public and private component, using the principal component composite index 
dubbed the ‘Bismarck index’. 
The contribution of this Chapter is the use of a comprehensive pension indicator dataset 
including composite indices, stemming four decades, and the use of several estimation 
methods to assess the impact of the overall pension system design on saving – both public 
pension design and private component.  
 
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II PENSION SYSTEM DESIGN AND SAVING: 
TWO-PERIOD PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between a pension system and household saving has been a subject of 
debate for a long time – both theoretically and empirically. A standard life-cycle hypothesis 
(LCH) predicts a one-for-one displacement effect of a pension programme on household 
saving. When additional assumptions are introduced into the LCH framework, such as 
myopic behaviour – one of the arguments for a public pension intervention, liquidity 
constraints, income uncertainty, bequest motive, etc., the offset is no longer expected to be 
one-for-one, and its size becomes an empirical question. 
In the ‘extended life cycle model’, Feldstein (1974; 1976) formalises the ‘induced 
retirement’ argument – additional wealth brought about by social security would induce 
individuals to retire earlier than otherwise, which in turn leads to higher lifetime savings 
needed for a longer period of retirement. Feldstein (1987) compares a universal and a 
means-tested pension programme in terms of a more optimal solution, and though not 
settling for either, he believes a means-tested programme with a very low level of benefit is 
preferable, but not politically attainable (Feldstein, 2005).  
Disney (2006a) argues that the design of a pension system also matters. Using the Lindbeck 
and Persson (2003) format, he includes pension design in budget constraints and argues 
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that the closer the pension programme is to a saving programme (the internal rate of return 
closer to the market interest rate), the greater the potential offset for private saving. 
Further, he argues that the higher the degree of redistribution within the programme, the 
average offset should be lower.  
In this Chapter, I analytically examine the effect of pension system design on household 
saving. After providing a background discussion in Section 2, in Section 3 I set out the Aaron-
Samuelson-type model of social security and derive saving rate, integrating various aspects 
of pension system design into the format of Lindbeck and Persson (2003) and Disney (2005; 
2006a).  
The model is a two-period two-generation partial equilibrium OLG model set in logarithmic 
format, capturing behaviour of the risk-averse individuals. This is a Samuelson-type of OLG 
model, without production. There is a possibility to save, but there is no firm sector 
(production) in the model, hence the market interest rate is an exogenous variable. This 
means that only the households sector is taken into account.  
The model includes design of the public pension system as in Lindbeck and Persson (2003) 
and Disney (2005; 2006a) and is further augmented by the mandatory funded pension 
programme with displacement coefficient. Thereby, I derive saving rate and analyse 
analytically two types of offsets from household saving – induced by public pensions, and 
induced by mandatory saving programmes. Obviously, these offsets are expected to differ 
and neither needs to be one-for-one.  
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At the end of Section 3, I set out and explain some partial derivatives, which are numerically 
illustrated in Section 4, and empirically tested later in the thesis.  
The contribution of this Chapter is a derivation of the household saving rate using risk-
aversion logarithmic utility function, based on the two-period budget constraints problem 
set in Disney (2005), and further augmenting it by the mandatory funded pension 
programme and displacement coefficient. Additional contribution is numerical simulations 
of the model. 
2. BACKGROUND: THE RATIONAL AND DESIGN OF PENSION 
SYSTEM 
2.1. LIFE-CYCLE HYPOTHESIS (LCH) AND THE RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC PENSIONS 
Life-Cycle Hypothesis  
The standard framework for the analysis of savings decisions at the microeconomic 
(individual) level is the Life-Cycle Hypothesis developed by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), 
and Ando and Modigliani (1963), which is based on the Irving Fisher's model of inter-
temporal choice and Harrod`s notion of hump-saving.  
According to the life cycle hypothesis (henceforth LCH), individuals maximise their utility by 
smoothing lifetime consumption, while consumption is a function of lifetime resources. The 
assumption of this model is that consumers are forward looking and rational and there is no 
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bequest motive. The utility function is homogeneous – a function where multiplying all the 
arguments by any constant multiplies the value of the function by some power of this 
constant1.   
Let us consider a two-period model (working in period  and retired in period  with 
forward-looking behaviour and no bequests. 
An individual maximises his/her lifetime utility function:  
  	 
                                         (II-1) 
where  is the life-time utility function; 
 is the instantaneous utility function  
 is consumption of the individual during the year   (in this case 1 or 2); 
the parameter   is the subjective discount factor (  		
 
 and    captures time 
preference,    if the individual values future the same as current consumption),  
Subject to budget constraints: 
	   
	  	      and        
  
	  	   (II-2)   
where  is household net worth (wealth) carried over from the previous period (given in 
first period);  is labour income (wage).  

1
 If the power is 1 then it is said that function is homogenous of degree 1, if the power is 2 then function is 
homogeneous of degree 2 etc.  
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Combining the constraints yields the intertemporal budget constraint, meaning that the 
present value of lifetime consumption must equal present value of lifetime income and 
initial assets.  
 	 
  !"	#  =   
	      (II-3) 
This gives the maximisation problem:  
$  	 
   %	+ 
   	]   (II-4) 
&'
&!( = 	  %  ,         &'&!" =    )	#   
and Euler equation: 
 	   
  
A change in consumption over time depends on the form of the utility function , the 
subjective discount rate  (time preference ), and the interest rate .  
For    it follows that the consumer wishes to smooth consumption completely. That is 
 	  ,  as long as there are no preference shifters between periods. 
For the logarithmic inter-temporal utility function  *+	 
 *+ , which captures the 
behaviour of risk-averse individuals, the 	


   
    
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Plugging budget constraint (II-1) into Euler equation (II-5) 
 
  
	  	   
  
	  	 
 
  cancels and substituting for 	   
	  	 we get: 
 
 	   
	 
Therefore the optimal saving rate is: 
	   ,	,  
	 
and since the parameter   is the subjective discount factor   		
   
	   -./(
 
 
This result demonstrates that individuals seek to maximise their utility by smoothing life-
cycle consumption, which means that there should be no discontinuity (i.e. sharp reduction) 
in consumption at retirement. Almost half of the household wealth carried over from the 
past and labour income earned in the period one will be saved for the retirement.  
Consequently, the LCH shows that ‘consumption smoothing leads to a humped-shaped age 
path of wealth holding, a shape that had been suggested earlier by Roy Harrod (1948) under 
the label of hump saving’ (Modigliani, 1986:300). 
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The Rationale for a Public Pension System  
From a microeconomic or individual point of view, consumption smoothing requires a 
mechanism. When saving, people face a range of uncertainties, including longevity risk – 
how long they are going to live. If saving as an individual, a person faces the risk of outliving 
those savings, or of consuming very little. Therefore, we need the insurer to ‘pool the risk’ – 
life expectancy of a larger group of people is better known (Barr and Diamond, 2006). 
Furthermore, there is always a risk that an individual does not earn enough to save – 
earnings risk.  
Samuelson (1958) provides a rationale for the introduction of social security from the 
macroeconomic/state view. Assuming no capital accumulation and constant productivity in 
a three-period two generation overlapping model, he proves that the introduction of a pay-
as-you-go social security system is welfare improving for each individual, as long as 
population growth is higher than the market interest rate. Aaron (1966) extends his model 
assuming stationary productivity growth, and argues that the social security program is 
welfare improving so long as the sum of the rates of growth of per capita wages and 
population, being a return to the social security program, exceeds the interest rate. 
Samuelson (1975), as well as Blanchard and Fischer (1989), allow capital accumulation and 
argue that in a dynamically inefficient economy, introduction of social security is welfare 
improving – see the discussion in Disney (1996). However, most economies are traditionally 
regarded as dynamically efficient so long as capital is scarce.   
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There are two other major reasons for state/public intervention suggested by Diamond 
(1977) – paternalism and market failure. Hozlmann and Hinz (2005) classify both arguments 
under market failure, dividing them into market failure from the demand side 
(myopia/paternalism) and from the supply side (absence of financial products). 
One of the assumptions of the LCH and Samuelson (1958) is that consumers are rational and 
forward-looking. On the other hand, there is a view that individuals may save insufficiently 
due to myopia and time-inconsistency, which actually strengthens the argument for public 
pensions. For example, Diamond (1977) suggests that individuals if left alone will not save 
enough for their old age because of irrationality in decision-making or because of a lack of 
good information about their future incomes or expected lifetimes. Consequently, he points 
to the paternalist motive as one of the justifications for Social Security.2   
On the other side of the argument, Feldstein (1985) performs a theoretical and numerical 
analysis of the two-period OLG model with productive capital and myopia, and argues that 
even if every individual is substantially myopic, it may be optimal to have either no social 
security retirement program or very low benefits based on means-testing.  In the case of 
completely myopic individuals, social security is justified, nevertheless ‘the optimal level of 
benefits may be quite low, unless a large fraction of the population is completely myopic’ 
(page 318). 

2
   Once a public pension program exists, however, it is hard to prove the counterfactual that individuals would 
not save enough without a public pension program. 
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A stream of research dubbed the ‘retirement-consumption puzzle’ may seem to give 
empirical support for the existence of myopic individuals. A number of empirical studies 
using survey data, starting with Hamermesh (1984) for the United States, found an 
unexpected drop in consumption at retirement, apparently incompatible with the 
assumption of underlying consumption smoothing. For example, Banks et.al. (1998) observe 
a sudden fall of consumption in retirement in United Kingdom household survey data, 
which cannot be explained by the LCH even when the researchers controlled for a decrease 
of work-related expenditures and substitution of purchased with home-produced goods, as 
well as allowing for age-related change in consumption preferences. Furthermore, they rule 
out a negative shock to wealth owing to unanticipated earlier retirement due to for 
example health event, unemployment, marital status as possible causes (Disney and Tanner, 
1998; Hurd and Rohwedder, 2003). However, Banks et.al. argue that this fall does not need 
to be the result of the lack of rationality in consumption choices over the life cycle, but can 
rather be explained by the change of information in retirement or what they call ‘systematic 
arrival of unexpected adverse information’, such as unanticipated shocks to perceived 
lifetime needs through health or life expectancy (page 769).  
On the contrary, Bernheim et al. (2001: 855) argue that the puzzle cannot be explained 
within the LHC framework, and that it can be more easily explained if ‘one steps outside the 
framework of rational, farsighted optimization’. Consequently, they see the cause of the 
retirement-consumption puzzle in myopic individuals, to whom post-retirement 
consumption feasibility is a surprise.   
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Holzmann and Hinz (2005:40) state, ‘myopia may be the result of an insufficient planning 
horizon or a high personal discount rate. Empirically, it is difficult to distinguish between 
both causes, but there are strong indications for the latter. A perceived high discount rate 
can be the result of restricted credit markets, the existence of other, more urgent, lifetime 
risks (such as sickness, disability, and family dissolution) or natural and political risks’.  
There is also a stream of research that points to the problem of time-inconsistency (Laibson, 
1996; Laibson and Harris, 2001 etc.). Laibson with his ‘pull of instant gratification’ explains 
that individuals conceive a long-term viable savings plan, but tend to deviate from it. In such 
cases inadequate old-age savings may be attributed to psychological reasons – current 
needs and satisfactions are what makes people save less than they rationally know they 
should.  
On the supply side, there are failures that prevent private markets to provide adequate 
financial products. Diamond (1977: 279) points to the three types of failures: the absence of 
safe investment opportunities, the absence of real annuities and the problems in insuring 
the risk associated with a varying length of working life.  In addition, any attempt to insure 
the risk faces severe moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Ibid, p. 280).  
Hence, the rationale for public intervention is the lack or suboptimal supply of market-
based retirement products. ‘Even when such products exist, they often require public 
intervention in the form of public education and guarantee funds’ (Holzmann and Hinz, 
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2005:40). Annuity companies face adverse selection – only the healthy sign up, which 
prevents private markets from offering an appropriate level of coverage. 
Besides providing a consumption smoothing mechanism, public policy might have two 
additional objectives for a pension scheme. The first is poverty relief: a society might wish 
its pensioners to have a minimum standard of living in retirement. The second is a 
redistributive objective: a society might wish to distribute additional resources above the 
poverty level to certain members of society (Barr, 2006).   
Overall, the pension system has multiple objectives – the most important being poverty 
prevention/reduction and consumption smoothing. A pension system is therefore said to be 
adequate when it manages to accomplish these two major goals: to provide the absolute 
level of retirement income (preventing/reducing old-age poverty), and to provide the 
relative level of retirement income (income replacement or maintaining the relative 
standard of living) (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005). These are the main reasons for the 
introduction of a pension system. 
2.2. THE OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL (OLG) AND AARON`S CONDITION 
The main framework to analyse the social security effect on aggregate household saving i.e. 
at the macroeconomic level is the Overlapping Generations Model (OLG), popularised by 
Samuelson (1958).  
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Samuelson considers a three-period three-generation one-sector model. He assumes no 
saving and investment, ‘all loans being consumption loans’. His model is partial with only 
one sector – household - and no production. Another feature of the model is that at every 
point in time, finitely lived individuals of different generations are alive. Agents are forward 
looking and rational and there is no bequest motive. He assumes stationary population 
growth.  
The essential feature of this model is that at every point in time, finitely-lived individuals of 
different generations are alive. Time preference is constant across time (individuals do not 
change the time preference over time) and it is the same for each generation. Future 
consumption is discounted at the subjective interest rate 0 that can be  , not 
necessarily positive as in Bohm-Bawerk. There is no possibility to store goods.  
Samuelson (1958) looks at three generations and each generation has three periods in life – 
workers produce one unit of product in period 1 and one in period 2 (when ‘young’), and in 
period 3 they retire and do not produce (when ‘old’). Each person maximises his/her 
lifetime utility function: 
  12	3 4 234 256) 
where  2	3 and 23 is the consumption of young age groups (generations) in period  and , 
and 256 in period 7
 
subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint: 
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2	3 
 823 
 8256   
 8 
 8    where 8  		9 
This merely says that the total discounted value of the individuals’ consumption must equal 
the discounted value of their production over the lifetime. Hence, net lifetime saving is 
equal to zero: 
:	38 
 8:38 
 8:568                                           (II-6) 
As in the previous section, the solution to this maximisation problem depends on the form 
of the utility function and the value of the subjective preference rate. If we assume 0  , 
then ‘individual inter-temporal equilibrium is obtained where marginal utility of 
consumption is equated across time-periods’ (Disney, 1996: 38). Similarly, if we assume 
0 ;  and the logarithmic utility function, then discounted marginal utilities are equated 
across periods. This is the same result obtained in the previous section. Consequently, we 
can see that the life-cycle model is embedded in the OLG framework.         
Let us consider the implications at the macroeconomic level. The assumption is that no 
goods can be stored – it means that ‘total net saving of community must cancel out to zero 
in every period’ (Samuelson, 1958: 470). Hence, equilibrium requires: 
<	:	38 
 <:38 
 <5:568                     
where the population size in each period of time is < with population growth =. If the first 
generation is normalised at , then we have:  
:	38 
  
=>	:38 
  
 =>:568       (II-7) 
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Recalling the budget identity, we can see that 8   
=>	   i.e.   0  =  
‘Every geometrically growing consumption-loan economy has an equilibrium market rate of 
interest exactly equal to its biological percentage growth rate’ (Samuelson, 1958: 472). 
Samuelson also proves that the solution is a socially optimal one. 
However, this solution is not unique. In addition, there is an equilibrium where 0    (or 
8  
/. The interpretation is that the oldest generation ‘is prepared to pay up to all its 
previous resources to persuade successive generations to support it in its retirement’ 
(Disney, 1996: 39).  
To resolve this suboptimal solution, Samuelson suggested the use of money as a store of 
values, as well as a social security programme as a form of ‘social contract’ between 
generations. He argued that the introduction of a social security program as a form of 
‘Hobbesian contract’ would be welfare improving for each individual, as long as population 
growth or the ‘biological interest rate’, being the rate of return on social security, was 
higher than the market interest rate (page 479).  
Aaron (1996) with his ‘social insurance paradox’ further formalized Samuelson`s conclusion. 
Besides steady (constant) population growth, he also assumes steady productivity growth. 
He proved that a social security program is welfare improving as long as the sum of the 
rates of growth of per capita wages and the population, being the return to the social 
security program, exceeds the interest rate. He adds though that ‘if saving and, hence, 
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investment and, hence, the rate of growth of income are reduced as the level of social 
insurance increases, this conclusion does not necessarily follow’ (Aaron, 1966: 374).  
Let us introduce a social security program, which is in balance. The government faces the 
following budget constraint at each period :   
?6@  3A 
                                                                 (II-8)   
 
The left hand side of the equation represents the pension liability of the government to the 
current old generation. Pension benefit equals the replacement rate on the previous salary 
?  88 B>	6 ; the number of pensioners equals the total number of the old generation 
in the period, @. The right hand side of the identity is the amount of contributions paid to 
the social security program in each period – with  being the contribution rate, 3 the 
wage of working generation and A the number of the working (young) generation.  
In the case of a stationary population, meaning no population growth, generations are the 
same size (A  @). If we assume a steady-state, which was Samuelson`s and Aaron`s 
assumption, population growth is constant +  so that A   
 +@  
From the social security balancing identity (II-8), we can derive the rate of return on PAYG 
system, being the ratio of benefits received during retirement and contributions paid during 
working life.  
 
CDEB/DF(E  GGB/DF(
E
B/DF(E  GG  
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Substituting in II-8 for the pension benefit and the size of the population and rearranging, 
we get: 
 
88 B>	6 B A 
 +   
 H>	6 A 
As the wages and young population cancels, it follows that: 
GG
    
 H 
 +              (II-9) 
which is the Aaron (1966) condition. Hence, society is better off with an unfunded social 
security program, with the implicit return of  
 H 
 +, as long as this is higher than 
( 
 4  the return on funded pensions (or ‘free’retirement saving). 
Lindbeck and Persson (2003), following Disney (2004), use I as the notation for Aaron`s 
internal rate of return of the social security program: 
I   
 H 
 + 
Hence, in a dynamically efficient economy - where the population growth rate exceeds the 
steady state marginal product of capital (r), as assumed by Samuleson and Aaron, the 
‘return’ on contributions to an unfunded defined benefit program G ≥ r. Nowadays, 
however, due to population aging, slow growth and a higher capital stock, economies may 
be approaching dynamically inefficiency, so  that the internal rate of return G ≤ r. 
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2.3. TYPES OF SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS, ‘BISMARKIAN FACTOR’ AND 
‘ACTUARIAL-BASIS’ 
According to historical foundations, we usually make a distinction between the ‘Beveridge’ 
and ‘Bismarck’ models of pension provision. A characteristic of the original ‘Beveridge’ 
model of pension provision is a flat benefit so that, if contributions are related to earnings, 
vertical intra-generational redistribution is achieved.  The primary aim of such programs is 
poverty prevention. In contrast, benefits in the ‘Bismarck’ model of pension provision are 
typically earnings-related, with the aim of income replacement in old age.  
Typically, however, nowadays pension programs offer some hybrid mixture of the two 
program types, with variation in the relative importance of the two components. Moreover, 
during later development since 1960, most of the Beveridge countries introduced earning-
related components, often being mandatory or quasi-mandatory funded ‘investment-based’ 
programs, usually privately managed.  Nowadays, most such countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, Canada and Asutralia, have some combination of private-public i.e. PAYG-funded 
mix, though this varies significantly across countries. 
Hence, we can formally characterise three broad types of social security intervention:  
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A Bismarck-type program  
The Bismarkian system is characterised by an earnings-related system i.e. a close link 
between contributions and benefits. Hence the pension benefit in a Bismarck type of 
program is: 
?   
 IJ 
where IJ  is the internal rate of return on the social security program as in Aaron (explained 
in the previous sub-section) equal for everybody in the system, regardless of the wage level 
during working history;  is the pension contribution and  is the wage.  
A Beveridge-type program  
The original Beveridge type of program aimed at poverty prevention, hence the benefit is 
flat and the program has within-generation redistributive features: 
?K   
 I 
In this program the benefit ?K is equal for everyone in the system, regardless of the wage 
level during the working history, hence the internal rate I is not the same and varies across 
the income distribution – higher for those with lower wages, and lower for those with higher 
wages. Concisely, this program is redistributive within a generation towards lower earners.  
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A Funded (‘investment-based’) type program  
A funded or ‘investment-based’ social security (as dubbed by Campbell and Feldstein, 2001) 
is an actuarially based system. One version of a mandatory funded program is considered 
here – defined contribution individual accounts program. With this type of program, 
employees pay contributions into individual accounts, contributions are accumulated and 
invested and earn market interest rate . 
?L   
  
Portfolio allocations for pension funds are generally restricted due to the need for safe 
investments where benefit levels are pre-committed, and these restrictions are more 
pronounced in developing countries where quantitative limits are in place3. In the case of 
quantitative limits, the returns on pension fund assets L may be lower than the market 
interest rate. It follows that the pension benefit is: 
?L   
 L    where     L   
The  ‘Bismarckian’ factor and actuarial-basis  
The distinction of Beveridge and Bismarck models is not clear-cut in modern pension 
systems. The ‘Bismarckian factor’, first introduced by Cremer and Pestieau (1998) and 
developed in successive papers (Cremer and Pestieau, 2000 and 2003; Pestieau, 1999), as 

The reasons for quantitative limits are explained in World Bank (2000), ‘Portfolio limits: pension investment 
restrictions compromise fund performance’, Pension Reform Primer briefing 
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well as by Casamatta et al. (2000) and used by Disney (2004), is therefore useful for 
analytical analysis.  
Cremer and Pestieau (1998) introduced a benefit formula for a social security system with a 
combination of Bismarck and Beveridge features: 
?  ?K 
 MH 
where ? is pension benefit coming from the public (social security) system; ?K is basic social 
benefit (flat component) and the parameter M is the ‘Bismarckian factor’.  
Here the terms Beveridge and Bismarck are used by reference to the benefit rule. A 
Bismarckian scheme is one where the link between individual contributions and benefits is 
tight, while the Beveridgian scheme builds in a degree of deliberate redistribution across 
individuals by income level. The higher the M, benefit is more closely linked to contributions 
and the system is less redistributive (i.e. more Bismarckian)4. When M  , the pension 
system is purely Bismarckian. As noted in Pestieau (1999:7), the Bismarckian factor is the 
‘fraction of pension benefit that is related to contributions’. When M  , it means that 
pension benefit is flat and the system is purely Beveridgean.  
In subsequent papers, starting from Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2000a), the pension 
benefit formula was rewritten as:  
?    M 
 +HN 
 M 
 +H 

4
 In their paper, Cremer and Pestieau use different notation for the Bismarckian factor (O) 
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or      ?   
 +  MHN 
 MH 
where +  is population growth, HN  is average wage, H is individual wage; so with a pure 
Bismarckian type of system (M  ) the implicit rate of return of social security is  
 + 
while where M ;  , the implicit rate of return equals  
 +  M PNP + M 
Similarly, Disney (2004) following Lindbeck and Persson’s (2003) notation for the internal 
rate of return (I), defines benefit as: 
?    M?K 
 M 
 IH
Disney (2004, 2006b) refers to the Bismarckian component i.e. to the tight link between 
contributions and benefits, as ‘actuarial fairness’. An actuarially fair programme would 
match individual entitlements exactly to lifetime earnings (Disney, 2004). Hence, the closer 
is M  to 1, the system is more ‘actuarially fair’.  
The term ‘actuarial fairness’ is not consistently used in the literature. As noted in Lindbeck 
and Persson’s (2003: 75) who use the term in the same manner as Disney, ‘the notion of 
actuarial fairness appears under different guises in the literature’ – Kotlikoff (1996, 1998) 
uses the term ‘degree of linkage,’ while Fenge (1995) uses the term ‘intragenerationally 
fair.’ 
Queisser and Whitehouse (2006) and Abatemarco (2006) define actuarial fairness as the 
requirement that the present value of lifetime contributions equals the present value of 
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lifetime benefits. This is equivalent to the term ‘actuarial-based’ defined in Disney (2006b: 
271), which includes the two aspects of a pension programme. First, the requirement that 
an individual’s contributions are exactly matched to his or her pension benefits – the 
‘actuarial fairness’ as in Disney (2004, 2006b) and Lindbeck and Persson (2003), or more 
precisely, ‘within-generation actuarial fairness’ (Disney, 2004: 271). The second 
requirement is that a generation retiring at a particular period earns a return on 
contributions at least as high as some international risk-free rate of interest r.  
Consequently, there are few possible departures from actuarial-basis. Firstly, if the rate of 
return of the PAYG system is lower than the market interest rate r, there is a departure 
from actuarial basis, which Fenge and Werding (2003) call an implicit tax from the PAYG 
financing. Disney (2004, 2006b) calls the departure from intergenerational equity 
(‘intergenerational redistribution’ in Abatemarco, 2006) if there are different rates of return 
across generations5. Secondly, there is an intragenerational or within-generation departure 
from the actuarial fairness or intragenerational (within generation) redistribution (Disney, 
2004; 2006b).  
  

5
  According to Disney (2006), intergenerational equity is achieved when each generation receives the long-
rung sustainable return to contributions. 
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3. THE EFFECT OF MANDATORY PENSION PROGRAMMES ON 
HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS 
Let us consider a simple two-period OLG model with these different forms of pension 
provision. Individuals in this economy live for two periods (period  and period ), working 
in the first period when they are Young (Y) and being retired in the second when they are 
Old (O). In period  agents/households work and save (the Young); in period , they 
consume what they saved in period  (the Old). Every household is assumed to live for only 
two periods at every period there is an overlapping generation of one young and one old 
cohort of agents. Agents are forward looking and rational, there is no myopia in the model.  
The aim is to analyse saving of generation born in the period 1, in the presence of a 
mandatory public-private (PAYG-funded) mixed pension system, and to see how each 
component affects individual saving decisions.   
First period consumption is: 
	3   
     Q	3  R	3 
where  is the payroll tax (used to finance the PAYG system) and Q is the contribution into 
the funded system (mandatory individual saving account); R	3 is other forms of voluntary 
saving. 
 Consumption in the second period is: 
6   
  
     Q	3  	3 
 ? 
 ?L  (II-10)
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where                            ?  M 
 IJ	3 
   M?K                       (II-11)   
is the ‘pension benefit’ stemming from the public pension system (PAYG). The pension 
benefit captures the design of the public pension system – the first component is the 
earnings related component of the pension; the second component is the flat benefit, 
redistributive component. The first component is weighted with Bismarckian factor M and 
the second by   M. In the case of a pension program which is completely earnings 
related (Bismark), M  ; hence total pension benefit is related to earnings history  
 
 IJ	3; if the system is only redistributive and is not related to earnings (Beveridge), 
M    and everyone gets the same flat benefit ?K. 
The pension benefit from the funded component is: 
?L   
 Q	3   (II-12)
or in case of investment restrictions:   
 ?L   
 LQ	3                (II-13) 
            where L   
Substituting (II-11) and    (II-12) into second period consumption  (II-10), 
and rearranging we get: 
6  S
	3 TT 	#>U	VJ	#  TT	3W 
  
   M?K 
(II-14) 
The term 
	#>U	VJ
	#   is what Disney (2004: 282; 2005: 7) calls the effective ‘tax 
component’ or the ‘effective tax rate’ in Lindbeck and Persson (2003: 79). The ‘tax 
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component’ of contributions is the difference between the return on saving and the ‘return’ 
on social security contributions (Disney, 2005: 7). It arises from departures from both 
actuarial fairness   M and intergenerational equity IJ  ). The higher the degree of 
the earnings related component in the PAYG system (M closer to ) and the closer IJ  to 4 
the lower is the effective tax component. 
I now develop the model in the case of the risk-aversion logarithmic utility function. Using 
the Euler equation for the logarithmic utility function 6   
 	3  we get: 
S 
	3 T T  
   M 
 IJ 
  T  T	3W 
  
   M?K
  
  
     Q	3  R	3 
and substituting for 	3: 
R	3   
     Q	
3   
 M  
 IJ 
  	3   
  
    M?K   
 Q	3 
   
                                                                                                             (II-15) 
Rearranging, other forms of voluntary household savings are equal to:  
R	3  -.	>/(
X>	U(YZN(Y[/(X>(Y\(Y[	>UCK>L/(X  
  (II-16) 
Equation (II-16) predicts no change in the amount of household saving with the 
introduction of a funded pension system, as there is a displacement of other forms of 
voluntary savings.  
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However, in case of restricted investments (quantitative restriction), which earn a lower 
return than the market rate of return, displacement is lower: 
R	3  -.	>/(
X>	U(YZN(Y[/(X>(Y\(Y[	>UCK>]		 (Y[^(Y[ _L/(X  
(II-17) 
Since L  , the term in brackets  
  
   	#^	#  in equation  – logarithmic case 
where the pension fund has quantitative restrictions, is lower than the equivalent term 
 
  in the logarithmic case where the pension fund has a free choice of investment 
portfolio (equation II-16).  
Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that displacement is not going to be exactly one-
for-one – this is due to borrowing constraints, induced retirement and/or recognition 
effects.  
In the case of imperfect capital markets (borrowing constraints), the private 
saving/consumption decision could be suboptimal, thus saving displacement does not 
necessarily need to be ‘one for one’.  It means that some households are forced to save 
more than they would without the interference of the state that mandated funded saving 
program, while at the same time households cannot borrow to restore consumption fully to 
its optimal level in the first period.  
Another reason why displacement of saving does not have to be ‘one-for-one’ is induced 
retirement. Feldstein (1974) argued that, beside the negative impact that public pensions 
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have on personal saving, there is also a positive effect – social security might contain 
incentives that would induce individuals to retire earlier than otherwise, leading to a larger 
pool of wealth to draw upon in earlier retirement and therefore to higher lifetime savings. 
This ‘induced retirement effect’ could increase personal savings according to Feldstein. In 
addition, Sheshinski (1978) argues that social security benefits may have a very pronounced 
effect in inducing earlier retirement - a replacement ratio of twenty percent reduces the 
retirement age by more than fifty percent relative to retirement in the absence of social 
security. 
Likewise, Munell (1982: 70) argues that private pensions may also stimulate aggregate 
saving. This additional saving could stimulate people to retire early, i.e. they would not mind 
higher saving than is optimal since this provides the opportunity for early retirement. This 
would naturally hold only if the private pension retirement age were flexible.  
Another reason against one-for-one saving displacement is the ‘recognition effect’. The 
development of funded pension schemes might raise awareness among the general 
population of the need to save for retirement (Baillu and Reisen, 1997). Cagan (1965) 
analyzed the saving behaviour in 1958-59 of over 15,000 members of the Consumers Union 
and found that private pensions are not substituted for other forms of saving i.e. that 
actually pension saving represents a net addition to personal saving. He explains this effect 
by a term he dubbed the ‘recognition effect’. That is, the individual ‘recognizes that a 
reasonable degree of financial independence in retirement is attainable for him when a 
pension program is made applicable to him in addition to his social security income 
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prospects. At this point, his motivation to save on his own to increase the adequacy of his 
retirement income is stimulated by the realization that such a goal is within his grasp’ 
(Murray, 1968: 58 as in Cagan, 1965). 
Due to all of these reasons, I introduce a displacement coefficient into the analysis, where I 
assume ` a , and if `   displacement is one-for-one. In that case, other forms of 
voluntary savings are: 
R	3  -.	>/(X>	U
(YZN(Y[/(X>(Y\(Y[	>UCK>bL/(X  
 (II-18)    
Equation (II-18) therefore demonstrates the effect of overall pension system design on the 
other forms of voluntary household savings in the logarithmic case.  
Now let us see the effect on total household saving:  
	3  -.	>/(X>	U
(YZN(Y[/(X>(Y\(Y[	>UCK>bL/(X  + Q	3 
Substituting for ?K, which can also be expressed as a return to the contributions (internal rate of 
return G that varies across different type of earners), and rearranging, we get saving as a share 
of income to equal to: 
c(X/(X  = 
{ 
 -./(X –  
 MT 		VJ	# 
   M 		V	#  
  
   `Q} 
(II-19) 
and in the case of the restrictive investment policy on pension funds: 
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c(X/(X  =  
 { 
 A  –  
 MT  		VJ	# 
   M 		V	#  
 e 
  
   	#^	# f  
`Q} 
(II-20) 
where 
&c(Xg/(X&  <0, &c(Xg/(X&VJ <0, &c(Xg/(X&V <0, &c(Xg/(X&	>U  		# IK  I>0,  
&c(Xg/(X&L   >0, &c(Xg/(X&b   <0 
These partial derivatives suggest that household saving as a share of income is negatively 
affected by the size of the PAYG public pension system – the higher the payroll tax for financing 
it, the lower the savings.  
Moreover, household saving also depends on the design of public pension system. In particular, 
the closer is IJ  (the internal rate of return from the earnings related component) to the market 
interest rate, implying the public pension system more closely mimics the private pension 
programmes, the lower is the savings ratio. Conversely, lower the IJ  i.e. higher the ‘implicit tax’, 
the higher is savings ratio.  
Similarly, the more generous the redistributive component of pension system (the higher the 
I), the lower the saving ratio.  
54 

The effect of ‘intragenerational redistribution’   M is not straightforward. The partial 
coefficient 
&c(Xg/(X&	>U  		# IJ  I is positive if the internal rate of return in a redistributive 
‘Beveridge’ system (I) is higher than it would be in a Bismarckian system (IJ), which is the 
case for average and high-income earners. For low-income earners, the internal rate of 
return in a Beveridge system is higher than it would be in a Bismarckian system for the given 
overall generosity – the replacement rates for earners below average are typically higher 
than for average earners. Concisely, in systems closer to ‘Beveridge’ i.e.   M ) closer to 
one, lower-income earners have less incentive to save and average and high-income 
workers more than they would have in a non-redistributive ‘Bismarck-style’ programme. 
Since higher-income earners are generally higher savers, and usually most of private saving 
is done by them (see Blinder, 1975; Diamond and Hausman, 1984; Bosworth et al., 1991; 
Bernheim and Scholz, 1993; Hubbard et al., 1995; Dynan et al., 2004, etc.), one may expect 
the overall positive effect of ‘intragenerational redistribution’ on private saving.  
When it comes to a mandatory funded programme, the effect of this component on private 
saving is positive, but the magnitude depends on the displacement coefficient – the higher 
the displacement coefficient, the lower the effect of a funded programme and vice versa. In 
the case of restricted pension fund investment policies, displacement is reduced.  
The overall impact of pension programmes on household saving amended for the effect on 
government and national saving is summarised in Table II-1. First row illustrates the effect 
of ‘Beveridge-type’ system on different income groups and in total – positive effect for 
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higher-income earners and negative for lower-income earners. Overall, the effect is 
ambiguous but more likely positive, since higher-income earners are usually higher savers.  
Second row shows negative effect of ‘Bismarck-type’ of pension programmer for each 
earning group and hence overall, while the effect of mandatory funded programme (row 
three) is different regarding liquidity constraints. With tight liquidity constraints overall 
effect is positive, while with no constraints effect is ambiguous.  
	


 Household saving 
 Low 
income-
earner 
High 
income-
earner 
Total 
    
PAYG-Beveridge – + +/– 
    
    
PAYG-Bismarck – – – 
    
    
Funded-Mandatory     
Tight liquidity constraints + 0 + 
No liquidity constraints +/– +/– +/– 
    
        
Source: Table is amended version of Bailliu and Reisen (1997) table by further including impact of PAYG-Beverigde system  
Note: (+) positive effect; (-) negative effect;  (+/–) ambiguous effect; (0=) no effect on savings.  
  
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4. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
To illustrate the effect of various mandatory pension components on the household saving 
rate, this subsection presents some numerical examples for ‘reasonable’ parameter values. 
Table II-2 first presents a general example of a two period economy with no social security 
system. In that case, with the assumption of 5% market interest rate and 4% discount rate, 
the saving ratio is 49%, indicating how a representative individual will divide his/her first 
period earning for two periods.  
Table II-2 Saving ratio with and without social security (baseline case) 
General parameters   
Market interest rate    hi 
Discount rate    hj 
Saving ratio (without social security)  0.4901 
Baseline parameters (for average worker)   
Bismarckian factor  M  hk 
Internal rate of return in earnings-related scheme   IJ  hj 
Internal rate of return in redistributive scheme  I  hi 
Payroll tax    hl 
Contributions to funded DC account  Q  hi 
Interest rate in funded DC scheme  L  hji 
Displacement coefficient  `  h7 
Saving ratio (with social security)  0.3480 
When a social security system is introduced, the saving ratio decreases significantly. For a 
baseline pension system with various assumed parameters, the first period saving ratio falls 
to 35% or first period earnings.  
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I justify these pension parameters as follows. This baseline pension system is a hypothetical 
system similar to Sweden - with a 16% contribution rate for the PAYG component of the 
program, and a 2.5% contribution for the mandatory individual account component. The 
rate of return on the mandatory funded component is assumed to be slightly lower then 
market interest rate, due to a conservative investment policies of pension funds. Taking a 
crude average from the coefficients found in the literature, the displacement coefficient is 
assumed to be 0.36. In other words, an increase of one dollar in the mandatory funded 
component reduces other assets by 30%. The general parameters – interest and discount 
rate – are fixed to 5% and 4% throughout all numerical examples. For simplicity, there is no 
initial wealth.  
Let us first consider the negative effect of the contribution rate on the saving ratio, as 
predicted by the model in equations II-20, i.e. other parameters are fixed for the baseline 
case, while the contribution rate varies.  
 
 

6
The literature looking both at PAYG and funded pension programmes found various displacement 
coefficients. For example, Feldstein (1974), using annual time series US data for social security wealth for the 
period 1929–1971, finds that social security depresses personal saving by 30-50 percent per dollar of benefit, 
depending on specification. The estimates in Hubbard (1986) and Dicks-Mireaux and King (1984) are between 
0.15 and 0.40. Kohl and O`Brien (1998) provide a survey of the effects of tax-favoured saving accounts 
(henceforth TFSA) on private savings, concluding that TFSA increased net private saving by 20 to 25 percent of 
total amount placed in a TFSA. Samwick (2003) concludes that the coefficient of displacement found in the 
literature ranges between 0.2 and 0.5. Hurd et al. (2009) combine cross-country and within-country variation 
exploiting survey data for a few countries. They estimate the effect of pension system on financial wealth and 
suggest a displacement effect of roughly 25 to 45 percent.  

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Figure II-1 Saving ratio for various contribution rates 
 
Figure II-1 presents how the level of the contribution rate significantly affects the saving 
ratio – with a contribution rate of 22%, the saving ratio is as low as 28.9% of the first period 
income, with the ‘baseline’ 16% saving ratio around 35%, while in the case of a 10% 
contribution rate, the saving ratio increases significantly to almost 41% of the first period 
income. 
Let us now consider the impact of the IRR of the earnings-related component (IJ) on the 
saving ratio. Figure II-2 shows a negative relationship – the higher the IRR, the lower the 
saving ratio and vice versa. In other words, the more closely the public earnings-related 
system mimics a private retirement saving account, the lower the household saving ratio. 
However, the magnitude of the impact is rather small compared to contribution rate - with 
a 3.5 percentage points decrease in the IRR, the increase in the saving ratio is only 0.2 
percentage points.  
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Figure II-2 Saving ratio for different internal rates of return 

 
Furthermore, if we take into account that the IRR is in part a function of the contribution 
rate, then the impact of the lower IRR is completely annulled by the increase in the 
contribution rate. For example, if we imagine the time path of a newly introduced generous 
pension system over several decades, we can expect this system to have high IRRs in the 
first decades. However, as the system matures, higher contributions are needed to finance 
benefits, and therefore with the course of time, as contribution rates increase, the IRR 
declines.  
Table II-3 Saving ratio for different values of IRR and contribution rates when IRR is a 
function of contribution rate 
Saving ratio 0.4076 0.3881 0.3685 0.3490 0.3196 0.2903 
IJ   0.0645 0.0538 0.0461 0.0403 0.0340 0.0293 
 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.22 
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shows the case where the IRR is a negative function of the contribution rate, so 
that the IRR is decreasing as the contribution rate is increasing. The overall effect is a 
significant decline in saving ratio.  
Now let us consider variations in the Bismarckian factor. Table II-4 presents the values of 
the saving ratio for different combinations of the Bismarckian factor coupled with different 
internal rates of return in an earnings-related scheme.  
Table II-4 Saving ratio for different values of IRR and contribution rates when IRR is a 
function of contribution rate 
m 1 0.85 0.7 0.55 0.4 0.2 
IJ  h 0.3499 0.3500 0.3501 0.3501 0.3502 0.3503 
IJ  hj 0.3484 0.3487 0.3490 0.3492 0.3495 0.3499 
Figure II-3 Saving ratio for different values of the Bismarckian factor and IRR in an 
earnings related scheme 
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The higher the Bismarckian factor, the lower the saving ratio. This effect is more 
pronounced for schemes that mimic more closely the private retirement saving programme 
(higher Gbar), though in general is very small.  
Examining the effect of internal rates of return from the redistributive component, we can 
see from Table II-5 that saving is lower for low-income earners, since the system is more 
generous for them, while the saving ratio is higher for richer workers. This effect is more 
pronounced as the system is closer to a ’pure’Beveridge type (alpha closer to zero).   
Table II-5 The saving ratio in a redistributive programme, different types of workers 
(earnings level)  
Earnings to  
average 
30% 50% 67% 100% 150% 200% 
n 0.047 0.043 0.030 0.020 0.005 -0.005 
Baseline system 0.3311 0.3312 0.3315 0.3317 0.3321 0.3323 
M  4   hl 0.3307 0.3310 0.3321 0.3328 0.3340 0.3348 
M  4   h 0.3906 0.3908 0.3915 0.3920 0.3927 0.3932 
Figure II-4 Saving ratios for different types of workers (various pension systems) 
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Nonetheless, the crucial effect comes from the fact that a Beveridge type of pension 
programme is typically characterised by lower contribution rates, meaning that the 
contribution rate is a function of alpha. Considering that, we can see that the overall effect 
of ‘intragenerational redistribution’ is quite signficant (Table II-6).  
Table II-6 Saving ratio for different values of alpha when contribution rate is a function of 
alpha 
Saving ratio 0.3086 0.3387 0.3688 0.3987 0.4286 0.4682 
M 1 0.85 0.7 0.55 0.4 0.2 
  QM 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.04 
Assuming the contribution rate is a positive direct proportional function of the ‘Bismarckian 
factor’, with a constant 0.2 representing a 20% contribution rate needed to finance a pure 
earnings-related system7, i.e. t=0.2xalpha, the saving ratio increases from around 31% in a 
‘Bismarck-style’ programme, to almost 47% in a highly redistributive ‘Beveridge-style’ 
programme.  
Finally, consider the effect of the mandatory funded saving component on the saving ratio. 
Figure II-5 presents saving ratios for different levels of contribution rates into a funded 
system coupled with various displacement coefficients  	 
    
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7
 Generious system paying approximately 70% net replacement rate 
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Figure II-5 Effect of funded scheme on saving ratio, baseline 2.5% contributions 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between a pension system and household saving has been a subject of 
debate for a long time. In this Chapter, I analysed the relationship analytically, using the 
two-period two-generation partial equilibrium household sector Samuelson-type of OLG 
model, set in logarithmic form. The model is augmented by design of the public pension 
system as in Lindbeck and Persson (2003) and Disney (2005; 2006a) and by the mandatory 
funded pension programme. Thereby, I analysed two types of offsets from household saving 
– induced by public pensions, and induced by mandatory saving programmes. 
The model predicts that household saving as a share of income is unambiguously negatively 
affected by the size of the PAYG public pension system – the higher the payroll tax for 
financing it, the lower the savings. Household saving also depends on design of a public 
0.300
0.320
0.340
0.360
0.380
0.400
0.420
0.440
0 2.5 4 6 8 10
sa
vi
n
g 
ra
ti
o
contribution rate to funded scheme
no displacement 
50% displacement
30% displacement 
one-for one
64 

pension system. In particular, the closer is the internal rate of return from the earnings 
related component to the market interest rate, implying that the public pension system 
more closely mimics private pension programmes, the lower is the savings ratio. 
Furthermore, the higher the ‘intragenerational redistribution’ in the system, the system is 
on average expected to have a positive effect on household saving. When it comes to a 
mandatory funded programme, the effect of this component on private saving is expected 
to be positive, but the magnitude depends on the displacement coefficient – the higher the 
displacement coefficient, the lower the effect of a funded programme and vice versa. In the 
case of restricted pension fund investment policies, displacement is reduced.  
I illustrated the model predictions with numerical simulations, using ‘reasonable’ general 
parameters – a 5% market interest rate and 4% discount rate. For the baseline scenario the 
contribution rate for the PAYG programme is set at 16% of gross wage; the contribution rate 
for the mandatory individual account component to 2.5%, with the rate of return slightly 
lower than the market interest rate (due to conservative investment policies of pension 
funds), and displacement coefficient of 0.3.  
Varying the level of the contribution rate for the PAYG programme, simulations show the 
significant effect of the scale of the PAYG system on the saving ratio – with a contribution 
rate of 22%, the saving ratio is as low as 27% compared to 33% with the ‘baseline’ 
contribution rate and a 49% saving ratio in the case where the PAYG system does not existl.  
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Variations of the internal rate of return in the earnings related component show that the 
magnitude of the impact is actually rather small compared to contribution rate – with a 3.5 
percentage point decrease in the IRR, the increase in the saving ratio is only 0.2 percentage 
points. When it comes to ‘intragenerational redistribution’, simulations again show a very 
small effect – for example, in a highly redistributive system (with the ‘Bismarckian factor’ 
0.2), the saving ratio is only 0.0015 percentage points higher than it would be in the purely 
earning-related system that provides the IRR of 4% to its beneficiaries. Nonetheless, 
assuming the contribution rate is a positive direct proportional function of the ‘Bismarckian 
factor’, the effect of ‘intragenerational redistribution’ becomes significant – the saving ratio 
increases from around 31% in a ‘Bismarck-style’ programme, to almost 47% in a highly 
redistributive ‘Beveridge-style’ programme.   
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III PENSION SYSTEM DESIGN: MEASUREMENT 
AND CONVERGENCE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The foundations of pension systems across the world were laid from the end of the 19th 
century until the beginning of World War II. The onset of pension system development is 
usually considered to be 1889, when Germany`s Chancellor Bismarck established a pension 
scheme for industrial workers, with the aim to provide income maintenance. At the same 
time, in 1891 Denmark and, a few years later, New Zealand introduced pension schemes 
with the aim to alleviate poverty across the whole old-age population. Other countries 
followed one of these two approaches. The German system was very influential in 
continental Europe, while the ‘New Zealand approach’ was dominant in the Anglo-American 
world, apart from the US at the very beginning.  
Countries that chose the ‘assistance’ approach initially set the systems as means-tested 
benefits financed from taxation, but later changed them into universal basic pensions. 
Countries that chose the ‘insurance’ approach had different trajectories – some originally 
set their systems as they are nowadays, such as Germany and then the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, while a few – Belgium, France, Italy and Spain, originally introduced subsidised 
voluntary systems that later took the form of public mandatory systems (Gordon, 1988; 
Overbye, 1996). A few countries, such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland, deliberated 
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between two approaches, while those that introduced pension systems later – such as 
Japan, the US and Switzerland – used a ‘hybrid’ approach.  
Table III-1 Development of original model of pension policy 
 Beveridge origin Bismarckian origin 
Means-tested 
Basic scheme 
Subsidised 
voluntary 
contribution 
schemes 
Compulsory old-age 
contribution schemes 
Contribution 
based 
Universal Workers 
Whole 
population 
1
st
 w
a
v
e
 
 
O
ri
gi
n
s 
Denmark 1891 
 New Z. 1898 
Australia 1908 
UK 1908 
Ireland 1908 
  Belgium 
 France 
 Italy 
Spain 
Switzerland 
 
Germany 1898  
Austro-Hungarian 
Empire 1906 
 
 
u
n
ti
l W
W
II
 
 
Sweden 1913 
Canada 1927  
Norway 1936 
USA 1936 
  
 
New Zealand 
1938 
 
 
France 1910 
Netherlan. 1913 
 Greece 
Italy 1919 
Spain 1919 
Belgium 1924 
 
Sweden 1913 
USA 1936 
Finland 1937  
 
2
n
d
 w
a
v
e
 
 
 
 
 
UK 1942 
Ireland 1961 
Japan 1954 
Sweden 1946 
Nether.1946(56) 
Canada 1951 
Denmark 1956 
Norway 1956 
Finland 1957 
   
 
Japan 1942 
 
 
Switzerland 
1946 
Source: Amended version of table in Overbye (1996:4). 
As a result, countries were grouped into two distinct clusters: countries with a ‘Bismarck 
pension model’, characterised with a low degree of ‘intragenerational redistribution’, a 
larger size of the public pension system, and a smaller fraction of private pensions, vs. 
countries with a ‘Beveridge pension model’, characterised by universal (or means-tested), 
tax-financed, flat rate pension provision and ‘typically accompanied by substantial private 
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funded provision of retirement benefits’ (Disney, 2004: 286).8 Table III-2 presents 
classification of pension systems as Bismarck and Beveridge according to the original model 
of pension policy – the one that prevailed in the last part of the long period of pension 
system foundation, the end of the 1950s.  
Table III-2 Original model of pension policy  
Bismarck Beveridge 
Germany (1889) 
Austria (1906) 
Italy (1919) 
France (1931) 
Belgium (1926) 
US *(1936) 
Japan* (1942 
Greece 
Luxembourg 
Portugal 
Spain (1919) 
Denmark  (1891) 
New Zealand (1898) 
UK (1908) 
Sweden (1913) 
Norway (1936) 
Ireland (1908) 
Australia (1908) 
Canada (1927) 
Switzerland* (1948) 
Finland (1956) 
Netherlands (1946) 
SOURCE: Supplemented version of Table ? in Bonoli (2000: 11). 
* Hybrid/mixed system.  
NOTE: In the brackets is the year when the first nation-wide compulsory system was introduced. 
Since the end of the 1950s the process of institutional convergence in pension programmes 
began. Bismarckian countries that started out with contribution-based income-maintenance 

8
Although Sir William Beveridge produced a report which proposed a programme for social insurance for the 
UK no sooner than in 1942, still this type of pension system is dubbed after him. In addition, Beveridge argued 
for contributory financing, though nowadays the ‘Beveridge model’ usually refers to general taxation 
financing. 
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schemes limited to some groups of employees, extended coverage to other groups or 
introduced parallel schemes for various occupational groups, thereby providing most of the 
working population with earnings-related pensions (Overbye, 2006). Moreover, they all 
introduced some kind of minimum income provision (Gordon, 1988). 
Table III-3 Evolution of pension system toward two-tiers 
 
First tier – Poverty prevention 
Second tier – Income 
Replacement 
Minimum/ 
Means-
tested 
Basic 
PAYG Funded 
Tax-financed Contributory 
Bismarck 
Germany 
Belgium 
Austria 
France  
Italy 
Spain 
Portugal 
1968 
 
 
1956 
1968 
 
 
  1957 
1953 
 
1945  
1952 
 
1889 
1924 (1900*) 
1906 
1910 (1850*) 
1919 (1898*) 
1919 (1909*) 
Bismarck hybrid 
USA 
Japan 
   1936  
 
 
Beveridge – early birds 
 Sweden 
Finland 
Canada 
Norway 
1913** 
 
1927 
1935 
1946  
1956  
1951  
1956  
1936  
 
 
 
1959  
1961  
1965  
1966 
 
1937 - 1945 
Beveridge – latecomers 
Australia 
Demark 
UK 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
 
1908  
1891 
1908 
   
 
1965 (1970) 
 
 
 
 
 
1946  
1946 (1956) 
 
 
 
1975 (1959) 
 
1946 
1986  
1991 (1964)  
1975  
1947 CA-OP 
1985 
Beveridge – ‘no top-up’ 
New Zealand 
Ireland 
1898 
1908 
1938  
1946 
   
* Voluntary subsidised systems. 
** Abolished scheme. 
NOTE: OP-occupational pension; CA- collective agreements. 
Source: Hinrichs (2000), Ebbinghaus and Gronwald (2009). 
70 

On the other side, most of the ‘Beveridge countries’ introduced earning-related systems 
since 1960. ‘Early birds’ introduced the public unfunded (PAYG) tier by the late 1960s. 
‘Latecomers’ did not introduce the earnings-related system until the early 1970s, and they 
used various solutions – occupational schemes mandated by the law in Switzerland and 
Australia, occupational schemes via collective agreements in Denmark and the Netherlands, 
and the unique opt-out scheme in the UK. There are only two countries – Ireland and New 
Zealand, where no comparable topping up occurred (Hinrichs, 2000), and even New Zealand 
is recently taking again some steps toward earning-related system introducing the 
‘KiwiSaver’ – voluntary retirement saving scheme with automatic enrolment.  
The result of these processes has been convergence toward a two-tiered pension system  
(Table III-3), in which the basic pension aims at guaranteeing a subsistence level to the 
whole population, while the second tier allows retirees to maintain a living standard close 
to the one they had while working (Bonoli, 2000; Overbye, 1996; Gordon, 1988). 
By the 1980s, increased generosity of pension systems coupled with economic crises 
brought about huge pension deficits (OECD, 1985). There has also been increasing 
recognition of the aging population impact for fiscal, economic and social policies (OECD, 
2003). Consequently, the focus of pension policy makers moved towards a policy of 
retrenchment, which includes targeting universal benefits, tightening the link between 
contributions and benefits, raising the retirement age, and increased need for private 
pensions to fill the income gap (Myles and Quandano, 1997; Hinrichs, 2000).  
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As a result, the design of pension systems across OECD countries has been changing toward 
three-tiered pension systems (Gordon, 1988). Indeed, ‘most countries nowadays either have 
or are evolving toward retirement income systems that contain three basic elements’: i) 
minimum income provision, (ii) mandatory earnings-related component, (iii) supplementary 
pension programmes on a voluntary basis (Thompson, 2006:235). 
These developments, together with the process of Open Method of Coordination within EU 
social protection policy, can be viewed as an instrument toward convergence to a unique 
EU pension model, dubbed ‘contingent convergence’ by Hemerijck (2006: 18). Furthermore, 
the process of globalisation, which allowed governments to increasingly seek to learn from 
international experience, and public policy ideas have been more easily disseminated across 
national boundaries - a process that has been termed ‘policy transfer’ by Banks, et. al. 
(2005), has been additional reason to expect convergence in pension policies.  
Consequently, Overbye (1996:149) argues that there has been convergence in ‘pension 
policy outcomes’ – i.e. towards pension systems that ‘provide roughly similar groups of 
citizens with roughly similar benefits’. Johnson (1999) searched for the evidence of 
convergence in outcomes and found it for high-income earners, but not for average and 
lower-income earners. He suggests that pension systems may have converged along other 
dimensions – for example, through encouragement of private pension provision, or an 
increase in the normal retirement age – but not by average earner entitlement.  
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Bonoli (2000:13) points out that convergence occurred mainly with regard to the ‘functions 
of pension policy’ – poverty prevention and income maintenance. When the analysis shifts 
to details of various components of pension systems, he believes the variation across 
countries is impressive and that ‘the initial choice in terms of the Bismarck or the Beveridge 
model still affects the current shape of a pension system’. 
Myles and Pierson (2003) argue that pension policy is a ‘locus classicus for the study of 
path-dependent change’, because policy options are heavily influenced by the existing 
commitments and institutional designs inherited from the past. Similarly, Banks et al. (2005) 
believe that, despite common problems facing OECD countries, true convergence in 
retirement programmes is not realistic due to huge differences between countries in terms 
of initial conditions, demographics and labour markets.  
Hinrichs (2000: 366) sums up the literature stating that the answer to the question is that 
convergence is not straightforward and depends on the ‘criteria defined for convergence, 
which can either be structural design, the outcome, the instruments, or the goals’. 
Despite the presence of the ‘convergence hypothesis’, models of pensions – both 
theoretical (e.g. Pestieau, 1998; 1999) and Casamatta et al. (2000), and empirical (e.g. 
Disney, 2004) – still tend to classify pension systems into ‘Beveridge’ and ‘Bismarck’, 
according to their historical origins. The theoretical model in Chapter II suggested that these 
models would have different impacts on household saving. Therefore, prior to testing 
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whether this empirically holds, it is of importance to examine whether pension systems still 
classify in such a way or convergence in pension systems has occurred.  
The motivation to empirically test the design of pension systems in OECD countries, and to 
see whether they still classify in traditional Bismarck-Beveridge way or they converged due 
to the junction in pension policy goals and the process of ‘policy transfer’ is two-fold. Firstly, 
it is needed to further empirically test theoretical model from Chapter II. In addition, this 
question is of great importance for policy recommendations. In case of juncture in pension 
systems ‘one size fits all’ policy recommendations, which have been around since World 
Bank’s  1994 study, make much more sense compared to the situation where pension 
systems are still influenced by historical origins.  
To analyse pension system design and examine its impact on household behaviour we need 
some measurable indicators. There are various indicators of ‘pension system design’ 
measured in the literature, though there are no ready available datasets. Thus, the first 
question to pose is how can we measure these indicators on a consistent and time-varying 
basis?  
This chapter describes and measures various pension indicators and explains in detail what 
the pension indicators are, how they are calculated and what are the data sources. This set 
of indicators is later used in the empirical analysis of pension system design and saving.  
As the proposed indicators overlap and correlate, the second question is whether we can 
‘package’ these measures together? I have performed the factor and principal component 
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analysis and tried to identify commonalities on indicators in line with the typology of 
pension programmes – Beveridge vs. Bismarck. 
The empirical analysis is devoted to the central question of this chapter – to what extent 
historical differences are still evident between pension systems, or have pension models 
converged. To answer this question, I pose three sub-questions.  
Firstly, is there evidence that the development of ‘Bismarck’ programmes has ‘crowded out’ 
private pension plans? This is the same point as Disney (2000), but with somewhat more 
sophisticated indicators – using ‘Bismarck dummy’ variable as a proxy for Bismarck system 
instead of public pension expenditures, and including more control variables, such as 
financial liquidity. The second sub-question is ‘do countries still group as Bismarck and 
Beveridge’? I follow Bonoli (1997) using the two-dimensional approach to see if countries 
still group as Bismarck and Beveridge. Lastly, I test formally whether there is any empirical 
evidence that ‘convergence’ of pension models has happened in practice.  
Contribution of this chapter is comprehensive and careful data gathering, which highlights 
the problem of the quality of ‘pension data’, and makes the gaps in the provision of data in 
this field particularly apparent. Furthermore, I have tested empirically ‘convergence 
hypotheses’, using a comprehensive set of measures and a number of estimation methods. 
Findings of all three sub-sections unambiguously suggest that true convergence has not 
happened, and that pension models are still heavily influenced by their historical paths – 
Bismarck vs. Beveridge.  
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2. MEASURING PENSION SYSTEM DESIGN 
2.1. PENSION SYSTEM INDICATORS 
As the pension system has multiple objectives, there are a number of pension system 
indicators which might be used to measure different characteristics of pension programs. 
Pension indicators are complementary and should be looked at together for a better 
understanding of any pension system (EC, 2006).  
Pension indicators can be crudely divided into i) those that measure the relative living 
standard of pensioners, i.e. income replacement; ii) those designed to measure the absolute 
living standard of pensioners and poverty in old-age. Further, we can divide both groups of 
indicators into those measuring the design and those measuring the actual outcome. In 
addition, there is a set of indicators that measure the financial stance and stability of the 
pension system.  
Table III-4 summarise the most important goals of the pension system, parameters used to 
design the pension system, and the indicators used to measure the achievement of goals. 
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Table III-4 Goals, Parameters and Indicators of Pension System 
 
Goal 
(covered risk) 
Pension system 
parameters 
Measurement/Indicators 
Design Actual 
Poverty reduction/ 
Redistribution 
(earnings risk) 
Minimal benefit 
provision 
(flat/targeted/ 
minimum pension) 
Different accrual 
rates for different 
earnings levels 
Contribution/Benefi
t ceiling  
Minimal benefit/average 
earnings ratio 
Hypothetical replacement 
rate for low income 
earners (below  50% 
average) 
Coefficient of variation of 
hypothetical RR (higher 
than 0) 
Poverty and inequality 
indexes 
 
Coefficient of variation of 
actual RR 
Income maintenance 
(consumption 
smoothing mechanism)  
 
(longevity risk, myopia, 
time inconsistency, 
adverse selection) 
 
TRADITIONAL DB 
Valorisation 
Accrual rate 
POINT SYSTEM 
General point value 
General point 
indexation 
Hypothetical replacement 
rate 
 
Relative pension level 
 
Pension wealth 
Micro measures: 
Actual (individual) 
replacement rate 
Macro measures: 
Ratios of elderly to non-
elderly income 
 Ratio of economy-wide 
pension to wage 
 Aggregate replacement 
ratio  
Source: Table is an amended version of table in Fornero (2008).  
Various pension indicators can be found in the literature. For example, Disney and 
Whitehouse (2001) focus on alternative measurements of pensioners’ income and the 
extent to which pensioners are lifted out of poverty. A recent series of OECD publications 
called ‘Pensions at a Glance’ describe a number of pension indicators, including expected 
replacement rate (RR), pension wealth, a progressivity index, share of pension expenditures 
in GDP etc. The European Union’s Open Method of Coordination process has also 
formulated a set of so-called ‘indicators of the pension strand’, which include adequate 
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objective pension indicators, sustainable pension indicators and modernised pension 
indicators (EC, 2009c: 2). However, readily available cross-country datasets including 
historical data, which capture all these potential indicators, do not exist in any single source. 
In what follows, I list the set of indicators which will be used in my subsequent empirical 
analysis and explain how I have collected and constructed the data where appropriate.  
2.1.1. Replacement Rate  
The average replacement rate (RR) is the most commonly used indicator in pension 
analysis9. Nevertheless, despite the broad usage of the replacement rate, there is no single 
definition, and one can come across various ratios dubbed ‘the’ replacement rate. Mitchell 
and Phillips (2006: 1) point that ‘despite the myriad ways in which the replacement rate 
concept is used, there is no single commonly agreed-on definition of the term or exactly 
what it is intended to capture‘.  
What is usually referred to as the replacement rate (henceforth RR) is the ratio of the first 
post-retirement income to pre-retirement income10. Defined in such a way, this is a micro or 
individual measure of income maintenance.  

( ‘The number is a spiritual descendent of ‘life-cycle theory’, as it implicitly assumes that retirement 
consumption should be equated to some fraction of pre-retirement consumption (Mitchell and Moore, 1998: 
375). 
10
 Pre-retirement income may be defined as last salary prior to retirement, or individual lifetime-average 
earnings (re-valued in line with economy-wide earnings growth). With flat lifetime earners lifetime average re-
valued earnings and individual final earnings are identical.  
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In terms of the parameters of the pension system, the RR is a reflection of valorisation and 
accrual rate in the traditional defined benefit system, or value of general point and/or 
indexation of general point in a points-based system. In defined contribution systems, the 
RR reflects the product of the amount of contributions and yield on investments in case of 
funded DC, or the ‘balancing mechanism’ in NDC11.  
The RR can be calculated based on hypothetical or actual earnings. Hypothetical 
(theoretical) RRs reflect pension system design i.e. ‘measure the extent to which pension 
systems enable workers to preserve their previous living standard when moving from 
employment to retirement’ (EC, 2006:3). It be calculated as a current measure – showing 
the consequences of the design of the pension system for those retiring nowadays, or a 
prospective (expected) measure, explaining what the pension system is designed to provide 
to future pensioners. It is generally calculated for a hypothetical worker. The usual base 
case is a worker on average earnings with a full contribution record. Naturally, given the 
diversity of real-life situations, the base case is not representative for all workers and, in 
fact, very few may exhibit a profile that closely resembles the hypothetical worker. 
However, theoretical RRs allow us to analyse the design of the pension system and to 
compare pension systems across countries.  
A more realistic measure of old-age income replacement is the actual RR. Sources of data 
used for the calculation of the actual RR could be survey, as well as administrative data.  

11
 NDC is abbreviation for notional defined contribution system. For definitions of NDC, balancing mechanism 
and point system see the Glossary at the beginning of thesis.  
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As the interest of this chapter is in the design of a pension system rather than outcomes for 
specific workers, hypothetical replacement rates will be used henceforth. 
	
	

	
Over the past two decades, RRs were frequently used in the pension’s literature. However, 
it is still quite challenging to find a cross-country and time panel dataset of RRs.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, a few datasets were available. For example, a publication by 
the Commission of European Communities (1993) provided a ‘snapshot’ of RRs for member 
countries.  A dataset on 18-OECD countries for the period 1930-1985 was developed by the 
Swedish Institute for Social Research and used by Palme (1990) and Esping-Andersen 
(1990). 
Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) developed a more comprehensive dataset on OECD countries 
for the period 1961-1995. This dataset provides expected gross RRs at the age of 55 – how 
much those who started working aged 20 and were at the moment 55-years-old could 
expect to receive retiring at the standard retirement age in each country. The Blöndal and 
Scarpetta dataset provides four types of replacement rate – for single people and couples, 
and for average and low income (66% of average) earners. 
Recent data on hypothetical RRs are available from two main sources. One source is the 
European Commission (Social Protection Committee-Indicators Sub-Group), providing 
current as well as prospective RRs. The second source is the OECD Pensions at a Glance 
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publication, which provides only prospective RRs. There is one more source of data – the 
Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED), which presents both historical and 
current RRs, though for a limited number of countries. This dataset provides RRs for both 
singles and couples, but only for the average earning worker.  
The advantage of European Commission data is that it provides both current and 
prospective RRs, while OECD (Pensions at Glance) presents only future replacement rates. 
However, the EC dataset is limited only to EU countries and provides replacement rates only 
for two types of workers – singles at average and 67% of average earnings12, while the 
OECD data supply rich information with replacement rates for 5 different earnings levels. In 
addition, since 2009 the OECD’s Pension at a Glance provides RRs separately for public and 
private workers, and for mandatory and voluntary schemes.  
The methodologies for RR calculations are somewhat different for these two sources. In the 
EC calculation, working career is standardized to 40 years of service. OECD data, like Blondal 
and Scarpetta and CWED , calculate RRs for those who started working at the age of 20 until 
the standard retirement age, meaning that years of service varies according to the 
retirement age in each country.  
Both the EC and OECD data provide short time series data – EC for the 2000s and the OECD 
projected RRs for the 2050s. In that respect, the best-suited data is CWED, which is the 
longest time-series; nonetheless, this database covers only OECD-18 countries. 

12
 The 2009 EC report provides only RRs for the average earning worker 
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Further details on data sources and methodologies can be found in the Appendix to this 
thesis.  
	

	
	

Since there is no single panel data series on RR, there was a need to compile one for my 
research. Bearing in mind all the methodological differences between available sources, this 
was not a straightforward exercise. For example, in the cases of Blöndal and Scarpetta and 
the EC data, the career length of a hypothetical worker is different in the two calculations; 
hence the two series cannot be simply merged. Blöndal and Scarpeta and the OECD data 
methodologically correspond in that respect, but data for those retiring in the 2000s are 
missing as the OECD provides only the prospective RRs. Furthermore, errors and 
inconsistencies can be found both within the same source, as well as when comparing data 
from different sources.  
Taking into account the above explained sources and their methodological differences, as 
well as information about pension parameters across countries, I have constructed the RR 
panel time series presented in Table III-5. The table shows the gross current RR at the year 
of statutory retirement – usually 65 years, for those who started working at the age of 21. 
Since the statutory retirement age differs among countries, the length of career varies as 
well.  
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Table III-5 Current gross RR for OECD and EU-8: 1961-2050 
(Public PAYG pension, from 21 to retirement age)  

Source: Own compilation based on various sources (EC/SPC-ISG; B&S, Scruggs, APEX) 
a) Occupational schemes included (ARRCO & AGIRC) since they function as a public scheme – PAYG 
financed and managed by non-private entities. 
1961 1975 1985 1995 2005 2050
High-income OECD countries
Australia 12 20 23 24 23 ..
Canada 17 30 39 40 39 40
Japan 26 37 47 44 41 ..
New Zealand 18 26 32 39 38 39
Norway 16 52 51 51 52 52
Switzerland 19 37 36 36 36 36
United States 28 35 37 43 47 40
Average 19 34 38 40 39 41
EU-15
Austria 80 80 80 80 70 70
Belgium 60 50 56 54 39 40
Denmark 23 26 30 37 41 40
Finland 24 27 44 59 58 65
France
a)
40 50 58 65 65 50
Germany 60 55 55 50 44 40
Greece .. 78 98 117 108 95
Ireland 21 23 30 30 34 34
Italy 37 58 63 75 80 70
Luxembourg .. 79 85 91 90 90
Netherlands 20 31 33 31 33 30
Portugal 80 70 72 73 73 60
Spain .. 50 92 93 89 83
Sweden 40 60 65 63 53 38
United Kingdom
b)
20 24 22 20 17 17
EU-15 average 42 51 59 63 60 55
EU-10
Czech Republic .. .. .. 38 61 50
Estonia .. .. .. .. 36 23
Hungary .. .. .. 51 66 45
Latvia .. .. .. .. 55 ..
Lithuania .. .. .. .. 25 ..
Poland .. .. .. .. 63 30
Slovak Republic .. .. .. .. 50 24
Slovenia .. .. .. .. 64 40
Average .. .. .. 44.5 52.5 35.3
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Only public mandatory pensions – ‘social security programmes’ in US terminology – are 
included in this calculation of RRs. Private saving plans (mandated and/or occupational) are 
excluded, except for the French occupational scheme that is financed on a PAYG basis.  
The data in the table show the increasing trend in public RRs over the decades. RRs in EU-15 
countries have been always higher than in the rest of the high-income OECD countries. 
However, some reduction has been witnessed in the 2000s, and a further modest decline in 
The EU-15 is anticipated in the future, arising from current and prospective pension 
reforms. On the other hand, EU-8 countries have envisaged a radical drop in public pension 
benefits, which may be explained by the more radical World Bank reforms conducted in 
these countries during the 1990s.  
2.1.2. Pension Expenditures  
Pension expenditure expressed as a percent of GDP indicates the burden of current 
pensioners on the overall economy. This measure captures both the number of pensioners 
and the generosity of the system. Generosity reflects both the level of RR at retirement, as 
well as indexation of pensions in payment. The number of pensioners reflects demography, 
participation and employment rates in the previous decades, as well as policy measures 
such as the standard retirement age, early retirement possibilities etc.  
Long time series on pension expenditures are not readily available. Pension expenditures 
for EU-25 countries are available from EUROSTAT, but only from the start of the 1990s. ILO 
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used to produce the publication the 'Cost of Social Security' with data stemming from the 
1960s, but ceased a number of years ago.  
Data for OECD countries are available from the Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) 
stemming from the 1980s, while historical data can be found in the publication Social 
Expenditures 1960–1990: Problems of Growth and Control, OECD (1985). However, these 
two datasets cannot simply be merged because of somewhat different methodologies13.  
I have constructed a Public Old-Age Pension Expenditure14 panel dataset for the period 
1960–2010, using OECD SOCX data combined with OECD historical data. I have matched 
these two datasets cross-validating the matching with ILO data at the point where both 
series are available (1981). Since historical data are available for total pension aggregates, I 
estimated old-age pensions based on the trend of total pension aggregates. Where OECD 
historical data were not available, I have based the estimates on ILO data.  
The constructed data series are presented in Table III-6 and show an increasing trend in 
expenditure as a fraction of GDP in all countries until the 1990s, since when the share has 
remained stable. During the 1970s and 1980s, pension liabilities were growing only partly 
due to demographic reasons (Disney, 1999). Alongside with the increase of the elderly 
population, pension coverage was expanding while the benefits were increasing (OECD, 

13
 It seems that the major change relates to the public/private division of pension expenditure. Furthermore, 
historical data are available only for the total pension aggregate - they are not disaggregated according to old 
age, survivors and disability function. 
14
 This aggregate includes cash benefits for old-age pension, anticipated old-age pension, partial pension and 
early retirement (excluded are early retirement benefits for labour market reasons, which are classified under 
unemployment).  
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1985). In addition, unemployment in the 1970s, which initiated early-retirement policies, 
coupled with a decrease in the standard retirement age, brought about a huge increase in 
expenditures, which resulted in ‘retrenchment’ policies since the beginning of 1990s.  
Table III-6 Old-age public pension expenditures, % of GDP 
 
Source: Author`s compilation based on Social Expenditures 1960–1990: Problems of Growth and Control,  
OECD (1985), OECD SOCX database, ILO data. 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
H igh-in come OECD countrie s
Australia 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.7 3.1 2.9 2.8 3.4 3.6 3.2 3.2
Canada 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.5 3.9 4.3 3.9 3.8 3.8
Japan 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.9 3.8 4.0 5.1 6.1 7.2 7.2
Korea .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.6 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2
New Zealand 3.5 3.9 4.4 4.8 6.8 7.4 7.2 5.6 4.9 4.2 4.2
Norway 1.3 2.2 3.1 4.0 4.0 4.3 5.3 5.1 4.5 4.6 4.6
Switzerland 1.6 2.9 4.1 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.3 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.4
US 3.0 3.7 4.3 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.1 5.3 5.1 5.4 5.4
Average 2.0 2 .6 3.2 3.7 4.3 4.7 4 .3 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
EU-15
Austria 7.0 7.7 8.4 9.1 9.8 10.8 11.1 12.1 11.9 11.9 11.5
Belgium 3.4 4.1 4.9 5.6 5.9 6.3 6.5 6.9 6.8 7.0 6.9
Denmark 2.7 3.3 3.9 4.5 4.6 4.7 5.1 6.2 5.3 5.1 5.5
Finland 1.8 2.6 3.3 4.0 4.7 6.4 6.3 7.0 6.6 7.5 5.1
France 3.8 4.4 4.9 5.5 7.5 8.4 9.1 10.4 10.3 10.5 10.5
Germany 7.2 8.0 8.7 9.5 9.1 9.2 8.9 9.6 10.2 11.0 10.2
Greece 3.8 4.1 4.4 4.7 5.1 8.0 10.5 10.2 11.2 11.7 10.7
Ireland 2.0 2.4 2.9 3.4 4.0 4.2 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.8
Italy 3.3 4.3 5.2 6.2 7.2 9.0 8.2 9.3 11.1 11.3 11.1
Luxembourg 3.7 4.4 5.1 5.8 6.6 6.2 8.5 9.2 7.2 4.4 4.3
Netherlands 1.2 2.3 3.4 4.4 5.4 5.3 5.6 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.7
Portugal 1.9 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.6 4.4 6.5 7.3 9.0 9.9
Spain 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.6 5.7 7.1 8.1 8.0 7.4 7.5
Sweden 2.6 3.4 4.2 4.9 6.6 7.0 7.1 7.5 6.8 7.1 6.9
United Kingdom 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.6 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.2
EU-15 average 3.3 3 .9 4.6 5.2 5.9 6.6 7 .1 7.7 7.7 7.8 7.5
EU-10
Eston ia 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.6 3.9 5.4 5.8 5.1 5.4
Latvia 2.0 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.7 4.0 8.0 7.9 5.3 8.2
Lithuania 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.0 5.7 6.9 5.5 5.5
Hungary 2.0 2.2 2.5 3.5 4.9 5.6 6.2 6.3 6.4 7.7 7.7
Czech  Republic 2.5 3.0 3.4 3.9 4.3 4.8 5.2 6.0 7.4 7.2 6.8
Poland 2.0 2.1 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.8 4.2 7.7 9.9 10.9 9.1
Slovenia 4.0 4.7 5.3 6.0 6.7 7.3 8.0 9.2 9.5 9.1 9.2
Slovakia 2.8 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.7 5.1 5.6 6.2 6.2 6.4 5.8
Cyprus 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.7 2.1 4.5 5.2 6.2 7.0
Malta 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.3 3.6 4.0 6.5 7.1 8.1 9.3
EU-10 average 2.1 2 .4 2.8 3.3 3.8 4.2 4 .6 6.6 7.2 7.1 7.4
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2.1.3. The Effective Contribution Rate 
In a Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) program in which current tax receipts finance current spending 
on pensions, the earnings related (insurance) component is usually financed with separate 
social insurance contributions. In such cases, the administrative contribution rate should be 
an adequate measure of the workforce burden of current pensioners. However, as pointed 
out by Disney (2004), in several countries this assumption is unsatisfactory. This is because 
countries have different social security financing designs.  
Some countries, like Australia, New Zealand, Denmark and Ireland, have a significant 
component of the total pension system in the form of social pensions, which are financed 
by general taxes. Some countries subsidise public pensions by budgetary transfers. Other 
countries earmark part of the social security tax for purposes other than pension financing, 
and a few (such as the USA) partially pre-fund the programme.  
Bearing this in mind, Disney (2004) constructed the variable the effective average 
contribution rate, which is the contribution rate that would be required to finance total 
spending on public pensions out of labour force income. Exploiting the PAYG formula, he 
calculated the effective contribution rate as the average replacement rate divided by the 
support ratio. He used Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) data for RRs, and adjusted ILO data on 
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activity rates for support ratios (workers 15-59 to people over 60) 15. The source for the 
latter is the ILO LABORSTA database.  
Following Disney (2004), I calculate the effective average contribution rate, but in a slightly 
different manner. Again exploiting the PAYG balancing identity, the contribution rate can be 
also expressed by the ratio of pension expenditure to the wage bill in the economy. I chose 
this approach because derivation of this variable is made on two original data series, 
instead of estimating one - the system support ratio - prior to deriving effective contribution 
rate.  
To construct such a time series I have used pension expenditure series presented in Table 
III-6 and the variable Compensation of employees: total economy from National Accounts, 
drawn from an AMECO database16. This database contains time series going back to 1960, 
as well as data for some non-EU countries such as New Zealand, Canada, the US. Data for 
the EU-10 are generally not available for the period before the 1990s. For missing 
intervening data points, I have applied extrapolation. The ‘Compensation of Employees’ 
data includes employers' social security contributions; hence, the result is the total effective 
contribution rate paid by both the employer and employee, expressed as a percentage of 

15
 Workers aged under 20 are removed; since not all people over 60 receive a pension the denominator is 
adjusted according to participation rates.  
16
 This database is maintained by the European Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (DG ECFIN)
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gross labour17. This is actually equivalent to the OECD’s Taxing Wages methodology, and 
more appropriate for both within time and across country comparisons18. 
Table III-7 Effective contribution rates (as % of labour cost) for public old-age pension 
programmes 
 
Source: Own calculations based on pension expenditure data ( Table III-6) and AMECO database. 

17
 Gross labour costs are equal to gross wages plus the employer part of social security contributions 
18
 For example, an increase in effective contribution rates expressed on gross wages as a base may not be that 
evident, since the gross wage is already affected by the increase in nominal contributions.
1960 1965 1970 19 75 1980 1985 1990 199 5 2 000 2005 2010
H igh-in come O ECD countrie s
Austra lia 3.9 4.4 4.7 4.8 5.8 5.7 5.6 7 .0 7.4 6.7 6.7
Canada 3.6 3.9 4.1 4.4 5.2 6.6 7.2 8 .3 7.7 7.5 6.8
Japan 2.3 2.8 3.5 3.3 5.5 7.1 7.7 9 .3 11.4 13.9 13.6
Korea .. .. . . .. . . .. 1.3 2 .2 2.9 2.7 2.4
New Zealand 8.3 8.9 8.8 8.5 12.3 15.2 16.1 13 .2 11.7 9.6 9.0
Norwa y 2.9 4.7 6.5 7.7 8.4 9.5 11.0 11 .0 10.4 10.9 9.5
Switzerland 3.3 5.6 7.9 9.3 9.5 9.7 8.7 10 .1 10.5 10.3 10.5
US 5.3 6.5 7.2 8.6 8.6 9.1 8.8 9 .3 8.7 9.5 9.5
Aver age 4. 2 5 .3 6 .1 6.7 7.9 9 .0 8 .3 8 .8 8.8 8.9 8 .5
EU-15
Austri a 15.1 15.9 17.5 16.5 17.8 20.4 21.1 22 .5 23.2 24.3 23.3
Belgium 8.1 9.3 10.7 10.4 10.6 12.0 12.9 13 .6 13.4 14.0 13.3
Denm ark 5.8 6.7 7.6 8.3 8.5 8.9 9.4 11 .9 10.2 9.7 9.7
Finland 4.0 5.1 6.7 7.1 8.8 11.8 11.6 14 .1 14.0 15.3 9.9
France 8.5 9.1 9.9 10.0 13.5 15.4 17.6 20 .0 19.9 20.1 20.2
Germa ny 15.9 16.3 17.1 17.2 16.2 17.0 16.9 17 .8 19.2 21.9 20.4
Greece 13.3 14.9 15.3 16.1 15.8 23.0 29.4 31 .4 33.8 33.8 29.8
Ireland 4.7 5.5 6.2 6.6 7.3 8.5 6.4 5 .7 5.8 6.1 6.9
Italy 8.1 9.5 11.3 12.1 14.9 19.3 18.3 22 .5 28.3 27.8 26.3
Luxem bourg 10.6 11.2 13.7 11.5 12.7 12.9 18.1 19 .6 15.5 9.6 9.0
Nethe rlands 2.6 4.5 6.1 7.6 9.4 10.2 10.7 9 .6 9.1 9.6 9.1
Portugal 4.1 4.9 5.3 4.6 6.3 7.2 9.1 13 .5 14.5 17.9 19.7
Spain 6.3 7.1 7.9 7.9 8.9 12.3 14.4 16 .6 16.1 15.7 16.1
Sweden 5.0 6.0 7.1 8.2 10.4 12.2 12.1 14 .4 12.3 13.0 12.6
United K ingdom 3.9 4.5 5.2 5.4 6.4 7.5 8.3 9 .7 9.5 9.6 9.7
EU-15  aver age 7. 7 8 .7 9 .8 10.0 1 1.2 13 .3 14 .4 16 .2 16.3 16.5 15 .7
EU-10
Estoni a 4.3 5.0 5.7 6.3 7.0 7.6 8.1 10 .3 12.7 11.5 10.1
Latvia 4.5 5.3 6.1 6.9 7.7 8.5 9.4 18 .2 19.1 12.7 16.6
Lithua nia 4.0 4.6 5.1 5.6 6.1 6.6 6.8 14 .8 17.5 13.5 13.9
Hungary 4.3 4.6 5.1 7.1 9.6 10.8 11.8 13 .6 14.7 16.4 16.1
Czech Republic 7.2 8.3 9.3 10.3 11.3 12.2 13.1 14 .1 17.5 16.7 15.3
Po land 5.8 6.2 7.9 8.6 9.3 10.0 10.8 19 .5 24.7 30.3 25.2
Slovenia 7.9 9.0 10.1 11.1 12.1 13.0 13.9 16 .5 18.5 17.9 17.9
Slovakia 7.7 8.8 9.9 10.9 11.8 12.4 13.4 15 .4 15.3 17.1 15.1
Cyprus 0.7 0.7 1.5 2.3 3.1 3.9 4.8 10 .3 12.2 13.8 15.4
Malta 4.8 5.6 6.4 7.2 7.9 8.6 9.3 14 .5 16.2 18.2 21.1
EU-10  aver age 5. 1 5 .8 6 .7 7.6 8.6 9 .4 10 .1 14 .7 16.8 16.8 16 .7
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‘Effective contribution rates’ since the 1960s are presented in Table III-7. The trend is similar 
to that of pension expenditure as a share of GDP – an increase until the 1990s, then 
stabilisation, and even a slight decrease in high-income countries in 2010.  
2.1.4. Measures of Progressivity 
Redistribution within a pension system can be intra-generational - among members of the 
same cohort, and inter-generational – between different cohorts19. Vertical (progressive) 
redistribution characterises the ‘Beveridge’ pension model. Such progressivity can be 
achieved via a minimum benefit (flat or targeted), differential accrual rates for different 
earning levels (lower accrual for higher income), or by a link between maximum benefit and 
a ceiling to contributions
20.  
I follow Disney (2004) to construct indicators of vertical progressivity using ‘pension 
variation’ and ‘pension tax’ as measures21.  
Pension Variation  
‘Pension variation’ is a coefficient of variation (henceforth CV)22 of replacement rates across 
several household types. This is a measure of vertical intragenerational redistribution within 

( Intra-generational redistribution can be vertical or horizontal. Vertical redistribution is most often 
progressive (from rich to poor), while horizontal goes from one group to another – men to women, singles to 
couples, etc.
20
 See Appendix for discussion on information on ceilings across countries 
) Whitehouse devises another measure of vertical progressivity , the ‘progressivity index’, which is calculated 
as 100 minus the ratio of the Gini coefficient of pension entitlements divided by the Gini coefficient of 
earnings (Pension at Glance, 2007)
90 

the pension programme, which is a proxy for the term   M explained in Chapter II. 
‘Intragenerational redistribution’ means higher RRs for lower-income workers and lower 
RRs for higher-income workers. Thus, RRs vary with the income level and CV is higher. In the 
‘Bismarckian-style’ of programme, with low or no ‘intragenerational redistribution’, 
everyone earns the same RR, hence CV is zero or close to zero.   
Disney (2004) calculated the CV using Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) replacement rates for 
four different household types (for single and couples, average and 66% of average 
earners). As there is no later update of the Blöndal and Scarpetta dataset, it is not possible 
to calculate CVs for the 2000s in the exact same manner and thereby to extend the data 
series. Still, it is feasible to construct a CV data series merging several sources. RRs for two 
types of earners – 67% and 100% for EU countries – can be merged using Blöndal and 
Scarpetta (1998) for the period 1960–1990s and EC data for the 2000s, correcting where 
there are differences in years of service. For the rest of the high-income OECD countries, I 
used the data presented in Table III-5 single workers on average earnings and made 
estimates for those on 67% of average earnings based on information from ‘Pensions at a 
Glance’ and the US Social Security Administration’s ‘Social Security Around the World’. For 
couples, I used Blöndal and Scarpetta for the first three decades, CWED for the 2000s (for 
average earners), and made estimates for couples with 67% of average earnings as before23.  

22
 Coefficient of variation (CV) is a normalized measure of dispersion of a probability distribution. It is defined 
as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. 
23
 In order to have consistent data series, in some cases the same ‘mistakes’ in calculations as in Blöndal and 
Scarpetta were repeated. For example, Blöndal and Scarpetta calculated RRs for Australia without GIS 
(guaranteed income supplement); RR for Sweden was calculated with the occupational scheme part. 
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Coefficients of variation calculated in this way (Table III-8) show that, in general, there have 
been no significant changes in the level of redistribution in the recent decades. Countries 
that traditionally have a higher level of redistribution are Australia, Canada, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK and the US. There was a decrease in redistribution in the 
1970s in Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland); countries which started out with 
‘Beveridge’ models, but introduced an earnings-related component to pensions at the end 
of the 1960s, thereby reducing redistribution within their systems.  
Table III-8 Coefficient of variation, 4 household types  (67% and average, single/couple) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on B&S, CDEW, Pension at Glance and national data 
1961 1975 1985 1995 2005
	 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38
	 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

	 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.14
 0.45 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.28
 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.32
	 0.28 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.08
 0.23 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.00
 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.00
 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.38
 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.13
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04
 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.30
 ! 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.36
  0.34 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11
" 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.00
#	 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
#  0.18 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12
# 	$ 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28
%& 0.37 0.36 0.24 0.21 0.30
%# 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.25
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Another source of RR data, - the OECD ‘Pensions at a Glance’ data, which provides 
replacement rates for five different types of earners – 50%, 75%, 100%, 150% and 200% of 
average24, certainly composes the richest available data to capture vertical redistribution. 
However, data are available only for 2050s (prospective RRs for those entering the labour 
market in 2000s). In addition, since most OECD countries have ceilings on pensions subject 
to pension contributions below two times average earnings, there is actually no value in 
calculating CV with all five income levels. Details on CVs calculated with ‘Pension at a 
Glance’ data are presented in the Appendix to this thesis.  
Pension Tax 
Pension tax is a calculated variable of the previously described ‘pension variation’ multiplied 
by the average effective contribution rate. This is an indicator devised by Disney (2004) to 
capture the absolute ‘tax component’ of the contribution rate. He argues that treating 
social security contributions as a pure tax on wages, as in the OECD studies of the ‘tax 
wedge’, can be misleading. Contributions to public pension programmes differ from other 
taxes because individuals may observe them as a claim to future pension benefits and 
hence, do not perceive social security contribution as a tax, but rather as a saving.  This is 
most likely in earnings-related pension programs (Bismarck) and least plausible with 
programs with a high degree of vertical progressivity and little relation between 
contributions and benefits (‘Beveridge’). 

24
 Details are in the section III2.1.1, 
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Since there is a negative correlation between the redistributive component of pension 
systems – ‘pension variation’ - and the effective contribution rate, the product of these two 
variables – ‘pension tax’ – has less absolute dispersion than the effective contribution rate 
(Disney, 2004: 293). This is illustrated in Figure III-1. 
Figure III-1 Effective contribution rate and effective tax component (pension tax), OECD 
countries, 2000s 
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Figure ) confirms that there is a relationship between effective contributions and 
pension tax, which is negative albeit not particularly strong – the correlation coefficient is -
0.339. 
Figure III-2 Effective contribution rate and tax component of contributions,  
1960s-2000s (mid decades) 
 
Figure III-3 Coefficient of correlation between contribution rate and tax component of 
contributions (pension tax) 1960s-2000s (mid decades) 
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The negative relationship is however getting stronger during recent decades (Figure III-3). 
This is probably because generous pension systems with no redistribution – Bismarck 
systems - faced a larger increase in the effective contribution rate than Beveridge countries 
in the face of population ageing.  
2.1.5. The Internal Rate of Return 
The internal rate of return (IRR) on a pension program is the interest rate at which the 
average present value of the stream of contributions paid is equal to the average present 
value of stream of pension benefits. It is a measure of the ‘profitability’ of the PAYG system 
for a representative member of a generation. Comparing IRRs across generations i.e. at 
different points in time, one can measure the intergenerational redistribution i.e. 
intergenerational equity of a pension program (Disney, 2004).  
According to Queisser and Whitehouse (2006), a social security programme is ‘actuarially 
fair’ when the IRR to a given generation equals the market rate of return of an asset 
invested in the capital market over the same period. However, in a dynamically efficient 
economy, the market rate of return is typically higher than the IRR in the pension system. 
Fenge and Werding (2003) call this difference an implicit tax from PAYG financing, while 
Disney (2004) refers to it as departure from actuarial basis.  
In general, the measured IRR depends on the benefit formula and method of indexation of 
pensions in payment, on the length of the retirement period and the value of pension 
contributions paid into the system. In addition to the pension design parameters, the IRR 
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also depends on the pace of wage growth during the contribution period – the higher the 
wage growth, the higher the IRR.  
In order to make it possible to isolate the effect of pension design on IRR, I have calculated 
four versions of the internal rate of return (Table III-9). Variable IRR1 measures the actual 
internal rate of return. Variables IRR2 and IRR4 are constructed to isolate the effect of wage 
growth, with the assumption of no wage growth and with wage growth of 2.5% during the 
employment history in all countries. Variables IRR3 and IRR4 are calculated assuming that 
the first cohort only started contributing in the 1950s, while for variables IRR1 and IRR2 an 
attempt was made to estimate the effective contribution rate since the introduction of the 
pension system in the country. The preferred measure is IRR2, since it isolates the pension 
design excluding the effect of wage growth, and at the same time takes into account the 
reality i.e. the period when the system was founded. However, as the correlation between 
variables is high – more than 0.9 (except for IRR2 and IRR3 – 0.79), it is actually reasonably 
safe to use any of them.  
Table III-9 Four versions of IRR 
 
Wage growth during 
contribution 
(employment) period 
Wage growth during 
benefit payment 
Start date of 
contributions 
IRR 1 Actual growth Actual growth Introduction 
IRR 2 No 2.5% Introduction 
IRR 3 Actual growth Actual growth 1950 
IRR 4 No 2.5% 1950 
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To calculate the stream of contributions, I use effective contribution rates (Table III-7) and a 
wage growth index (Real Compensation per Employee, local currency 2000=100) obtained 
from the AMECO database.  
To calculate the stream of pension benefits, I use the gross replacement rate from the 
public system for the first year of retirement; then index benefits in payment in line with 
the indexation formula. Information on the indexation formula in each country is obtained 
from EC-ISG reports, from Pensions at a Glance various issues and Pensions Panorama 
(which is World Bank`s publication). The retirement duration is estimated based on the 
statutory retirement age for each country and average life expectancy at the age of 
retirement, obtained from EUROSTAT.  
Calculated in this way, IRR is slightly overstated since contributions are expressed as the 
rate on total compensation and the RR on gross wage. This should not cause a problem for 
time and cross-country comparisons, however.  
Figure III-4 shows IRR1 over time for OECD countries. One can see a general trend of an 
increase in IRR in the 1980s and then a decrease in the following years. As Disney (2004) 
points out, although one might think that ‘Bismarck’ programs will have higher IRRs as they 
are more generous, this does not need to be the case. Generous systems mean at the same 
time higher contribution rates, therefore the IRR does not necessarily need to be high in 
such countries. Indeed, the correlation of IRR with RR is only 0.35. 
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Figure III-4 Internal Rate of Return (IRR1), over time and across countries 
 
       Source: Own calculations.  
2.1.6. Private Pensions Statistics  
The difficulty in collecting private pension data stems from the fact that pension assets are 
not always managed separately from other financial products, such as life insurance, bank 
assets etc25. In addition, databases with historical data on pension assets do not exist.  
Historical data could be found in a few academic and analytical papers. Davis (1993) 
provides pension assets and life insurance data for around 10 developed countries. There 
are some data tables in the WB (1994) and OECD (1998). In addition, there are country 
papers where data on private pensions can be found, for example Bateman and Piggott 
(1997) for Australia, Whelan (2005) for Ireland, Schieber and Shoven (1997) for the US, etc. 

25
 Details are explained in the Appendix to this Chapter 
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
1975 1985 1995 2005
99 

There are three sources for recent private pension data: OECD Institutional Investors’ 
Statistics, OECD Global Pension Statistics and EUROSTAT, though the later is available only 
for EU countries.  
Data from OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook are financial assets managed 
by autonomous pension funds. Pension arrangements that do not constitute a separately 
organised and independent legal entity, such as pension assets managed by life insurance 
companies, are not included (Baillu and Reisen, 1997). This source also provides information 
on financial assets managed by life insurance companies. Baillu and Reisen (1997) argue 
that one should consider the life insurance sector since assets of certain pension schemes 
are managed by life insurance companies, while life insurance companies insure certain 
pension plans. However, by including the total assets of life insurance companies — and not 
just those attributed to pension schemes — is in fact overestimating the extent of pension 
wealth (Baillu and Reisen, 1997). 
Consequently, the major drawback of the publication OECD Institutional Investors Statistics 
is that it does not contain separate figures on pension assets managed by funds or insured 
by insurance companies. Furthermore, data on financial assets managed by life-insurance 
companies and non-autonomous funds (book reserves) are not complete.  
In order to fill this significant data gap in pension statistics, in 2002 the OECD Financial 
Markets Division initiated a statistical project with the aim to set up a dataset of Global 
Pension Statistics. Pension assets in this database are available according to the financing 
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vehicle – those managed by autonomous pension funds, book reserves, pension insurance 
contracts and other types of private pensions (such as Individual Saving Accounts in the US 
etc.). These data are presented in Pension Markets in Focus – a brief OECD publication 
published annually since 2005, and in an on-line database. In general, data stem from 2001, 
though in some cases such as the US, the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, the time series is 
much longer. Consequently, the major drawback of this database is the short time span.  
According to OECD Statistics, in 2007, the Netherlands with 155% followed by Switzerland 
with 150%, were the countries with the highest share of pension assets relative to GDP. The 
majority of these funds are managed by a separate legal entity (autonomous fund)26.  
Other countries with a very high share of pension assets to GDP are Iceland, Denmark, the 
US, Australia and Canada. In all these countries, assets are managed by separate legal 
entities, except in Denmark where the majority of funds are under the management of life 
insurance companies. Countries with a medium share of pension assets relative to GDP are 
the UK, Ireland and the rest of Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden and Norway). All other 
countries have a quite low share of pension assets in GDP.  
 
 

26
 In most countries a typical financing vehicle are autonomous pension funds except for three Scandinavian 
countries where the major financing vehicle are insurance companies. For the available methods of 
implementing private pension plans across countries see the Appendix.  
 

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Figure III-5 Pension funds by type of financing vehicle in % of GDP, 2007 
 
            Source: OECD.stats 
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Since there is no unique dataset on pension funds available for a longer period, I 
constructed panel data in the following way – I started with the most recent and best 
quality data from Global Pension Statistics and extended them with Institutional Investors 
data, cross validating the data for the years where both sources are available. I estimated 
data prior to the 2000s for pension assets managed by life-insurance companies calculating 
the percentage of pension funds within total funds managed by life insurance companies, 
for the years where both data sets were available. I have then applied this percentage to 
historical (Institutional Investors) data to obtain historical data on pension funds managed 
by insurance companies. For years between the 1960–1980s, I have used some additional 
sources – Davis (1993), country-specific papers, and information on countries’ pension 
systems, such as when each scheme was introduced. Table*+ in the Appendix to thesis 
presents decade averages of private pension fund shares since the 1960s. There is an 
obvious upward trend among all countries, while EU-8 countries started introducing private 
pension funds only in the 2000s. 
2.2. BISMARCK FACTOR AND COMPOSITE INDICATORS 
The previously described indicators overlap and correlate, so it is desirable to ‘package’ 
these measures together. I am going to use the principal component analysis to construct 
the composite index that will be used later in the empirical analysis, and to try to identify 
commonalities on indicators in typology of pension programmes (Beveridge v Bismarck).  
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I conduct principal component analysis (PCA)27, which aims to reduce pension indicators to 
a composite index. The analysis is performed on two combinations of variables with the 
difference between them being the inclusion/omission of the ‘pension tax’ variable and the 
IRR. In the first case, the PCA is performed on 7 variables excluding ‘pension tax’, and in the 
second case on 7 variables excluding IRR but including ‘pension tax’.  
Table III-10 Principal component loadings (1960s–2000s) 
 
In the first case, the PCA extracts component that can be dubbed the ‘Bismarck’, and in the 
second case, the ‘Beveridge’ component is extracted (Table III-10). Indeed, the ‘Bismarck’ 
PCA composite index is highly correlated with the Bismarck dummy28, with coefficients of 
correlation being greater than +-0.8. The Bismarck component is, as expected, positively 
correlated with the level of RR, contribution rates and expenditure rates, and the IRR, and 

27
 Principal component analysis involves a mathematical procedure (orthogonal transformation) that 
transforms a number of correlated variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables called principal 
components. 
28
 Dummy variable applied to countries according to the original pension model (see Appendix for the table of 
countries with values 1 for Bismarck dummy) 
PCA 1 - Bismarck PCA 2 - Beveridge
Variables:
Pension variation -0.45047 0.44206
Pension tax … 0.35967
RR (public system) 0.42668 -0.41015
Private pension assets -0.32398 0.24139
Pension expenditure 0.37840 -0.35817
Contributions 0.39233 -0.37205
Single/couple ratio -0.43683 0.42663
IRR1 0.14877 …
eigenvalue 4.36508 4.686
% total var 62.36 66.94
Number of observations 88 107
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negatively with variables of the ‘Beveridge kind’ – ‘pension variation’, private pension assets 
and the single/couple ratio29. The second PCA run extracts the ‘Beveridge’ component, since 
more of the ‘Beveridge-type’ of variables ares included in the analysis (e.g. ‘pension tax’ 
instead of IRR).  
Figure III-6 PCA1 scores by countries (for 2000s) – Bismarck composite index 
 
If one looks at the PCA1 i.e. ‘Bismarck’ scores (Figure III-6), for the 2000s for example, it 
seems that countries still group similarly to their original pension model presented in the 
amended Bonoli (2000: 11) Table III-2 Original model of pension policy’. 
The exceptions are countries that are close to zero, such as Sweden and Norway, as well as 
Belgium, and to some extent Finland and Japan. According to the ‘original model of pension 
policy’, which prevailed in the late 1950s, Nordic countries are classified as ‘Beveridge’ 
countries. However, these countries are ‘early birds’ that introduced the earnings-related 

29
 Single/couple ratio is taken as ‘Beveridge’ variable, since this system were founded on the basis of 
redistribution and targeted towards general population, not just working class. Therefore very often pension 
for those with non-working spouses were accelerated.   
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public unfunded (PAYG) tier by the end of the 1960s. Thus, if the classification was made 
according to the model that prevailed at the end of the 1960s, the ‘Nordic’ model - the one 
which combines elements of both ‘Beveridge’ and ‘Bismarck’, would stand out as well. 
Therefore, zero scores for Sweden, Norway and Finland are not surprising. Japan is also not 
a surprise, since it introduced its pension system quite late and therefore used the ‘hybrid’ 
approach. The only exemption is actually Belgium, the original ‘Bismarck’ country, but with 
a lower replacement rate and therefore lower pension expenditures than in comparable 
‘Bismarck’ countries.  
Scores of the ‘Beveridge’ composite index, presented in Figure III-7, are a mirror image of 
the ‘Bismarck’ PCA index scores. Greece has the lowest values of the ‘Beveridge’ score, 
while Australia has the highest, and it is vice versa for the ‘Bismarck’ score.  
Figure III-7 PCA2 scores by countries (for 2000s) – Beveridge composite index 
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3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: CONVERGENCE VS. PATH 
DEPENDENCE 
The two original pension models – Bismarck and Beveridge, differ in a number of features: 
the degree of ‘intragenerational redistribution’, the size of the public pension system and 
the way of financing.  
Ebbinghaus and Gronwald (2009) highlight the connection between the original pension 
model and private pensions using the ‘crowding-out’ hypothesis, which postulates that 
Bismarckian pension systems are limiting the scope for the development of private pensions 
because state pensions provide sufficient earnings-related benefits30. 
The evolution of pension systems and the latest developments (explained in the 
introduction of this Chapter), brought the question whether the historical paths are still 
important, or whether there has been convergence in pension models. 
The dilemma ‘convergence’ vs. ‘path dependence’ is the central to this section, which I 
attempt to answer examining three sub-themes. Firstly, following Disney (2000a), I will test 
the ‘crowding-out’ hypothesis, which indirectly implies whether it still makes sense to talk 
about Bismarck vs. Beveridge differences.  

30
 Conversely, the ‘insufficient state pension’ hypothesis suggests that Beveridge basic pension systems have 
the largest potential for occupational pension development. This is actually in line with one of the principles 
Beveridge stated in his Report (1942: 6-7) that ‘social security must be achieved by co-operation between the 
state and the individual; in establishing a national minimum, it (state) should leave room and encouragement 
for voluntary action by each individual to provide more than that minimum for himself and his family’.  

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Secondly, I will analyse whether countries still group as they used to – Bismarck and 
Beveridge. The methodology that will be employed is Bonoli`s (1997) ‘two-dimension 
approach’, combining various dimensions of pension policy.   
Lastly, motivated by the notion of ‘convergence’ (Overbye, 1996; Bonoli, 2000; Hinrichs 
(2000; Hemerijck, 2006; etc.) and ‘policy transfers’ (Banks et al. 2005), I proceed to formally 
test if there is empirical evidence for the ‘convergence hypothesis’.  
The empirical analysis is conducted on the sample of 22 OECD countries over five decades. 
The pension design indicators used are explained in detail in the section 2.1. and listed in 
the appendix to this Chapter. For variables that do not vary at high frequency, such as RR, 
pension variation, single/couple ratio, mid-decade points are used; for variables that do 
fluctuate, such as pension assets, contributions, expenditures, mid-decade five year 
averages are used.  
The Bismarck dummy variable is derived from the Table III-2 Original model of pension 
policy’, presented in the introduction of this Chapter. There are three alternative Bismarck 
dummies, which differ depending on the classification of countries with a ‘hybrid’ original 
model. For example, one version of dummy variable – ‘Bismarck2’ - considers the US as a 
Beveridge country (see Appendix to the thesis). Although founded its social security system 
as earnings-related, hence according to original model of pension policy it should be 
classified as Bismarck country, with high level of private pension assets and redistribution 
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within public system US fits better into the Beveridge group. Therefore, ‘Bismarck2’ is 
preffered version of Bismarck dummy variable31.  

3.1. DO BISMARCK SYSTEMS CROWD OUT PRIVATE PENSION SAVINGS? 
Disney (2000a) notes that public pension programs with a strong earnings-related 
component (‘Bismarckian’) tend to hinder the development of private pension 
arrangements – a form of ‘crowding out’. In this sub-section, I follow his analysis using 
longer data series and a slightly different set of variables - ‘Bismarck dummy’ as a proxy for 
Bismarck system instead of public pension expenditures, and more control variables 
including a proxy for financial liquidity.   
By a natural converse, preliminary data analysis suggests that countries that originated with 
Beveridge-type programmes are more likely to encourage private pension savings. There is 
quite a strong relationship between ‘pension variation’ - a good indicator of a ‘Beverige’ 
programme, and private pension assets– a positive correlation of 75% (see Figure III-8) 












31
 Unless otherwise stated, the ‘Bismarck dummy’ refers to the second alteration, i.e. ‘Bismarck2’ dummy. 
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Figure III-8 Pension variation and private pension assets, OECD-20 (mid-2000s) 
 
In addition, if one looks at private pension assets according to the Bismarck-Beveridge origin 
(using the ‘Bismarck2 dummy’, based on the  )32), the difference between 
countries is obvious and persists over time (Figure III-9 and Figure III-10). 
Figure III-9 Private pension assets in Beveridge and Bismarck countries in 1961 
 

32
 See the appendix to thesis for the list of countries  
R² = 0.5614
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Figure III-10 Private pension assets in Beveridge and Bismarck countries in 2005 
 
I follow Disney (2000a) and formalise this finding with a simple reduced form panel-data 
regression of private pension assets on the ‘Bismarck 2’ dummy, including some control 
variables. I do not use the PCA indicators since they already contain private assets data; 
therefore, such a regression could suffer from endogeneity bias. P!	
% 	 ,
#-
dummy’ on program origins i.e. constructing the dummy so that it captures the system type 
at its origin, gives a degree of identification to the econometric analysis. 
Distribution of dependent variable ‘private pension assets’ is skewed to the left (Figure III-
11). Given the fact that a number of countries did not have private pension assets until 
1990s, and a few still do not have or have negligible values, it is not surprising that 12.5% of 
observations is of value zero and almost 20% below 2% of GDP.  
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Figure III-11 Histogram of private pension asset variable 
 
Therefore, I have decided to use a Tobit specification with two lower bands: zero % and 2% 
of GDP, though OLS estimators also give strong results.  
The results in Table III-11 suggest a strong impact of historical origins on the volume of 
private assets in a country. The coefficient on the Bismarck dummy implies that countries 
with the original Bismarck pension model have, on average, around 50 percentage points 
lower pension assets of potential (latent) pension assets as percent of GDP.  
 
 
'
('
)
(*
(*
)
(+






' )' *'' *)'

112 

Table III-11 Private pension assets and Bismarck dummy – tobit specification              
(OECD-22, 1975-2005) 
Dependent 
variable: Private 
Pension Assets 
(%GDI) 
Pooled data  
(LL=0 % of GDP) 
Random effects  
(LL=0 % of GDP) 
Random effects 
 (LL=2% of GDP) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
z-ratio 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
z-ratio 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
z-ratio 
(p-value) 
       
Bismarck dummy -52.13  (5.67) 
-9.19    
(0.000) 
-52.53 
(8.26) 
-6.36 
(0.000) 
-55.42 
8.76 
-6.32 
(0.000) 
Financial 
development* 
0.44 
 (0.07) 
5.94 
(0.000) 
0.39 
(0.07) 
5.36 
(0.000)   
0.43 
(0.07) 
5.53 
  (0.000) 
Old-age dependency 
-0.10 
 (0.81) 
-0.13 
(0.895) 
0.17 
(0.80) 
0.21 
(0.830) 
0.12 
(0.86) 
  0.14 
(0.887) 
Government 
consumption 
1.01 
 (0.76) 
 1.33 
(0.188) 
0.90 
(0.92) 
0.98 
(0.329) 
1.50 
(1.00) 
1.50 
(0.134) 
GDP pc 2e
-4 
 
(4e
-4
) 
0.72 
(0.475) 
8e
-4 
(5e
-4
) 
1.71 
 (0.087) 
8e
-4 
(5e
-4
) 
1.58 
(0.114) 
Constant   -7.155 16.58 
  -0.43 
0.667 
-18.522 
18.391 
-1.01 
  0.314 
-32.28 
20.28 
-1.59 
0.111 
Number of observations 88 88 88 
Uncensored 
observations 
77 77 71 
 LR chi2  
(Prob>chi2) 
109.85 
(0.000) 
155.41 
 (0.000) 
155.27 
(0.000) 
      NOTE: LL for lower limit 
    * Proxy for financial development is variable credit to private sector 
When only data from the 2000s are analysed, the sample is slightly different since most of 
the countries nowadays have non-zero value of pension assets in GDP. Therefore, OLS 
estimators are more approapriate estimators, and I use employ Tobit estimators with 2% 
assets of GDP as the lower band.  
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Table III-12 Private pension assets and Bismarck dummy – OECD and EU-8 in 2000s 
Dependent variable: 
Private Pension Assets 
(%GDI) 
OLS 
Tobit 
 (LL=2% of GDP) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
t-ratio 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
t-ratio 
(p-value) 
     
Bismarck dummy -60.11 (12.83) 
-4.68 
(0.000)  
-64.58 
(13.42) 
-4.81 
(0.000)  
Financial development* 
0.38 
(0.12) 
3.05 
(0.006) 
0.46 
(0.13) 
3.55 
(0.002) 
Old-age dependency 
-1.16 
(1.46) 
  -0.80    
(0.433) 
-0.74 
(1.57) 
  -0.47    
(0.641) 
Government consumption 0.74  (1.44) 
0.51 
(0.612) 
1.27 
 (1.46) 
0.87 
(0.393) 
GDP pc 
-2e
-4 
(4e
-4
) 
 -0.49 
(0.630) 
-2e
-4 
(5e
-4
)
 
 
 -0.50 
(0.621) 
Constant 52.17 (36.19) 
1.44   
(0.162) 
23.33 
(37.82) 
0.62 
(0.543) 
Number of observations 30 30 
Uncensored observations ... 24 
 F-stat/LR chi2  
(Prob>chi2) 
  20.97 
(0.000) 
48. 21 
(0.000) 
       NOTE: LL for lower limit 
      * Proxy for financial liquidity is variable credit to private sector 
The results are very close to those for the full sample of years, implying path dependence 
i.e. in this context that pension systems that originated as ‘Bismarck’ continued to crowd 
out private pension savings. 
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3.2. DO COUNTRIES STILL GROUP AS ‘BISMARCK’ AND ‘BEVERIDGE’? 
In this sub-section, I examine whether countries still group as ‘Bismarck’ and ‘Beveridge’. I 
use Bonoli`s (1997) ‘two-dimensional approach’33 to investigate if countries tend to classify 
in a certain way according to two dimensions of pension policy.  
Firstly, I choose the (i) the generosity of a pension system (average level of RR) and the (ii) 
the extent of vertical redistribution (‘pension variation’ as defined previously).  
Figure III-12 OECD pension systems according to pension variation and replacement rate 
in 1975 
 

33
 Bonoli (1997) pointed out that welfare regime classifications are typically based on the single dimension, 
either capturing quantity (how much) or ‘how’ dimension. He suggests ‘two-dimensional’ classification, 
according to i) the quantity of welfare they provide, and ii) where they stand on the Beveridge versus Bismarck 
dimension. He uses social expenditure as a proportion of GDP as an indicator of quantitative dimension, and a 
percentage of social expenditure financed through contributions as a proxy for the relative size of Bismarckian 
and Beveridgean provision within a welfare state. 
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According to these two dimensions, public pension programs in 1975 are clustered in the 
traditional dichotomy: ‘Bismarck countries’ – generous systems with a low level of 
redistribution; and ‘Beveridge countries’, where the program aims at a minimum protection 
(i.e. a lower average RR) with a high level of redistribution (Figure III-12).  
There are a few outliers. The United States clusters in the group of Beveridge countries.  
Japan, as a country that 
%
	!.
! #
/!#!, is located somewhere in 
between Bismarck and Beveridge. France surprisingly was an outlier. Although it is a typical 
Bismarck country, in 70s it had a high degree of pension variation due to the high 
single/couple ratio (Figure III-13). Finland, which together with other Nordic countries 
introduced an earnings related scheme as early as in 1960s and decreased vertical 
redistribution, is another exception. The initial earnings related scheme introduced in 
Finland was small, and therefore, RR in 1975 was still very low, while Sweden and Norway 
group as Bismarck countries. 
In the 2000s, countries still cluster in these two large groups, though somewhat differently 
(Figure III-13). A major difference during three decades occurred in the distribution of the 
average levels of RRs. In general, one can say that there is a greater dispersion of the RR 
level in the 2000s, especially within Bismarck countries. While in 1975, the average RR in 
most Bismarck countries ranged between 50 and 80%, in the 2000s it ranges from 40 to 
more than 100%. In addition, some Beveridge countries increased their social security RRs, 
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so a few Bismarck countries, such as Germany, are now actually at the same level of RR as 
Beveridge countries34.  
Figure III-13 OECD pension systems according to pension variation and replacement rate in 
the 2000s  
 
I use the replacement rate of 70% as the cut-off line to distinguish between more and less 
generous Bismarck countries – generous are 70% (Austria) and above. This classification is 
presented in Table III-13. 
 

34
 Replacement rates are given in gross term. For example, this means that for Germany net RR amounts 63%. 
Source for the data in the Figures are data explained in the section 2 of this Chapter.  
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Table III-13 OECD pension systems according to pension variation and the level of 
replacement rate, 2000s 
Beveridge  Bismarck 
 
Australia 
Canada 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Generous 
Austria 
Greece 
Spain 
Luxembourg 
Italy 
Portugal 
Modest 
France 
Germany 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Japan 
Belgium 
 
In what follows I analyse how countries cluster according to: (i) pension variation and (ii) 
private pension fund assets. In the early 1960s, all ‘Bismarck countries’ clustered along the 
x-axis, having a negligible amount of private pension assets (Figure III-14).  
The Beveridge countries differ from Bismarck in having higher pension assets, though still 
below the demarcation line of 20% of GDP. Furthermore, there were significant differences 
between them – from modest pension assets in Finland and Ireland, to moderate in the UK, 
Norway, Australia, Canada and Denmark, to higher in the US and the Netherlands (around 
20% of GDP) and exceptionally high in Switzerland. Sweden, as a Nordic country that initially 
followed the Beveridge policy model, actually clustered in the Bismarck group.  
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Figure III-14 OECD pension systems according to pension variation and private pension 
fund assets in 1961 
 
In the 1970s private pension assets increased in all countries, though this increase seems 
more pronounced in Beveridge countries (Figure III-15). Differences between the Beveridge 
countries are still high, but a few countries – the US, the Netherlands and Ireland joined 
Switzerland in the upper ‘Beveridge quadrant’. Nordic countries (except for Denmark) 
‘moved’ to the ‘Bismarck quadrant’, with an inherited larger amount of private assets.  
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Figure III-15 OECD pension systems according to pension variation and private pension 
fund assets in 1975 
 
Figure III-16 OECD pension systems according to pension variation and private pension 
fund assets in 2005 
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By the 2000s, countries nicely clustered into two groups – Beveridge and Bismarck (
%
). The interesting exception is New Zealand, which, although a typical Beveridge 
country in public pension design, had a low level of private pension assets. This is because 
New Zealand is a country where an earnings-related ‘top-up’ has never occurred (Hinrichs, 
2000; Overbye, 1994; etc). Moreover, voluntary pensions were not favoured and stimulated 
by tax incentives pensions between 1987, when New Zealand became the only country in 
the OECD to eliminate all tax subsidies for pension saving, and 2007 when tax reliefs were 
introduced for ‘KiwiSaver’35 (Hughes, 2008:6).  
Table III-14 "	 	 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2!
#!Nordic countries differ from Bismarck countries as they have a higher level 
of private pension assets, with Finland leading in funded pensions. 
Table III-14 OECD pension systems according to pension variation and private pension 
funds in the 2000s 
Bismarck Beveridge 
Bismarck /Higher  
Assets (Nordic) 
Beveridge/Low 
Assets 
Germany 
Italy 
France 
Austria 
Greece 
Portugal 
Japan 
Australia 
Denmark 
Canada 
United 
Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Norway 
Finland 
Sweden 
New Zealand 

35
 KiwiSaver is a voluntary retirement savings scheme in New Zealand, which came into operation in July 2007. 
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Succinctly, according to the simple two-dimensional analysis, we can still see strong 
influence of original pension policy in the 2000s – countries still group according to their 
original pension policy models despite changes in the indicators over time. The only 
exception are Nordic countries, which very early converged to the ‘two-tier system’, thus 
representing a distinct model.  
An analysis of the difference in the means of the values of the pension indicators between 
the two groups of countries – original Bismarck and Beveridge (using our original 
classification of ‘Bismarck’ v. ‘Beveridge’ from the end 1950s) confirm this conclusion.  
Differences in means of the most important pension variables are statistically significant for 
the sample of OECD countries throughout five decades (Table III-15).  
Table III-15 Difference in means for Bismarck and Beveridge countries: OECD sample, 
1960s–2000s 
 
NOTE: Results for ‘Bismarck 1’ dummy; results are even stronger when‘Bismarck2’ variable is used.  
 
Beveridge Bismarck t-test p-value
RR 33.54 63.98 -8.94 0.000
IRR1 4.46 5.84 -3.01 0.003
IRR2 2.71 3.48 -2.27 0.026
Pension Variation 0.27 0.07 10.59 0.000
Pension Tax 2.09 0.71 7.75 0.000
Private Pension Assets 44.60 11.16 5.57 0.000
Pension Expenditure 4.27 6.77 -5.50 0.000
Contribution Rate 8.27 14.23 -5.80 0.000
Couple/Single ratio 1.43 1.10 9.25 0.000
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Differences persist over time and programs are therefore ‘path dependent’. For variables 
such as pension variation, pension tax, pension expenditure and the effective contribution 
rate, the significance in the difference of the means actually increased since the 1970s. For 
other variables, differences remain constant, while the only variable for which we can say 
the means in the Beveridge and Bismarck countries converged is the average IRR– the 
measure of intergenerational redistribution).  
3.3. IS THERE CONVERGENCE? 
Motivated by the notion of ‘convergence’ (Overbye, 1996; Bonoli, 2000; Hinrichs (2000; 
Hemerijck, 2006; etc.) and ‘policy transfers’ (Banks et al. 2005), I proceed to formally test if 
there is empirical evidence of the ‘convergence hypothesis’.  
Firstly, I follow Johnson (1999) and investigate whether there has been a decrease in the 
coefficient of variation (CV) of pension indicators across countries over time. Johnson (1999) 
searched for evidence of convergence in outcomes, simulating replacement for five 
different earnings levels for individuals since the 1950s in five countries – France, Germany, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK. He calculated the coefficient of variation of hypothetical 
replacement rates for each earning level across countries in each decade and plotted the 
results. By visual inspection of the plotted data, he concludes that there is convergence for 
high-income earners. However, for an average income earner and 50% average earners he 
finds that ‘not the financial retrenchment since the 1980s has made public pension 
outcomes more similar, but rather that retrenchment has reversed a trend towards 
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harmonisation and has increased the variance across countries in the level of income 
provided for similar individuals through the public pension system’. He adds that pension 
systems may have converged along other dimensions – for example through 
encouragement of private pension provision, or an increase in the normal retirement age – 
but not by average earner entitlement.  
This procedure is analogous to that used to capture ‘sigma convergence’ stemming from the 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) growth literature. With this approach, I will measure 
whether there is a decline in dispersion between all countries, leaving aside the Beveridge-
Bismarck classification.  
The only variable where we can see significant decrease in the CV of an indicator across 
countries over time in Figure III-17 is in private pension assets. Nonetheless, this is still the 
variable with the greatest variation between countries, since in the 1960s, the differences 
between countries regarding private pension were enormous with some countries having 
near-zero assets.  
Many indicators, after the initial decrease in variation that happened in the 1970s, have 
seen a steady increase in variation, for example, in effective contributions and pension 
expenditure. Thus, using Johnson`s approach, we can conclude that no overall convergence 
occurred for pension design parameters, as measured by the most important pension 
indicators.  
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Figure III-17 Coefficient of variation of pension variables throughout decades 
 
To give a statistical underpinning to these findings, I follow Harvey (2002) and Affinito and 
De Bonis (2008), and formally test convergence by testing the stationarity of the difference 
of the two series (o). The procedure is to test in the first step whether the differential of 
the two series is either a nonstationary or stationary process with the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test36:  
po q 
ro>	 
 s	po>	 
t
 supo>u 
 

36
 The augmented Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root is used for higher order AR process. The test includes 
lagged changes of the variable as regressors. It tests the vw r  . If t* > ADF crtitical value, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected, i.e. a unit root exists.Dickey-Fuller t-statistic does not follow a standard 
t-distribution as the sampling distribution of this test statistic is skewed to the left with a long, left-hand-tail. 
Each version of the test has its own critical value which depends on the size of the sample. 
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In the second step, if stationarity is verified, the zero-mean stationarity is tested with 
Kwiatkowski-PhillipsSchmidt-Shin (KPSS) test37. In the case of zero-mean stationarity, the 
series converge.  
I chose to test two long time series – private pension assets and pension expenditure, for 
two reasons: the first is data availability and second is that these two series depict the 
private-public mix in models of pension provision well. There is a break in the former series 
in 2001, especially in Beveridge countries with high values of pension assets, most likely due 
to the events of September 11th and the dot-com bubble collapse (Table III-18).
Figure III-18 Private pension assets (%GDP), Beveridge and Bismarck countries 
 
 
 

37
 KPSS is a one-sided right-tailed stationarity tests, where the null is that a time series is trend stationary 
against the unit root alternative hypothesis. The test is based on the auxiliary regression of A upon an 
intercept and a time trend. The test is xy::  z :g{|}~	  where : is partial sum of residuals and  {|  
estimator for the error variance.  
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Figure III-19 Difference in private pension assets between Beveridge and Bismarck 
countries 
 
Just by visual inspection of the data (Figure III-18 and Figure III-19), it is obvious that the 
series do not converge.  
The formal ADF test confirms no convergence – since the computed ADF test-statistics 
(65.74481) are greater than the critical value ‘tau’ (1.60), the null cannot be rejected. That 
means the series has a unit root and is non-stationary. The coefficient of somewhat more 
than 1 suggests divergence between the data series. Thus, there is no point in proceeding to 
step two – testing the zero-mean stationarity. 
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Table III-16 ADF test for difference in private pension assets in Beveridge and Bismarck 
countries 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     X(-1) 1.024958 0.015590 65.74481 0.0000 
DX(-1) 0.481825 0.183702 2.622858 0.0130 
DX(-2) -0.043294 0.185472 -0.233429 0.8168 
DX(-3) -0.353745 0.182827 -1.934861 0.0614 
DX(-4) 0.174159 0.175791 0.990716 0.3288 
DX(-5) -0.462649 0.204483 -2.262524 0.0302 
DX(-6) 0.443623 0.269418 1.646596 0.1089 
     
     R-squared 0.994156     Mean dependent var 44.66659 
Adjusted R-squared 0.993125     S.D. dependent var 22.56622 
S.E. of regression 1.871099     Akaike info criterion 4.245180 
Sum squared residuals 119.0343     Schwarz criterion 4.537741 
Log likelihood -80.02620     Hannan-Quinn criterion 4.351715 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.159645  1% critical value            ADF(6)=1,600 
  
     
A similar result is found for the series of public expenditure on old-age pensions. Visual 
inspection of the data suggests no convergence – until the beginning of the 1980s 
expenditures increased by the same pace, but from the beginning of the 1980s until the 
2000s there was a divergence in trends: expenditures in Bismarck countries increasing while 
in Beveridge countries they were quite stable.  The difference stopped increasing after the 
beginning of the 2000s (Figure III-20 and  

%)).  
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Figure III-20 Public old-age pension expenditures (%GDP), Beveridge and Bismarck 
countries 
 
 
Figure III-21 Difference in public old-age pension expenditures between Beveridge and 
Bismarck countries 
 
The ADF test confirms no convergence, i.e. slight divergence given the coefficient of 1.0085. 
The ADF test-statistic (108.5666) is greater than the critical value ‘tau’ (0.92), hence the null 
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cannot be rejected. The difference between the public old-age expenditure in Bismarck and 
Beveridge countries is a non-stationary series, and there is no sign of convergence.  
Table III-17 ADF test for difference in public expenditure on old-age pensions      in 
Beveridge and Bismarck countries 
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     Y(-1) 1.008530 0.009290 108.5666 0.0000 
DY(-1) 0.041521 0.152900 0.271556 0.7874 
DY(-2) 0.170397 0.152710 1.115824 0.2712 
DY(-3) 0.337040 0.155011 2.174292 0.0357 
     
     R-squared 0.988739    Mean dependent var 2.480010 
Adjusted R-squared 0.987894    S.D. dependent var 1.073776 
S.E. of regression 0.118145    Akaike info criterion -1.347304 
Sum squared residual 0.558328    Schwarz criterion -1.185105 
Log likelihood 33.64068    Hannan-Quinn criterion -1.287153 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.988442    1% critical value         ADF(3)=0,92 
     
     
4. CONCLUSION 
The foundations of pension systems across the world were laid, roughly speaking, from the 
end of the 19th century until the beginning of the 1960s. With the onset of modern public 
pension programs, policy analysts generally dichotomised countries into two distinct 
models – the Bismarck pension model with the aim to maintain income in old-age, and the 
Beveridge model introduced with the aim to prevent poverty in old-age. This original 
pension policy set-up was influenced by many factors – political, historical, cultural, etc. 
From the beginning of the 1960s, pension programmes have evolved and converged in 
objectives so as to incorporate both goals of pension policy – poverty prevention and 
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income maintenance. Nowadays, a pension is said to be adequate when it manages to 
accomplish both (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005).   
By the 1980s, welfare states had reached their limits of generosity. Economic crises, and 
anticipated demographic pressures, together led to an increasing need for financial stability 
in public pension programs. Consequently, pension reform has emerged as a major issue 
since the early 1990s (Disney, 2000b). The focus of pension policy makers moved 
increasingly towards a policy of retrenchment – cutting benefits generosity by increases in 
the ages of first receipt of pension, changes in benefits indexation, erosion of privileged 
pensions etc. Furthermore, the process of globalisation and EU Open Method of 
Coordination allowed and contributed to the ‘policy transfer’ within pension policy.  
As a result, it might appear that distinct pension models – Bismarck and Beveridge, have 
converged towards each other partly due to the convergence in policy objectives and partly 
due to retrenchment policy reforms. There has been convergence in what Bonoli (2000) 
names pension functions, or what can be called convergence in pension policy objectives. 
This convergence translates in what Overbye (1996) defines as convergence in policy 
outcomes.  
Therefore, this chapter examined whether the design of modern pension systems is still 
influenced by their historical origins – whether the ‘Bismarck system’ or the ‘Beveridge 
system’, or whether programs have converged in the mean time. 
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For this purpose, and for later analysis of retirement saving, I constructed several measures 
or ‘indicators’ of pension program design. Some were utilized by Disney (2004; 2006) in his 
analysis of labour force participation and retirement saving, but I was able to construct 
them using more reliable data sources and for longer time period.   
Subsequently, I conducted three types of empirical analysis using these constructed data. 
Firstly, using a both Tobit and OLS specification, I examined whether the ‘Bismarck design’ 
crowded out private pension savings. Secondly, I used Bonolli`s (1997) two-dimensional 
approach to see if countries still grouped as ‘Bismarck’ and ‘Beveridge’ systems i.e. ‘path 
dependence’. Finally, I perform formal convergence tests.  
The results of the regression of private pension assets on a ‘Bismarck dummy’ and control 
variables suggested a strong impact of historical origins on the volume of private assets in a 
country. The results were robust to choice of sample and  to specification – whether on 
cross-section or panel data.  
The two-dimensional approach of Bonoli (2000), matching combinations of series of 
pension indicators such as pension variation and private assets, or pension variation and RR, 
suggest that countries still broadly cluster as ‘Bismarck’ and ‘Beveridge’, notwithstanding 
policy pressures towards uniformity. An analysis of difference in means between the two 
groups of countries – Bismarck and Beveridge - confirm this conclusion 
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Finally, the formal test of convergence – testing the stationarity of the difference of two 
series with the augmented Dicky-Fuller test, suggests, if anything, a slight divergence 
between Bismarck and Beveridge countries.  
Consequently, despite a convergence in pension policy goals and in an outcome as reflected 
by the total or average replacement rate, no convergence in pension models could be 
found. Pension systems around the world are still very diverse and influenced by the 
original policy choice i.e. historical paths.  
These findings are important for policy makers, as they suggest that more attention should 
be given to the adequacy of each pension policy measure in the particular country setting. 
Moreover, any analysis of household behaviour, such as retirement saving behaviour, which 
gives a primary role of program design, still makes a lot of sense. This analysis of retirement 
saving is pursued in the forthcoming chapter.  
Appendix: List of variables 
VARIABLE 
STATA 
LABEL 
DESCRIPTION SOURCE NOTE 
Replacement rate RR 
The gross current RR at the year of 
statutory retirement (most often 65) for 
those who started working at the age of 
21. Only public mandatory pensions 
included. 
Compilation/calculations by author based on 
Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999); European 
Commission (Social Protection Committee-SPC 
and Indicators Sub-group-ISG) reports; OECD 
Pension at Glance publications, Comparative 
Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED); and 
information on pension parameters from ISSA 
 
Pension variation CV2 
Coefficient of variation between RRs for 4 
household levels:  67% and average, 
single and couple. 
Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) and European 
Commission 
 
IRR- internal rate 
of return 
IRR1 Actual internal rate of return  
Own calculation based on, effective 
contributions, RR, AMECO database for 
earnings growth, UN for life expectancy 
For all indicators assumption is 
2.5% wage growth in 
retirement. 
Variable used in analysis, unless 
otherwise stated is IRR 2. 
IRR2 
Assumption of no wage growth during 
employment 
IRR3 
Actual wage growth during employment , 
assumption that first cohort started 
contributing in the 1950s 
IRR4 
Assumption of no wage growth during 
employment, assumption that first cohort 
started contributing in the 1950s 
Private pension 
assets 
Assets Total private pension assets 
Own compilation/calculation based on Global 
Pension Statistics, extended with Institutional 
Investors data, cross validating the data for the 
years where both sources are available. For 
historical data additional sources – Davis 
(1993), country papers, and information on 
countries’ pension systems 
Details for data series 
construction explained in the 
section 2.1.6 
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Pension 
expenditure 
Expend 
Public Old-Age Pension Expenditure as 
share of GDP.  
Own compilation based on OECD Social 
Expenditure Database (SOCX)
 
stemming from 
1980s, historical data from publication Social 
Expenditures 1960–1990: Problems of Growth 
and Control, OECD (1985) and cross validated 
by ILO 'Cost of Social Security' 
Aggregate includes cash 
benefits for old-age pension, 
anticipated old-age pension, 
partial pension and early 
retirement for non-labour 
market reasons 
Effective pension 
contribution  Contr 
Effective contribution rate for old-age 
pension, calculated as the ratio of the 
ratio of old age pension expenditure and 
wage bill in the economy. 
Own calculations based pension expenditures 
and Compensation of employees: total 
economy from National Accounts, drawn from 
an AMECO database 
This is total effective 
contribution rate paid by both 
the employer and employee 
and expressed as a percentage 
of gross labour 
Pension tax 
PensionTax Pension variation multiplied by the 
average effective contribution rate 
Effective contribution rate and pension 
variation variables 
 
Couple/single 
ratio 
CoupleSingle 
Ratio of replacement rate for dependent 
couple and single average worker 
Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) and CWED  
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IV PENSION SYSTEM DESIGN AND SAVING: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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 higher household saving rates for 
retirement in countries with a lower contribution rate, higher intragenerational 
redistribution within the public system and a greater importance of private pension savings 
i.e. systems that could be classified as ’Beveridge‘; and lower household saving for countries 
with a public system that ‘mimics’ a private system – meaning a higher contribution rate, 
earnings-related pensions and lower private pension assets, i.e. those that can be classified 
as ‘Bismarck’.  
The aim of this chapter is to test empirically the relationship between pension system 
design and household saving. The existing empirical literature primarily deals with the effect 
of the scale (generosity) of a public pension system on saving. Regarding the private pension 
component, there is a significant literature on the effects of voluntary (tax-favoured) private 
pensions on aggregate savings, usually single country evidence, while there are just a few 
cross-country studies on the effect of a funded pension component on saving. The stream 
of research that I seek to address in this paper, which is the effect of pension system design 
(both public and private) on saving, is actually quite limited. A key paper on public pension 
system design was that of Disney (2005) on which the analysis builds on. 
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I use longer dataset with pension design variables calculated in slightly different manner 
with more reliable data sources. In particular, the effective contribution rate is calculated 
using original pension expenditures series instead of estimated support ratios; cross-
validation of few data sources was performed to construct replacement rate series, which in 
turn were used for IRR construction; information on the indexation formula in each country 
again needed for IRR construction was carefully collected from a number of sources, such as 
EC-ISG reports, OECD Pensions at a Glance publications and World Bank’s Pensions 
Panorama. Finally, I have  used improved household saving dataset. 
The analysis is split into three parts. The first part is an examination of the effect of public 
pension design on household saving rates, where I attempt to replicate the analysis of 
Disney (2005).  In the second part, I estimate the effect of the private pension component 
on saving, proxied by the stock of private pension assets as a share of GDP. In the third part 
I attempt to model the overall pension design, taking into account both public and private 
components, using the principal component composite index, which I dubbed the ‘Bismarck 
index’. 
The findings obtained using a number of estimation methods do not confirm the predictions 
of the theoretical analysis. Moreover, the findings are counter-intuitive and do not confirm 
the results obtained by Disney – the study I have attempted to replicate in one part of the 
analysis. 
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Empirical analysis of the effect of pension design on household saving is confronted by a 
number of limitations – methodological issues concerning the household saving measure, 
the complexity of household saving behaviour, a number of determinants exerting the 
opposite effect and the difficulty of finding proxies and data for them, the need to model 
saving inertia and endogeneity, etc. One may argue, as do Horioka and Yin (2010), that a 
number of determinants that have not been controlled for, or have not adequately been 
controlled – such as the wealth effect and borrowing constraints, are the governing 
determinants of household saving, thus blurring the other relationships.  
2. EXISTING EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
2.1. SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMMES AND SAVING 
2.1.1. Effect of the magnitude of PAYG system and saving  
Surveys of the empirical literature on PAYG social security programmes on private saving 
can be found in Magnussen (1994), Mackenzie and Gerson (1997) and Kohl and O`Brien 
(1998). This literature can be classified into time series analysis, cross-country and cross 
section analysis. In general, findings suggest that reducing the generosity of the PAYG 
systems is likely to stimulate a small increase in private saving, but this effect depends on 
many factors – such as the demographic composition and the economic institutions of each 
country. 
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Time series literature 
Time series empirical analyses of the social security effect on savings stem from the work of 
Feldstein (1974). This seminal paper followed the method of Cagan and Katona`s analysis of 
the effect of private pensions on private non-retirement saving. Cagan (1965) performed a 
cross-sectional analysis of saving on 15,000 members of the Consumers Union in 1958–59, 
and found that private pensions did not substitute for other forms of saving. He explains his 
finding by a term he dubbed the ’recognition effect‘. It means that forced retirement saving 
practically has an educational effect, and that an individual is stimulated to save even more 
once he realises that the goal of saving a sufficient amount for the adequate pension 
provision in old-age is ‘within his grasp’ (Murray, 1965: 58). Katona (1965) explained these 
findings with a ‘goal gradient’ hypothesis – ‘effort is intensified the closer one is to one's 
goal’ (Feldstein, 1974:907 as in Katona 1964, p. 4). 
Feldstein (1974) instead explains the possible and unexpected positive effect of social 
security on private saving by ’induced retirement’. Social security ‘increases personal saving 
because it lengthens the period of retirement over which accumulated assets will be spread’ 
(Feldstein, 1974:908). Nonetheless, he reminds us that social security could also act as a 
substitute for household saving; hence the overall effect is not clear and is an empirical 
matter. Therefore, he estimates the impact on consumption for the period 1929–1971, 
using annual time series US data for social security wealth. He found a positive statistically 
significant coefficient of social security wealth on consumption, and thereby calculates the 
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effect on saving based on the estimated coefficients. He finds that social security depresses 
personal saving by 30-50 percent per dollar of benefit, depending on specification.  
The Feldstein 1974 article is perhaps the most famous in the PAYG/saving literature, but 
also produced a good deal of controversy. Barro (1978) claimed that Feldstein’s estimation 
was biased due to the omission of government saving as one of the determinants of the 
consumption function. He demonstrated that social security wealth was not statistically 
significant when government saving was included in the regression. Leimer and Lesnoy 
(1982) also challenged Feldstein`s findings. They argued that the social security wealth 
variable used by Feldstein was seriously flawed as a result of a computer-programming 
error, and that findings were highly sensitive to the assumptions he made to construct the 
social security wealth variable. Indeed, Leimer and Lesnoy replicated Feldstein`s original 
analysis and found no effect of social security on saving. However, in later work, Feldstein 
(1996) corrected the programming error and added about 20 observations to his original 
1974 paper, and found a displacement of overall private savings by nearly 60 percent.  
Schmidt-Hebbel (1998) investigates the effect of the 1981 pension reform, which reduced 
the generosity of the public programme in Chile, by decomposing data on national savings 
as a percent of GDP. He finds that pension reform contributed to the overall increase in 
national savings.  
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Cross section literature  
There are a number of cross-section studies, most of them using USA micro data. Using 
1962–63 data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, Feldstein and Pellechio (1979) found 
a negative relationship between Social Security wealth and household savings – the offset in 
private pensions ranging from 50% to more than 100%, depending on specification.  
Exploiting a larger sample of more than 2,000 observations for male household heads aged 
45–59 conducted by the Bureau of Census, Kotlikoff (1979) used a similar econometric 
specification to the one employed by Feldstein and Pellechio (1979). He included more 
controls in the regression, such as dummies for marriage, race, widowed, or divorced, etc. 
His results are in line with those obtained by Feldstein and Pellechio. 
King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) considered the relationship in a microeconomic dataset 
drawn from 1977 Canadian data, which covered 8279 households excluding those headed 
by single women and below a certain income level. They reported an offset of private saving 
with public pension of around 17%.  
Gale (1995) estimated a sample of USA data from 1983 that covered households with full-
time workers aged 40–64 and excluded farm and self-employed households. He found 
displacement of around 11%. 
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Cross country literature 
Barro and MacDonald (1979) studied 16 industrialised countries for the 1951–60 period. 
They found a significant negative correlation between consumption and PAYG pension 
benefits, implying that public pension wealth actually stimulated savings. However, when 
they included individual country fixed effects in their model, the sign on pension wealth 
reversed. They concluded that the effect of pension wealth on savings differed between 
cross section and time series – countries with higher levels of pension wealth had higher 
savings, while increases in pension wealth over time lowered private savings. 
Feldstein (1980) analysed a short panel of 12 OECD countries and found that social security 
significantly reduces private saving – an increase of the benefit-to-earnings ratio by 10 
percentage points reduces the saving rate by approximately 3 percentage points.  
There are a few papers stemming from the saving determinants literature that include some 
measure of social security, for example, the influential work by Edwards (1996) where he 
estimates from a panel of 32 countries to study the determinants of private savings. Among 
a number of variables, he includes a social security variable that is defined as the ratio of 
public expenditure on social security and welfare to total public expenditures. In all the 
regressions presented in his paper, the social security variable has a negative statistically 
significant coefficient on private savings.  
Callen and Thimman (1997) use a panel of 21 OECD countries spanning from 1975 to 1995. 
Among the usual saving determinant variables, a special focus of the paper was given to 
 3)
public policy in the form of tax and social security variables. They found that higher 
government transfers were associated with lower saving.  
Bloom et al. (2007) model saving behaviour with respect to demographic and pension 
policy. They utilise a panel of 60 countries for three data points: 1961, 1981 and 2002. 
Pension policy is proxied with four variables – the replacement rate for PAYG and for a 
mandatory funded system, retirement incentives and universal coverage. Regressions are 
estimated with OLS, fixed effect and a dynamic panel specification. The dependency ratio is 
negative and significant in all specifications. The coefficient on the RR from the PAYG 
programme is surprisingly positive and significant, whereas the RR from the funded system 
is negative and significant in some specifications (OLS and fixed effects).  
Hurd et al. (2009) combine cross-country and within-country variation exploiting survey 
data for a few countries. They estimate the effect of pension system on financial wealth and 
suggest a displacement effect of roughly -25 to -45 cents of financial assets for every 
additional dollar of pension wealth. They conclude that the results confirm previous findings 
on saving displacement, but argue that displacement is lower than what the standard life 
cycle hypothesis would predict. Therefore, they suggest areas for further research on 
institutions such as labour market regulations and borrowing constraints, to ‘enrich our 
understanding  of the reasons behind the imperfect displacement effect’ (p. 16). 
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2.1.2. Effect of public pension system design on saving 
The debate on the social security programmes and its impact on household saving has 
focused on size of the PAYG system, but the design of the social security programme may 
also matter. Pension design was a subject of analytical interest to some extent, as in 
Feldstein (1987) and Lindbeck and Persson (2003).  
Disney (2005; 2006a) introduced the analysis of the effect of design of social security 
programmes on saving into the empirical literature. He argues that the effects of social 
security programmes on household behaviour depend on programme design features, such 
as how closely a particular social security programme mimics a private retirement saving 
programme. He examines this for the panel of 21 OECD countries, for mid-points of three 
decades – the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  
Two particularly important variables were used to capture design features of the public 
pension programme in his analysis. The first, termed the pension tax, is designed to 
measure deviation from ‘intragenerational actuarial fairness’, i.e. the Beveridge component 
of the public pension programme. This is a coefficient of variation of replacement rates 
across several household types in the same country and year, multiplied by the average 
effective contribution rate. The first step to construct this ‘pension tax’ variable was to 
derive average effective contribution rate constructed as the average replacement rate of 
pensions to earnings divided by the system support ratio. The second step was to calculate 
the coefficient of variation of replacement rates across different household types. For this 
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calculation, he used data in Bl△ndal and Scarpetta (1998) – replacement rates for workers in 
their mid-50s, at different levels of lifetime earnings in a single/couple household, which 
was expected when they reach the statutory retirement age, usually 65. The third step was 
to multiply this coefficient of variation by the average effective contribution rate and get 
the variable ‘pension tax’. In his analysis, the ‘pension tax’ variable is expected to lower the 
offset effect for a given average level of social security benefits, ceteris paribus.  
The second variable, termed the intergenerational rate of return (IRR at 65), is designed to 
capture deviations from ‘intergenerational actuarial fairness’ defined as the rate of return 
on a funded scheme, which is in turn assumed to be equal in all countries. This variable (IRR 
at 65) is a proxy for the Lindbeck and Persson (2003) variable G, which is a rate of return at 
which the present value of the stream of contributions paid is equal to the present value of 
the stream of pension benefits. When IRR is lower than the rate of return on private funded 
schemes, there is a departure from intergenerational actuarial fairness. Fenge and Werding 
(2003 and 2004) call this difference the ‘implicit tax’ arising from PAYG financing. Again, the 
effective contribution rate was exploited and Bl△ndal and Scarpetta (1998) expected 
replacement rates were used to calculate expected pension benefits. A higher ‘IRR’ is 
expected to raise the offset effect, ceteris paribus.   
The empirical model is estimated by generalised least squares, weighted by civilian 
employment. Estimation shows a positive impact of ‘pension tax’ on household saving and a 
negative effect from the IRR, suggesting that public pension programmes which more 
closely imitate private programmes are associated with a lower household saving rate. This 
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finding implies that the question of the effect of pension system design on saving is closely 
related to tax incentives. Since the whole idea behind the analysis is the individual 
perception of contributions – tax or contributions – when contributions are perceived as 
merely a ‘tax’, they do not act as a disincentive for saving, while when perceived as a 
pension ‘contribution’ with a rate of return as in private investments, this will offset any 
additional private saving.  
2.2. PRIVATE PENSIONS AND SAVING 
When it comes to the analysis of private pension programmes on savings, the literature is 
mainly focused on the effects of voluntary (tax-favoured) private pensions on savings. The 
literature mostly utilises cross-section and time series analyses within a single country, 
rather than cross-country analyses. 
Kohl and O`Brien (1998) provide a survey of the effects of tax-favoured saving accounts 
(henceforth TFSA) on private savings, concluding that TFSA increased net private saving by 
20 to 25 percent of total amount placed in a TFSA, but as they generate tax expenditures, 
national saving is almost unchanged. Engen et al. (1994, 1996) and Poterba et al. (1995, 
1996) debate whether US retirement saving schemes (IRA and 401k) increased the private 
saving rate, and argue that the bulk of IRA and 401(k) contributions are net additions to 
saving. However, Davis and Hu (2005) in their review of the literature concluded that 
empirical work finds positive but limited influence of pension funds on saving. 
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A paper by Samwick (2000) tried to estimate whether a transition to a funded public 
pension programme results in higher savings. The sample comprises 150 countries and 
spans the years 1960 to 1995. He first estimates panel fixed effects regressions on typical 
saving determinants, and then uses residuals for each country in which a pension reform 
was implemented and performs a time series analysis. The residuals were regressed on 
dummy variables for the year of the reform. None of the countries other than Chile 
experienced a significant increase in the trend in the savings residual after the reform.  
Buffa and Monticone (2006) used a similar approach in the analysis of pension reforms in 
EU countries. In the first stage of investigation, they estimated a typical saving regression 
using fixed effects estimators. In the second stage, they studied the behaviour of saving 
residuals over time for countries that implemented reform in the 1990s. They found no 
evidence regarding a change in neither private nor national saving with respect to pension 
reform.  
When it comes to the line of research analysing cross-country evidence of the effects of 
private pensions on saving, there are three main papers: Baillu and Reisen (1997), Murphy 
and Musalem (2004) and Bebczuk and Musalem (2006). All three studies rely on the OECD 
as a source for pension funds assets – the Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook.  
The most cited paper in this line of research, probably since it is the oldest one, is the study 
by Baillu and Reisen (1997). They estimated the effect of funded pension wealth (using 8 
different proxies – such as variations of assets managed by pension funds and life insurance 
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companies) on private saving rates, controlling for other determinants as in Edwards (1996). 
They used an unbalanced panel of 11 countries, of which 7 are OECD, in the period 1982–
1993. The impact of pension wealth on saving is allowed to differ for OECD and non-OECD 
countries by interacting the pension wealth variable with two different dummies. The 
methodology used is a fixed effects estimator and 2SLS to address two-way causality 
between the growth rate and savings. They find that the demographically adjusted stock of 
pension assets increases private saving rates, but the results were not significant when 
other variables are used (the net flow of assets and the GDP-adjusted stock). They interpret 
their results as showing that the increase in pension assets relative to the working-age 
population — but not relative to GDP — exerts a positive and statistically significant impact 
on aggregate savings rates. Furthermore, they find that the impact of private pension 
wealth on saving is more pronounced in developing countries than in OECD, which is 
intuitive due to tighter borrowing constraints and the mandatory rather than voluntary 
status of funded pension schemes. They perform the same regression on national saving 
data and do not find any significant results. 
The study by Murphy and Musalem (2004) appears to be the first large cross-country 
empirical study on the effects of private pensions on national saving. They chose national 
instead of private saving, and defend this choice with the aim to avoid data measurement 
problems. The main determinant of interest is what they termed the pension saving rate – 
the ratio between pension saving and gross national disposable income. Pension saving is 
defined as a flow – the change in the value of financial assets of autonomous pension funds. 
They used an unbalanced sample of countries and a long time span – a data set which 
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comprises 43 countries and spans from 1960 to 2002, although the span depends on the 
country since this panel is heavily unbalanced38. Countries are divided into two groups – the 
first comprises the countries in which the data on pension assets are predominantly (more 
than 50 percent) the result of mandatory funded pension programmes; and second the 
group of countries in which data on pension assets are predominantly the result of 
voluntary funded pension programmes. They control for other national saving determinants 
used in the saving literature (such as GDP level and growth, demographics, inflation etc.), 
and look at the difference between mandatory and voluntary systems utilising interaction 
terms39. They apply OLS estimators on pooled data and find one-for-one increases in 
national saving for the increase in mandatory pension savings i.e. ‘not much substitution 
between mandatory pension saving and ordinary saving’ (page 32). Conversely, they find a 
decrease in national saving for the increase in voluntary funded pension saving, and 
interpret this result by a fall in government saving due to the fiscal incentives typically 
related to voluntary pension savings. To control for country specific effects they use the 
two-way fixed effects model and, to control for endogeneity, GMM (Arellano-Bond) 
estimators. The results for mandatory pension saving regression are robust and suggest 
more than 50 percent of increase in saving due to the mandatory pension savings in the 
long run, while voluntary funded pension saving turns out not to be significant.  
The more recent cross-country study is conducted by Bebczuk and Musalem (2006). This 
paper builds on the work and the database assembled by Murphy and Lopez (2004), and is  
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 The paper quotes 1960 as the first year for the data span, however, in the annex available upon request the 
earliest data point is 1980 for some of the OECD countries. 
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 They also ran  simple regressions separately for mandatory and voluntary systems.
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extended for two more years and five more countries – creating an unbalanced sample of 
48 developed and developing countries, over the 1980–2004 time span. As in Murphy and 
Musalem (2004), the main variable of interest is a pension saving variable – defined as the 
annual change in the value of the stock of pension funds. Their main finding is that a one-
dollar increase in pension saving increases national saving by between 0 and 20 cents. In the 
baseline regression, controlling for standard saving determinants, results suggest that a one 
dollar increase in pension saving translates into 10 cents of additional national saving. 
Contrary to Murphy and Musalem, the findings suggest that there is no stronger effect in 
systems with mandatory participation. When entered separately in the regression, the age 
of the funded pension system variable (proxied by the number of years for which 
information on the stock of pension funds is available) is not only significant, but has a 
coefficient of 0.5. Hence, authors argue that ‘each additional year adds 0.5 percentage 
points to the national saving rate, everything else equal’.  
They also partitioned the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries. At first glance, it 
appears that the significance of pension saving is driven by non-OECD countries, which can 
be explained by the existence of borrowing constraints. However, on closer examination – 
excluding observations prior to 1990 – the pension saving coefficient is no longer significant. 
This suggests ‘that there might be influential observations in the pre-1990 period’ (p. 17). 
The econometric methodology applied in the Babczuk and Musalem (2006) paper is to use 
fixed and random effects. They rightly point to the problem of endogeneity of some 
regressors in the savings equation, and to the bias to which this leads. Therefore, they also 
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model the relationship dynamically, introducing lags for possible endogenous variables 
(such as per capita GDP growth, inflation rate, credit to private sector etc.) and for the 
dependent variable to capture ‘inertial behaviour’. However, though they clearly state that 
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects renders biased and 
inconsistent coefficients, they nonetheless apply fixed and random effects econometric 
techniques to their dynamic model specification. This is done under the explanation that 
GMM, although a ‘rather popular and sophisticated technique quite often generates weak 
instruments, which in the end means that the endogeneity issue is far from being solved.’ 
(page 19.) 
Succinctly, although in general there is a large body of literature when it comes to the empirical 
analysis of pension systems and saving, the stream of research that addresses cross-country 
evidence is actually quite limited, especially when it comes to the analysis of both public and private 
component of pension system design. In what follows is the attempt to fill in this gap in the existing 
literature.  
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The aim of this chapter is to examine empirically the effect of pension programme design on 
saving – both public pension design, as well as the extent to which contributions to private 
funded schemes (both mandatory and voluntary) have been offset by households reducing 
the other forms of saving.  
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I utilise the model derived in Chapter: 
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where 	3 is saving by the ‘young’ generation in period 1 
	3 is the income of the ‘young’ generation in period 1  
c(X/(X  is the the saving rate of the ‘young’ generation in period 1 
   captures time preference; 
 is the market interest rate; 
M is the ‘Bismarckian factor’ – the weight on the earnings related component of the system, 
while q  is the weight on the Beveridge (flat-rate pension) component;  
IJ is the internal rate of return on public pension contributions in the Bismarkian 
component, where the rate of return is the same for every income earner level;  
 I is the internal rate of return on public contributions in the Beveridgean systems, where 
rates of return tend to vary for different earning levels,
  Q is the contribution into the funded system,  
 a ` a  is the private funded pensions displacement coefficient,  
and    is the contribution rate to the PAYG system.  
This model suggests that the private saving rate is unambiguously negatively affected by the 
size of the PAYG public pension system – the higher the payroll tax for financing it, the 
lower the savings.  
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In addition, the private saving rate is affected by pension system design. The higher the 
internal rate of return in the social security system (IJ), there is an offset in household 
saving (
&c(Xg/(X&VJ  <0). Conversely, the more redistributive the system is, i.e. closer to the 
Beveridge model of pension provision, the higher are the overall incentives to save. In 
particular, for low income earners the internal rate of return in the Beveridge system is 
higher than the market interest rate, meaning a disincentive to save. However, as for the 
average and high-income earners the internal rate of return in redistributive systems is low, 
for them there is an incentive to save. Since higher income earners are generally higher 
savers, and usually most of the private saving is done by them (Blinder, 1975; Diamond and 
Hausman 1984; Bernheim and Scholz 1993; Hubbard et al. 1995; Dynan et al. 2004, Disney, 
2006a), one should expect an overall positive effect.  
A mandatory funded pension programme should have a positive effect on overall household 
saving. How much exactly the maginitude of this effect is, depends on the displacement 
coefficient. With the hypothetical assumption of perfect capital markets (no borrowing 
constraint), the overall household saving would not increase with the introduction of a 
funded pension system, only a change in the form of saving would happen. Moreover, the 
displacement coefficient is theoretically possible to take a value greater than 1, meaning 
that households run into higher debt than they would otherwise. Displacement, however, is 
not expected to be one-for-one due to borrowing constraints, induced retirement and/or 
the recognition effect.  
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Linearising the theoretical model in equation IV-1, gives the following panel data empirical 
specification (dubbed Variant 1 in the results section): 
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Where 9  represents c(X/(X – the household saving rate; 
 9  is a vector of country specific characteristics captured with country dummy variables  
889   stands for the internal rate of return of the PAYG system  
 IJ; 
y9  is the pension variation variable and stands for   M, which is proxied by the 
coefficient of variation of replacement rates for different types of earners; 
9  stands for pension contributions;  
Q9 for contributions into the funded system and is proxied by the stock of private pension 
assets; 
09   stands for the interest rate; 
9   is a set of control variables usually used in the literature on saving determinants, such as 
GDP growth, old-age dependency, proxy for financial liquidity, government consumption 
Coefficient on G is 	 and captures also 		#  as well as alpha 
Coefficient on proxy for   M is   		V	#  
Coefficient of funded component Q is 5 and captures  
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I also estimate a similar equation based on Disney (2005), Variant 2: 
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In the ‘variant 2’, intragenerational redistribution is captured with the ‘pension tax’ variable, 
calculated as the product of pension variation and the effective contribution rate. In this 
variant, contributions do not enter the equation separately.  
Hence, the difference between two variants is in the form that pension design variables 
enter the equation. In the ‘variant 1’, which is directly derived from the theoretical model 
presented in Chapter III, ‘pension variation’ variable is used as a measure of 
intragenerational redistribution, and effective contribution rate as a measure of burden by 
PAYG system enter the equation separately. In the ‘variant 2’, both intragenerational 
redistribution and contribution rate level is captured by one variable, the ‘pension tax’.  
I use both versions to explore the robustness of the findings. The advantage of the ‘variant 
1’ is being directly derived from theoretical model, while the ‘variant 2’ is preferred due to  
fewer number of pension design variables i.e. the less chances for multicollinearity, and 
since it allows to replicate Disney (2005) more accurately.  
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4. EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS: DATA AND ESTIMATION 
ISSUES 
The empirical analysis of saving is challenging due to the problems of saving data availability 
and quality. Additionally, saving modelling is hampered by endogeneity problems, saving 
inertia, and the complexity of saving behaviour.  
4.1.  MULTIPLE SAVING DETERMINANTS, SAVING INERTIA, ENDOGENEITY 
The theory suggests a number of motives for household saving: the life-cycle motive, hence 
the need to save for retirement; the precautionary motive in response to uncertainty 
regarding future income and the bequest motive. Browning and Lusardi (1995) also describe 
other motives, such as the intertemporal substitution motive – to enjoy interest and 
appreciation; the improvement motive – to enjoy a gradual increase in spending; the 
independence motive, the enterprise motive; the avarice motive, being an irrational motive; 
and they add one more – the down-payment motive, to accumulate deposits to buy houses 
and durable goods.  
The importance of all these motives varies across individuals/households depending on 
their consumption habits, time preferences, risk aversion, etc. Therefore, there are a great 
number of variables that can impact an saving behaviour at the national level, such as the 
age structure of household members, type of households (married/single/children/lone 
parents), life expectancy, household`s wealth, time preferences, consumption habits, risk 
aversion etc. In addition, there may be cross-country variation in time preference and risk-
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aversion, as well as in bequest motive. Furthermore, a number of public policies and 
institutions affect saving behavior – the development of financial markets, pension and tax 
policy, the health and education system etc.  
Besides, the effect of some variables on saving is ambiguous from the theoretical viewpoint. 
For instance, income growth should raise savings; however, if this encourages individuals to 
anticipate higher future income, they will consume more today thus lowering the saving 
rate (Hufner and Koske, 2010). The effect of financial development and liberalisation on 
private saving is theoretically ambiguous, ‘not only because the link between interest rate  
levels and saving is itself ambiguous, but also because some dimensions of it, such as  
increased household access to consumer credit or housing finance, might also work to 
reduce private savings rather than increasing it’ (Bandiera et al. 2000: 1). Developed capital 
markets should provide greater saving opportunities, hence, stimulate household savings, 
but at the same time complexities of financial products may lead to financial illiteracy, 
which hampers savings (Lusardi, 2008; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011). Furthermore, some 
parameters within the same policy field may have divergent effects. For example, in 
generous pension systems replacement rates should have an adverse effect on saving, while 
early retirement may have a positive effect due to the induced retirement effect. 
Despite considerable empirical analysis, which is vast and diverse in terms of micro and 
macro investigation, different dependent variables used, various explanatory variables, 
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different samples used and the estimation techniques employed40, saving, and in particular 
household saving is still little understood (Börsch-Supan and Lusardi, 2002). Economists 
have been puzzled with high household savings in Germany and Italy, despite substantial 
public sector retirement and health benefits, and traditionally low and declining old saving 
rates in the US.  
Detailed country case studies shed more light on the complexity of saving. Poterba (1994) 
based on the study of six countries, points to the multifaceted relationship between 
individual saving and social security. He suggests, ‘the bequest motive or similar factors may 
be a key explanation for some components of saving behaviour’ (Ibid: 9). Similarly, a cross-
country study on 6 countries41 conducted by Börsch-Supan and Lusardi (2002), shows how 
the relationship between a social security system and saving can be misinterpreted if it does 
not control for down-payment ratios.  
Consequently, modelling saving behaviour is quite complex as there are many potentially 
important determinants of savings, for some of which it is often difficult to find proxies and 
available data, especially for the ‘70s and ‘80s and for the larger set of countries. Börsch-
Supan and Lusardi (2002) argue that understanding saving behaviour cannot be achieved 
within single country studies – neither by time series variation in aggregate data, nor with 
cross sectional data from a single country. They advocate using panel data sets that 
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 Loyaza et al. (2000) and more recently Hufner and Koske (2010) provide literature survey on cross country 
macroeconomic determinants of saving. For example, Callen and Thiman (1997) study the household saving 
behaviour among 21 OECD countries over the period 1975-95; Masson et al. (1998) examine the determinants 
of the private saving rate in a sample of 21 OECD countries over 1971-93.
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combine the cross-sectional variation within a country with the time-series variation of that 
country. However, as they point out, these data sets are usually short and therefore rarely 
include sufficient policy changes and ‘historical experiments.’ ‘This particularly applies to 
one potentially very important determinant of saving, namely public pension policy’ (p. 2.).  
Concisely, finding an appropriate set of data to analyse saving behaviour, which would allow 
for capturing both institutional and policy variations, as well as individual/country 
heterogeneity, is quite a challenge. In addition, multicollinearity issues will usually plague 
saving models with a great number of explanatory variables, which are needed to 
understand saving behaviour.   
Furthermore, most empirical studies on the determinants of saving recognise the need to 
model saving inertia with lagged saving variable. Extensions of the life cycle hypothesis, 
especially habit formation models, suggest persistence in consumer behaviour, which in turn 
leads to saving inertia. However, modelling saving rates with lagged saving as an 
explanatory variable, which is a solution to the saving inertia issue, induces serial correlation 
in the model that needs to be addressed.  
Additionally, there is an endogeneity (two-way causality) problem whereby GDP growth is 
introduced as an explanatory variable to saving. First, growth will tend to affect the saving 
rate through income increase. On the other hand, saving will tend to impact on growth via 
the capital accumulation effect. Also, there might be a reverse causality between the value 
of private pension assets and the saving rate, via the income growth channel. An increase in 
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private pension assets may exert an impact on household saving, which in turn will lead to 
income growth, and this will provide more room for private pension saving. Whether this 
will indeed further increase saving is an empirical question.   
4.2. SAVING DATA DEFINITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES  
Saving is defined as the difference between disposable income and final consumption 
expenditure. It therefore reflects the residual income used to acquire financial and non-
financial assets (OECD, 2011).  
Since the system of national accounts (SNA) recommends breaking the economy down into 
at least five sectors, aggregate saving can be calculated for each institutional sector and for 
the whole economy42. Accordingly, there are aggregates like household saving, corporate 
saving, personal saving, private saving, government saving, domestic and national saving.  
Household saving is unconsumed household income, defined as household disposable 
income less current consumption. Personal saving is saving by households and non-profit 
institutions serving households (NPISH)43. As not all countries distinguish NPISH as a 
separate sector, personal saving is used interchangeably with household saving.  
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 SNA divides the economy into the corporate sector (nonfinancial and financial corporate sector), general 
government, and non-profit institutions serving households (NPISHs), and the household sector.
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 This sector includes bodies such as charities, trade unions and churches (Verrinder, 2002).
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Corporations by definition do not have final consumption, hence corporate saving equals 
their disposable income (OECD, 2011). Private saving equals personal saving plus corporate 
saving.  
For the economy as a whole, there are two common aggregates – domestic saving and 
national saving. They differ concerning the measure used for disposable income – gross 
domestic product (GDP) or gross disposable income (GDI)44.  
Domestic saving equals GDP as a measure of disposable income minus total final 
consumption. National saving is gross national disposable income minus total final 
consumption45. Final consumption in either case includes goods and services that are used 
by households or the community to satisfy their individual wants and social needs, and thus 
includes final consumption expenditure of households, general government and NPISH 46. 
Each aggregate is typically calculated as a ratio – a share of income that is not consumed. 
Each saving rate can be calculated either gross or net of consumption of fixed capital. The 
net measure reduces saving by the amount required to replace consumption of fixed 
capital.  
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 SNA93/ESA95 use GDI. Gross Domestic Product + net primary income from the rest of the world 
(compensation of employees and property income) = Gross national income (GNI). This aggregate is similar to 
the gross national product (GNP), except that in measuring GNP one does not deduct the indirect business 
taxes. Gross national disposable income (GNDI) = GNI + net current transfers from the rest of the world (such 
as remittances).
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Saving data generally suffer from low quality. Since it is defined as a residual between 
income and consumption, saving will be affected by errors in the measurement of either 
receipts or disbursements. Relatively minor errors in either income or consumption can 
result in large errors in residually measured saving (Blades, 1982 as in Elmeskov et al, 1991). 
Household saving rates suffer from some additional measurement problems, which will be 
discussed below.  
Household saving is disposable income less current consumption. Household disposable 
income consists essentially of income from employment and from the operation of 
unincorporated enterprises, plus receipts of interest, dividends and social benefits minus 
payments of current taxes, interest and social contributions (OECD, 2011b). 
On the consumption side, both durable and non-durable goods are part of final 
consumption, while the purchases for own-construction or improvements of residential 
housing are treated as part of gross capital formation. Many authors argued that treating 
durable goods as consumption is inconsistent, as durables create a stream of services over 
time in a similar way to housing, thereby underestimating the household saving rate. 
Perozek and Reinsdorf (2002) compared the US published household saving rate data with 
the adjusted measure for consumer durables, and found that the adjustment raises personal 
saving between 1 percent and 3.1 percent of disposable income, but does not significantly 
alter the trend of decline in the saving rate in the late 1990s. However, in the follow-up 
study, Reinsdorf (2007) suggests that in the most r
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durable goods slightly slows the decline in the US saving rate. Blades and Sturm (1982 :18) 
show that the exclusion of consumer durable goods from household consumption 
expenditure had a significant impact on saving ratios during the 70s – around 3 percentage 
points of disposable income in Japan and up to 10 in Canada. Jalava and Kavonius (2007) 
show that, due to the exclusion of durable goods from consumption, saving ratios in the 
euro area were on average one to two percentage points underestimated in 1999–2003, 
while this effect varies significantly between member states. Consequently, it seems that 
such adjustments tend to reduce between-country differences significantly. 
A further difficulty with household saving is that not all countries distinguish non-profit 
institutions serving households (NPISH) as a separate institutional sector. To overcome this 
problem it is necessary to combine NPISH with the household sector for all countries 
included in any comparative study. In 2003, there were five countries that did not include 
NPISH – the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Japan and New Zealand. So far, only New 
Zealand followed the instructions of the OECD National Account Expert group and included 
NPISH in the household saving aggregate. However, the magnitude of the NPISH sector is 
usually negligible, thus this methodological issue should not cause much of the problem47.  
More importantly, the household sector includes unincorporated enterprises that are small 
businesses and some partnerships. The scale and activity of these institutions vary 
significantly across countries, being relatively high in Mediterranean and rather low in 
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 Catte and Boissinot (2005) show that the effect of excluding NPISH for France and Japan is minuscule (the 
adjustment changes their saving rate by only 0.1 pp over the period 1996-2003) (cited in Hufner and Koske, 
2010). 
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Scandinavian countries. Given that companies, by definition have no final consumption 
expenditure, their total income counts as saving. This may be the reason why countries with 
a high proportion of unincorporated enterprises, like Italy, Spain and Greece, will show 
correspondingly higher household saving rates (Verrinder, 2002). 
A very important issue regarding the measurement of household savings is the treatment of 
pensions. Originally, only unfunded pension schemes were registered in household 
accounts, while flows toward funded pension schemes were treated just as financing 
transactions and recorded in the financial accounts. To achieve greater correspondence 
with household income measures derived from household surveys, SNA 93/ESA95 
recommended including funded pension schemes in the secondary distribution of income 
account (Harvey, 2004). This means parallel accounting of funded pension contributions and 
benefits as if they were unfunded plans – contributions paid into the schemes are recorded 
as an expense for households (therefore reducing saving), and pensions paid by the 
schemes as a receipt for households (thereby increasing disposable income rather than dis-
saving). However, as this creates a mis-measurement that would have resulted in saving via 
pension funds being excluded from the measure for household saving, the SNA93/ESA95 
also introduced a correction factor into household saving for funded schemes – adjustment 
for the change in net equity of households in pension funds
48. Household saving ratios are 
derived by adding this adjustment both to the household saving and to the household 
disposable income. 
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This adjustment factor may affect international comparability of household saving data if 
not applied consistently. For example, if one analyses adjustment factor data available from 
national account statistics, it is surprising to see zero values for Denmark and very low 
values for the UK. It is also interesting to note that ‘the US, Canada and Australia – three 
major countries with pension funds – do not record this item because they do not use the 
parallel accounting that generates it’ (Lequiller and Blades, 2006:174).  
Furthermore, some authors argue that treatment of DB and DC funded pension should not 
be the same. In case of DB pensions, the firm’s contribution to its pension plan does not 
have to equal the increase in the actuarial value of the firm’s expected pension liability. 
Similar to the situation of household’s saving being affected with capital gains, a firm that 
has large gains on its investments may not need to make pension contributions to meet its 
pension obligations. As a result, in periods of large capital gains, such as the 1990s, the 
pension component of personal saving may fall even if the actuarial value of promised 
pension benefits rises49. The new SNA/200850 provides some recommendations addressing 
these issues (Lequiller and Blades, 2006).  
Besides, Elmeskov et al. (1991) argues that ‘sectoral measures of saving are distorted in 
periods with inflation’. Since the household sector is a net holder of corporate debt, with 
inflation the household sector incurs capital losses on these holdings. Correspondingly, the 
corporate sector incurs capital gains. Therefore, the income and saving of the household 
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 Private saving is unaffected by such changes in pension plan contributions because it combines personal and 
business saving (Reinsdorf, 2002; Perosek and Reinsdorf, 2007).
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sector is overstated during periods of inflation, while that of the corporate sector is 
understated by the equal amount. In particular, ‘because the personal sector tends to be a 
net lender to other sectors, a decline in personal saving will be observed as inflationary 
pressures wane’ (Perozek and Reinsdorf, 2002: 19). On the aggregate level these effects 
offset, hence the national saving rate is a more reliable measure.  
Finally, one of the most important sources of non-comparability relates to the gross vs. net 
method of calculation of the household saving ratio (Lequiller and Blades, 2006). It is 
conceptually preferable to use net household saving ratios because the cost of using up 
capital assets in the process of production should be deducted from both income and saving 
(Harvey, 2004). However, there are reasons for preferring a gross ratio. First, it corresponds 
more closely to the observed financial flows, whereas the net ratio is artificial in that it 
incorporates an imputed flow, i.e. the consumption of fixed capital (Lequiller and Blades, 
2006). Second, it may be preferable to use gross measure in international comparisons since 
there is probably a certain lack of harmonisation between countries` measurement of 
consumption of fixed capital (Eurostat, 2002).  
Nonetheless, the OECD publishes net ratios, while few countries chose to report only gross 
ratios. In particular, until 2003, seven countries (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom) recorded household saving ratios in their national 
account on the gross basis. There are still four countries that report household saving ratios 
on the gross basis – France, Portugal, Spain and the UK. Lequiller and Blades (2006: 79) 
illustrate, using the UK example, the magnitude of improperness of the comparison that can 
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be made. For the period 2000–2003, the gross household saving ratio for the UK reported in 
OECD publications/database ranged from 5–6.5 percent of household disposable income, 
while the net household ratio, calculated by Lequiller and Blades, ranged from 0.5–2 
percent. They conclude that ‘saving behaviour in the United Kingdom turns out to be 
comparable to that of the United States, and not, as Table 3 incorrectly indicated51, 
somewhere between that of the United States and Germany’ (p. 79). Therefore, one should 
be careful when using household saving rate data not to combine net and gross values.  
As regards the interpretation of household saving data, there is also an issue of household 
consumption of public services. The extent to which an individual pays for services such as 
education and health, varies considerably between countries. Household saving will not be 
directly affected by these differences, although household saving ratios will. Namely, if the 
government provides these services for ‘free’ – meaning they are financed by income taxes 
from households – income of household as well as consumption will be lower in comparison 
to the country where households pay for these services explicitly. However, in the first case 
– the one where the government provides services – the household saving ratio will be 
higher because the denominator (disposable income) of the ratio will be lower by the 
amount of additional income tax that is required to finance the free education and health 
services. One of the innovations of the SNA 93 was the disaggregation of government final 
consumption expenditure into individual (e.g. education and health) and collective (e.g. 
defence) expenditure. This enables an alternative household saving ratio to be calculated 
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using adjusted disposable income (the sum of household disposable income and 
government individual consumption) rather than disposable income in the denominator 
(Harvey, 2004). 
Another significant difficulty in interpreting household saving ratios is the fact that capital 
gains and losses are excluded from the definition of income in SNA93. The value of 
household assets – housing, monetary and financial investments – varies over time.  As long 
as these assets have not been sold, these ‘holding gains’ are only potential – hence the term 
‘unrealised capital gains (or losses)’ is applied to them. The day a household actually makes 
a capital gain by selling an asset, it is said to be ‘realised’. As regards investment income, 
only interest and dividends are included in household income52. However, capital gains 
taxes are deducted from disposable income (Audenis et al, 2002:13). 
The treatment of capital gains/losses in such a way raised two issues. First, capital 
gains/losses affect saving, and there is a need to capture this effect. Rather than adjusting 
the household saving ratio for capital gains/losses directly, it is recommended that capital 
gains/losses be used as an additional explanatory variable when analysing household 
consumption behaviour (Harvey, 2003). Indeed, several studies have related the declines in 
private saving rates in the late 1990s to the substantial rise in financial and housing wealth, 
in particular in the United States, and in general in countries where financial wealth data are 
available. Evidence from both household surveys and empirical analysis has shown that the 
sensitivity of saving to wealth can vary quite substantially depending on the source of 
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 Unlike interest and dividends, these unrealised or realised capital gains are not derived from production. 
They are not therefore included in household income.
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capital gains – housing vs. stock market – and whether such gains are realised or not (De 
Serres and Pelgrin, 2003). This means that controlling for the wealth effect is even more 
difficult.  
Secondly, a country in which households make large capital gains could see its saving rate 
fall simply due to methodological reasons i.e. by virtue of the taxes levied on those gains, 
while realised capital gains are not included in personal income. ‘Given the divergence 
between the economic definitions of the two main variables entering the calculation of 
saving – income and consumption – and their respective treatment in the National 
Accounts, it may well be that the negative correlation between household saving and 
financial wealth is partly spurious’ (De Serres and Pelgrin, 2003:121).  
There has been a constant improvement in household saving data over the last couple of 
years. The OECD National Account Expert Group pursues the improvement of household 
saving data, and the ‘data series are permanently revised in light of the latest available 
information’. That is the reason why data series from older OECD Economic Outlooks differ 
from data from latest issues – ‘due to the regular revision of historical data’53.  
Nonetheless, household saving rates are still plagued with problems, hence many authors 
suggest using whole economy aggregates. For example, Perozek and Reinsdorft, (2002: 16) 
argue ‘the boundary lines between sectors, particularly those between the business and 
personal sectors, are somewhat difficult to draw because of the complicated set of 
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 This is confirmed by the OECD/ECO/MASD ADB Team. Quotes are from an email correspondence dated 19
th
-
21
st
 of January , 2010, available on request.
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interactions among participants both within and across sector lines. Though sector 
definitions do not alter national saving, they can affect the allocation of saving across 
sectors’.  
5. EVIDENCE FROM 21-OECD COUNTRIES, MID-1970S TO 
MID-2000S 
5.1. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS  
To investigate the empirical relationship between the saving rate and pension system 
design, an empirical analysis was conducted for 21 OECD countries in four periods – from 
the mid-1970s until 2000s, for which consistent data are available. 
The panel is unbalanced due to the availability of household saving data. Sources and 
details on saving data are presented in the next section and in the Appendix to this Chapter. 
The construction of pension design variables – IRR, pension variation, pension tax, the 
effective contribution rate and private pension assets, is described in Chapter III. In 
addition, variable descriptions and sources are also presented in an Appendix to this 
Chapter. 
Data for variables that do not fluctuate over short periods of time are mid-decade points 
(1975, 1985, 1995 and 2005). For other variables, such as the household saving rate and 
private pension assets, which do fluctuate, 5-year averages around mid-decade point are 
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employed54. Averages are used to reduce the effects of fluctuations, while the need to 
model saving inertia could thereby be overcome to some extent as well. 
5.1.1. Saving Data and Trends 
Aggregate saving ratios are generally drawn from national accounts55. Cross-country saving 
ratios are obtainable from several sources, such as EUROSTAT, AMECO database (The 
Annual Macro-Economic Database of the European Commission's Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs), OECD statistics, World Bank`s WDI (World Development 
Indicators).  
Gross national and household saving ratios are available from EUROSTAT, though only from 
1995 and for EU countries. The AMECO database contains net and gross household data 
series since the 1970s. The OECD compiles data on net household saving and net national 
saving from the 1960s onwards. The World Bank (WDI – World Development Indicators) 
contains data series on gross domestic savings and gross national saving.  
For the net household saving ratio, I use data from the OECD statistics (Economic Outlook 
database). For the countries that do not report the net saving rate in OECD statistics – 
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 For example, instead of 1975 data point, the average 1973–1977 is used.
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 Countries use many sources to compile their national accounts, among them administrative data from the 
government, censuses, business surveys and household surveys. Sources vary from country to country and 
may cover a large set of economic, social, financial and environmental items, which need not always be strictly 
related to national accounts. In any case, there is no single survey source for national accounts (EUROSTAT 
Metadata).
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France, Portugal, Spain and the UK, I use the AMECO database56. The gross household 
saving rate is also drawn from AMECO; gross domestic and gross national series are taken 
from WDI, while net national saving from OECD statistics. Household saving data for the 
1970s were missing for a few countries – Denmark, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Switzerland and the UK. Household saving data for Ireland are available only from 
2002. Saving data for Luxembourg – both household and national, are not available in OECD 
statistics, and this country is therefore excluded from the analysis.  
Table * shows the correlation between several saving measures – the household saving 
rate (gross and net), domestic and national saving ratios. It turns out that the measure of 
household saving is only weakly correlated with total economy saving ratios, such as 
national and domestic saving.  
Table IV-1 Correlations between various saving ratios 
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 Data in OECD and AMECO databases are almost the same, except that AMECO covers a shorter time span 
and does not have data for some countries outside the EU (Australia, Canada). On the other side, for some 
countries that did not report the net saving rate to the OECD (France, Portugal, Spain and the UK), the net 
household saving rate is available at AMECO. Data for Luxembourg are not available from neither the AMECO 
nor OECD, hence this country is excluded from the empirical analysis. 
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Data on household savings rates in the OECD member countries show an overall downward 
trend of household saving in the last decades. Rather counter-intuitively, ‘Bismarck 
countries’ have had higher household savings than ‘Beveridge countries’57. Only in the last 
few years has this difference been declining (Figure IV-1). 
Figure IV-1 Average net household saving rate for 21-OECD countries and  y Bismarck vs. 
Beveridge classification 

  SOURCE: OECD stats; AMECO for the UK, France, Portugal and Spain. 
Differences between countries, as well as the downward trend in the household saving rate, 
have been puzzling economists for a few decades. Dean et al. (1989: 48–49) noticed that 
‘the decline in household saving rates during the 1980s has been particularly pronounced in 
North America, the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries, Australia and New Zealand – 
mostly countries where there has been some domestic financial liberalisation’. The authors 
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 Division into ‘Beveridge’ and ‘Bismarck’ countries according to the original model of pension policy. 
Countries listed in the Appendix to the thesis – Bismarck dummy. Bismarck 2 dummy  - the one that treats US 
system as Beveridge, is used  Although the US pension system originated as a ‘hybrid’ (explained in the 
introduction of Chapter III), by its overall features it belongs to Beveridge rather than to Bismarck countries. 
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also suggest that the fall in household saving was associated with disinflation and a strong 
rise in personal sector wealth, which in turn resulted from the housing and equity market 
boom. Similarly, Lequiller and Blades (2006) argued that the dramatic fall in the saving ratio 
in the US was masked by the huge increase in housing prices, which is not captured by the 
household saving ratio as it excludes holding gains.  
On the other side, for countries with the ‘Bismarck pension model’ such as Germany and 
Italy, some economists believe that household saving rates are actually higher due to the 
lack of confidence in the ability of their economy to guarantee them a job and a good 
pension (Lequiller and Blades, 2006). For some Mediterranean countries, with typically 
Bismarck systems, a high proportion of unincorporated enterprises may explain higher 
household savings (Verrinder, 2002). 
Börsch-Supan and Lusardi (2002: 26) point to the complexity of household saving behaviour 
and to the influence of ‘many opposing effects’. For example, they show how the down- 
payment ratio exerts a conflicting effect on household saving compared to the public 
pension system replacement rate, which may lead to misunderstanding of the relationships. 
They argue that countries with less developed financial markets may display higher saving 
rates. Similarly, Horioka and Yin (2010) argue that borrowing constraints are more 
important than social safety nets as a determinant of household saving. 
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In addition, Berry and Williams (2009) suggest that lower household saving may also have 
been offset to some extent by higher corporate saving, which indeed shows opposite trends 
and levels compared to household data (Figure IV-2). 
Figure IV-2 Average corporate saving rate for 21-OECD countries and  
by Bismarck vs. Beveridge classification

SOURCE: AMECO database 
Consequently, overall economy saving aggregates such as domestic and national saving, 
turn out to be more stable and the differences between countries are taking somewhat 
different patterns  (Figure IV-3and Figure*3). 
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Figure IV-3 Gross Domestic Saving for 21-OECD countries and by Bismarck vs. Beveridge 
classification

                    SOURCE: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
Figure IV-4 Net National Saving for 21-OECD countries and 
by Bismarck vs. Beveridge classification 

    SOURCE: OECD stats 
 
 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
21-OECD countries
Bismarck (OECD) 
countries
Beveridge (OECD) 
countries
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
21-OECD countries
Bismarck
Beveridge
 '
5.1.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Although there has been convergence in pension policy objectives, the conclusion of the 
analysis presented in Chapter III is that there is no conjunction of pension models. Pension 
systems around the world are still very diverse and still influenced by the original policy 
choice. Consequently, it is not surprising that there is more variation between than within 
countries in the sample.  
Figure IV-5 Between and within coefficient of variation for dependent  
and explanatory variables 
 
The variable ‘pension variation’ shows a high degree of stationarity, despite such a long 
span of time. ‘Private pension assets’ show the highest degree of variation, both within and 
between (Figure IV-5)58. The only variable with the same between and within variation is 
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 Details are presented in the summary statistics table in the appendix to this chapter.
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the ‘internal rate of return’ (IRR), although this depends on the exact definition of the 
variable that is used in the analysis59.  
There is a statistically significant difference between Bismarck and Beveridge countries in 
the level of the household saving rate, in the internal rate of return, in ‘pension variation’, 
and in private pension assets (Table IV-2). The average household saving rate is higher in 
Bismarck countries as well as the ‘IRR’ and the contribution rate, while ‘pension variation’ 
and private pension assets are higher in Beveridge countries. There is no statistically 
significant difference in means for any other saving variable (gross domestic saving, gross 
national saving or net national saving). 
Table IV-2 Difference in means of main variables, Bismarck and Beveridge countries 
 
The correlation between pension variation and private pension assets with the household 
saving rate is negative, again suggesting that ‘Beveridge countries’, characterised by higher 
redistribution of the public system and much greater importance of private component, 
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 There are 4 versions of variable IRR, which are explained in Chapter III. In Figure IV-5 variant 3 (IRR3) is 
presented, which measures the actual internal rate of return assuming that the first cohort only started 
contributing in the 1950s, simply because it has similar between and within variation. Variant IRR2, for 
example, shows higher between than within variation.  
Beveridge Bismarck t-test p-value
Household Saving 5.50 11.58 -4.28 0.000
IRR 5.26 6.75 -2.46 0.016
Pension Variation 0.26 0.06 9.98 0.000
Pension Tax 2.31 0.73 7.79 0.000
Private Pension Assets 55.67 6.68 7.80 0.000
Contribution Rate 9.24 16.40 -6.62 0.000
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have lower household saving. Similarly, the coefficient for IRR and household saving shows 
a positive relationship. Since the correlation coefficient between private pension assets and 
the ‘pension variation’ variable is quite high (0.64), while both variables have much lower 
correlation coefficients with the dependent variable – the household saving rate, this may 
produce problems during estimation. Same stands for contributions and pension variation. 
Table IV-3 Correlation coefficients for pension design variables and household saving 

Some control variables are also highly correlated with explanatory or other control 
variables, there may be issues of multicollinearity. For example, the dependency ratio is 
strongly (negatively) correlated with pension variation; private pension assets with private 
credit and GDP pc, etc (see Appendix to this Chapter).  
5.2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY 
The aim of the empirical estimation is to test the theoretical model derived in Chapter II, 
which examines the effect of pension system design – both public and private component – 
on household saving.  
Household 
Saving
Contribut. IRR
Pension 
variation 
Private 
Pension 
Assets 
Household Saving 1.00
Contributions 0.04 1.00
IRR 0.37 -0.24 1.00
Pension variation -0.28 -0.67 -0.29 1.00
Private Pension Assets -0.36 -0.45 -0.43 0.64 1.00
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Since the theory explains how pension programmes affect households’ decisions, the 
household saving rate for the dependent variable is by far the most preferable measure. 
However, due to the measurement issues discussed in the previous sections, there are 
reasons to choose national rates instead. Therefore, alternative estimations will be 
performed on the domestic and national saving.  
The descriptive analysis suggested that counter-intuitively, household saving is higher in 
countries with the Bismarck model of pension provision. It would seem that the reason is a 
complexity of saving behaviour and the multiple factors affecting saving decisions that need 
to be controlled for. In particular, it is essential to isolate the effects of financial market 
development and borrowing constraints, as well as the wealth effect on household saving, 
which are presumably the factors that blur the relationship between social security and 
saving.  
However, it is quite challenging to find adequate proxies, in particular longer time series 
across countries. Moreover, a major shortcoming of the following empirical analysis is the 
inability to control for wealth effects on saving. A desirable proxy for household wealth 
could be, for example, ‘household financial assets from balance sheets’ that can be found at 
the EUROSTAT, yet the data are available only from the mid ‘90s and for EU countries60. 
Another possible proxy could be share prices as a measure of unrealised stock market 
wealth, but this variable is available only for the most recent decades. In a nutshell, a proxy 
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 Even for the most recent decade, data for the UK are missing.
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for households` unrealised gains i.e. wealth effect, for such a long time frame and a 
considerable number of countries, is to my knowledge not possible to obtain.   
Domestic credit to private sector (as % of GDP) will be used as a proxy for financial market 
liquidity (borrowing constraints). Jappelli and Pagano (1994) investigate the relationship 
between household saving and liquidity constraints using a measure specifically designed to 
capture the liquidity of the household sector, such as the maximum loan to value ratio and 
consumer credit (as % of net national product). These controls seem to be more appropriate 
when it comes to household saving, nonetheless, such data are not available for the sample 
of 21-OECD countries spanning four decades.  
In order to avoid the multicollinearity issues detected in the previous section, the empirical 
estimation will be split into the analysis of the impact of the public pension system 
component on household saving and the effect of the private pension component on 
household saving. In addition, the principal component index and factor analysis scores will 
be used as the way to solve the multicollinearity problem among the explanatory variables 
and to investigate the impact of overall pension system design on household saving.   
The methodology that will be applied here is the usual estimators used for longitudinal 
data. Due to small country level sample size, I start with the fixed effect estimators which 
assumes that there are country-specific fixed effects M9  that ought to be controlled for in 
estimation.  
                     9  M9 
 9 
 9        (IV-4) 
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where 0 stands for individual/country,  for time and 9  set of explanatory variables 
assumed to be independent of 9. This is equivalent to the equation with dummy variables 
of each unit 0, so that  M9  M	`	9 
 M`9 
tM`9 `9, where `9 (  0) are group-
specific dummies.  
The fixed effect or within estimator is the OLS estimator applied to ‘within transformation’, 
which are deviations from individual means (Verbeek, 2004:346).  
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An advantage of the fixed effects panel data estimator is that it allows the researcher to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity, thus it is typically used in cross-country panel 
estimation.  
However, fixed effect estimators exploit only the time dimension of data, while pension 
design variables show a significant degree of between-country variation. Therefore, 
although relying on the strong assumption that the unobserved country-specific effect is 
uncorrelated with explanatory variables and the error term, random effects estimators will 
be applied as well, followed by the Hausman test, which investigate whether random-
effects are safe to use.  
Random effects estimators take following form: 
   9  M 
 9 
 9 
 9         (IV-5) 
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where the individual-specific effect is assumed to be randomly distributed, so that 
M9  M 
 9  and 9  has a zero mean. 
The random effect estimator G can be written as: 
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where r is function of { and {. 
The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients obtained with 
fixed-effect estimators vs. random-effect estimators is not systematic. 
v    G  G>	>G                      (IV-6) 
where   denotes the estimate of the covariance matrix. Under the null, v (Hausman test) 
has asympthotic Chi-squared distribution. It is possible to use random effects estimators if 
the null can be accepted, meaning insignificant P-value (Prob>chi2 larger than 0.05). If the 
null has to be rejected, then only fixed effects should be used. 
 +
In order to model the saving inertia and potential endogeneity of the certain control 
variables, such as GDP growth and private pension assets, the dynamic model specification 
will also be allowed. 
                    9  M9 
 94>	 
 9 
 9                                (IV-7) 
where 94>	 are lags of saving as a dependent variable, capturing saving inertia.  
A major drawback with this specification is that the introduction of the lagged dependent 
variable as an explanatory variable, in the presence of country-specific effects, renders OLS 
(and GLS) estimators to be biased and inconsistent61. By taking first-differences it is possible 
to eliminate the unobserved country-specific effect:
p9  p94>	 
 p9 
 p9                                
This removes the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term, 
but the bias caused by inclusion of the lagged dependent variable remains as by 
construction is correlated with the new error term (Nickell, 1981)62. 
One solution to this problem is the GMM procedure suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
which uses the lagged level values of two periods or more as valid instruments for the 
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 Since 9 is a function of M9 , then 94>	 clearly depends on M9 . Thus, the composite error term 9  M9 
 9 
is correlated with the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable, violating the classical linear model
assumption that the error term and explanatory variable are uncorrelated. 
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 p94>	  94>	  94>  where 94>	 is correlated to p9  9  94>	. 
 +3
transformed lagged dependent variable. Moreover, this procedure allows controls for 
potential endogeneity of explanatory variables by using the so-called ‘internal instruments’ 
– lags of the explanatory variables as instruments for their contemporaneous values63.  
Consistency of the GMM estimator can be tested by the Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as χ under the null of instrument validity. 
The failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model.  
One of disadvantages of this methodology is that GMM difference estimators may be 
subject to a large downward finite-sample bias, particularly when the number of time 
periods available is small (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
 
5.3. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
In the first part of the empirical analysis, I replicate the estimation done by Disney (2005) 
adding one more data point and using somewhat differently constructed pension design 
variables using more reliable data sources. In particular, to calculate effective contribution 
rate series I have used original pension expenditures data instead of estimated support 
ratios; I have cross-validated few data sources to construct replacement rate series, which 
in turn were used to construct internal rate of return; information on the indexation 
formula in each country again needed for IRR construction was carefully collected from a 
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 For ‘weakly exogenous’ or predetermined variables (can be affected by current and past realisation but are 
uncorrelated with future realisations of the error term), all their lagged levels are used as instruments. For 
endogenous regressors, the lagged levels dated earlier may be used as instrumental variables. 
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number of sources, such as EC-ISG reports, OECD Pensions at a Glance publications and 
World Bank’s Pensions Panorama. Finally, I have used improved household saving dataset. 
Firstly, to avoid multicollinearity I endeavour to examine just the effect of public pension 
component on saving, I start estimating the model as derived in Chapter II – ‘Variant 1’, and 
then estimating ‘Variant 2’ of the model, which is the exact replicate of Disney (2005). In 
the second part, the effect of private pension component on saving is tested. Finally, I 
endeavour to investigate the effect of the overall pension design on saving, using PCA index 
and ‘Bismarck’ dummy variables. 
Below is a brief account of the effect of explanatory variables on saving and the expected 
coefficient signs.  
‘Pension variation’ is a variable that measures intragenerational redistribution of the 
pension system. Its overall effect on household saving is expected to be positive. In 
particular, while in redistributive systems low income earners have less incentive to save,  
higher income earners have a higher incentive to save. As most of private saving is usually 
done by higher-income earners, one may expect an overall positive effect of the degree of 
redistribution in the pension programme on household saving (Disney, 2005).  
Pension tax is a similar variable to pension variation, used in ‘Variant 2’ of the model, and it 
is calculated as the product of pension variation and the effective contribution rate. This 
variable captures the absolute ‘tax component’ of the contribution rate.  
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The internal rate of return is a rate at which the present value of the stream of 
contributions is equal to the present value of the stream of pension. A higher IRR means 
that the public system offers a higher ‘return’ on its pension contributions, hence predicting 
a higher displacement relative to other forms of private savings. Therefore, the expected 
coefficient on household saving for this variable is negative.  
The contribution rate for public old-age pension – in the ‘standard’ models, contributions 
to public pensions (PAYG financing) are likely to offset private saving, therefore the 
coefficient sign is expected to be negative.  
Private pension assets is a variable that includes pension assets managed by all types of 
financing vehicles, both mandatory and voluntary pension saving. The expected sign on 
pension funds assets is positive, while the magnitude depends on the displacement effect.  
GDP growth – Income growth should raise savings, however, there can also be an effect 
moving in the opposite direction – anticipated future income increases may increase 
present consumption. Therefore, the predicted coefficient sign is ambiguous.  
Demographics – According to the simple LCH, working age people are savers who dissave in 
retirement. Consequently, a significant decline in saving rates could result from the rise in 
old-age dependency ratios. Therefore, a negative coefficient of the old-age dependency 
ratio on household saving might be expected.  
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Borrowing constraint (financial liquidity) – The extent to which individuals can dissave 
depends on their ability to borrow. Therefore, the expected sign on the financial liquidity 
variable is negative.  
Public balance/saving – In terms of the ‘Ricardian equivalence’ hypothesis, public and 
private saving are perfect substitutes. Forward-looking agents fully internalise the fact that 
government borrowing implies higher future debt servicing, implying agents will save in 
anticipation of the tax burden. On the other side, a government surplus implies higher 
taxes, which may crowd-out private savings. Therefore, the expected coefficient sign on 
public surplus (deficit) is negative (positive). 
5.3.1. Public pension design and household saving  
In this section, I replicate the empirical model as in Disney (2005), adding data for the 
2000s. Nonetheless, the overall number of observations just slightly increases – from 63 
observations in Disney (2005) to 69 observations. The reason is the process of constant 
improvement and revision of the household saving data, in which some historical data that 
were previously available have been removed, presumably due to the reliability and quality 
reasons. In particular, in the most recently published database, data for Greece, Ireland, 
Spain, and Portugal are not available for the 1970s64.   
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 For example, data for Greece used in Disney (2005) amounted to 22.1 in the 1970s, 21.3 in 1980s and 18.3 
in 1990s. In the latest OECD database, data for Greece are available only from 1995, and the average for that 
decade amounts to 9.8. The data revisions were obviously significant. 
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I start with the linear version of the theoretical model, dubbed ‘Variant 1’ in section 3, but I 
firstly only estimate the model for public pension variables in order to avoid possible 
multicollinearity (Table IV-4). 
The estimation is performed for a number of specifications. First, I start with fixed effects 
estimators, since these are the most appropriate for small country-level sample as they 
control for unobserved heterogeneity. A disadvantage is that fixed effect estimators capture 
only the impact of variables that vary over time, and pension design variables show a 
significant degree of between-country variation. Therefore, random effects estimators are 
further employed (both with and without time dummies), followed by Hausman test to 
check whether it is safe to use them. Thirdly, I use  GLS weighted by population (and 
controlled for country fixed effects and time effects), in order to replicate Disney (2005) as 
closely as possible. Finally, I use a dynamic specification estimated with the GMM Arellano-
Bond (1991) procedure to model the saving inertia and to control for possible endogeneity 
between GDP variables and saving.  
However, none of the findings are significant nor in line with the predictions of the 
theoretical model. The effect of IRR, except for the GLS specification, is negative but not 
significant65. The coefficient of contribution rate is surprisingly positive, though not 
significant. The pension variation appears to have a negative effect on household saving,   
for some specifications (random effects and GLS) even significant. 
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 Results for IRR also vary depending on the particular proxy used. Variables IRR1 and IRR3, which take into 
account wage growth, give a negative coefficient, while variables IRR2 and IRR4, constructed to isolate the 
effect of wage growth, a positive coefficient (though again not significant).  
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Table IV-4 Public pension design variables and household saving in OECD countries – 
Variant 1 
Dependent variable:  
Household Saving Rate 
(HSR) 
FE RE  GLS GMM 
Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
t- ratio  
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
z value 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
z value 
 (p-
value) 
Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
t-ratio  
(p-value) 
HSR lagged (t-1)       
0.41 
0.29 
1.39 
(0.181)   
Pension design variables         
Internal rate of return 
-0.38 
(0.48) 
-0.79 
(0.434) 
-0.05 
(0.34) 
-0.15 
(0.165) 
 -0.65  
(0.33) 
-1.97 
 0.013) 
-1.13 
(0.80) 
  -1.40 
(0.178) 
Pension variation 
-14.46 
(14.32) 
-1.01 
(0.319) 
-22.65 
(9.16) 
-2.47 
(0.013) 
-14.69 
(8.06) 
 -1.82 
(0.068) 
-34.55 
(20.23) 
-1.71  
(0.105) 
Contribution rate 
0.23 
(0.33) 
0.72 
(0.479) 
-0.08 
(0.21) 
-0.38 
(0.702) 
0.15 
(0.19) 
  0.82 
0.413 
0.26 
(0.58) 
0.44 
(0.662) 
Control variables         
GDP per capita 
-1e
-5 
(1e
-4 
) 
 - 0.05 
(0.958) 
1e
-3 
(1e
-4 
) 
  0.84 
0.401 
-1e
-4 
(1e
-4 
) 
-1.23 
(0.217) 
-5e
-6 
(4e
-4 
) 
0.01 
(0.991) 
GDP growth 
0.40 
(0.63) 
0.64 
(0.524) 
-0.23 
(0.56) 
-0.41 
(0.679) 
0.88 
(0.42) 
2.11 
(0.036) 
1.95 
1.25 
1.55 
(0.138) 
Old-age dependency 
-0.97 
(0.25) 
-3.76 
(0.001) 
-0.72 
(0.21) 
-3.37    
(0.001) 
-0.90 
(0.16) 
-5.59 
(0.000) 
0.02 
(0.032) 
0.77 
(0.453) 
Financial liquidity 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-2.41 
(0.020) 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-2.88 
(0.004) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
-2.70 
(0.007) 
-0.58 
(0.47) 
-1.22 
(0.238) 
Government consump. 
-0.41 
(0.41) 
-1.00 
( 0.325) 
-0.25 
(0.26) 
-0.99 
(0.322) 
-0.60 
(0.23) 
-2.68 
(0.007) 
-0.65 
(0.66) 
-0.99  
(0.335) 
Number of observations 69 69 69 28 
F/Wald-test (Prob>F/chi2) 8.91 (0.0000) 68.91 (0.0000) 954.92 (0.0000) ... 
Hausman /Sargan (Prob>chi2) ... 10.21 (0.1768) ... 4.61 (0.5947) 
NOTE: GLS weighted by population; country effects included; GMM Arellano-Bond (1991) procedure controls for GDP growth 
endogeneity. For internal rate of return variable IRR3 (see Appendix and Chapter III for details). 
Regarding control variables, the impact of the financial liquidity variable is negative, small 
but significant, in line with the intuition. Old-age dependency exerts a negative and 
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significant effect on household saving. The negative coefficient of government consumption 
is significant only in the GLS specification.  
Due to the multicollinearity problems, ‘Variant 2’ of the model, seems to be more 
convenient since the contribution rate does not enter separately in the equation, though it 
is still taken into account via the pension tax variable. Another reason to estimate this 
version of the model is to replicate Disney (2005) in the same form as in that paper.  
Table IV-5 Public pension variables and household saving in OECD countries – Variant 2 
Dependent variable:  
Household Saving (%GDI) 
FE  RE  GLS  
Coefficient 
(standard errors) 
t- ratio  
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(standard errors) 
Z ratio  
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(standard errors) 
Z ratio  
(p-value) 
Pension variables       
IRR 
-0.56  
(0.47) 
-1.20 
(0.236) 
0.03 
(0.34) 
0.10 
(0.922) 
-0.85  
(0.32) 
-2.63 
(0.009) 
Pension tax 
-0.26 
(1.03) 
-0.25 
(0.806) 
-1.45 
(0.76) 
-1.91 
(0.057) 
-0.77 
(0.65) 
-1.18 
(0.238) 
Control variables       
GDP per capita 
-3e
-5 
(2e
-4 
) 
-0.15 
  (0.885) 
-1e
-4 
(1e
-4 
) 
0.84 
(0.401) 
-1e
-4 
(1e
-4 
) 
  -1.13 
(0.260) 
GDP growth 
 0.13  
(0.56) 
0.23   
(0.817) 
-0.44 
(0.54) 
-0.81 
(0.420) 
0.65 
(0.38) 
1.66 
(0.096) 
Old-age dependency 
-0.94 
(0.23) 
-4.13 
(0.001) 
-0.64 
(0.19) 
-3.32 
(0.001) 
-0.91 
(0.15) 
-5.87 
(0.000) 
Financial liquidity 
-0.05 
(0.02) 
-2.78 
(0.008) 
-0.05 
(0.01) 
-3.00 
(0.003) 
-0.05 
(0.01) 
-3.14 
(0.002) 
Government  consumption 
-0.13 
(0.34) 
-0.38 
(0.706) 
-0.21 
( 0.26) 
-0.83 
(0.406) 
-0.43 
(0.21) 
-2.09 
(0.037) 
Number of observations 69 69 69 
F(Wald)-test 9.72 (0.0000) 59.03 (0.0000)   908.27 (0.0000) 
Hausman - chi2 (Prob>chi2) ... 12.37 (0.0542) ... 
NOTE: GLS weighted by population; country effects included; for internal rate of return variable IRR3 (see Appendix and Chapter III 
for details). 
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Nonetheless, the results are still not as expected and differ significantly from the results 
obtained by Disney (2005). In particular, although IRR appears to have a negative effect on 
household saving in two specifications – fixed effects estimators and GLS, where the effect 
is statistically significant – the coefficient on pension tax is negative throughout all 
specifications. The results for pension tax variable are not statistically significant, except in 
random effect specification where significant at 90% level. However, since the Hausman 
test does not allow to reject the null, meaning it is not safe to draw conclusions from 
random effect specification, we can conclude that coefficient for pension tax variable 
overall is not significant.  
When it comes to control variables, as previously, the variable old-age dependency is 
negative and significant as expected, as well as financial liquidity. Controlling for country 
effects in several specifications66, a few countries have significant dummy variables. Those 
with a significant positive effect in all specifications are Belgium, France, the Netherlands 
and Sweden, while New Zealand has a significant negative effect. There is no indication why 
these particular countries are specific when it comes to household savings.  
All specifications were performed controlling for time-effects as well, without much 
difference in results (presented in the Appendix to this Chapter).  
Regressions on alternative measures of saving, such as gross domestic and national saving, 
and net national saving, were run for various specifications and for both ‘Variants’ of the 
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 GLS in both variants control for country effects. Also, results for the first column of both tables are 
alternatively estimated with the country dummies coefficient, i.e. LSDV estimators (instead of FE). 
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model. In general, results are not significant apart from fixed effects regression of Variant 1 
on gross domestic saving, where old-age pension contribution appears to exert a 
significantly negative effect on gross domestic saving, in line with intuition and the model. 
The coefficient for pension variation is again negative and significant at 10% level. Results 
are attached in the Appendix to this Chapter.  
Overall, the results obtained in all specifications are not in line with the theoretical model 
predictions, and are counter-intuitive when it comes to the relationship between pension 
system design and household saving. In addition, they are surprisingly different to the 
results obtained in Disney (2005), a study that was basically replicated. This deserves 
further explanation.  
As regards the difference in result in Disney (2005), a few factors can explain the disparity – 
the revision of the household saving data, differently constructed pension design variables, 
the different set of control variables, as well as different ‘weighting’ variable in GLS 
specification67. Inclusion of 2000s data does not seem as the reason for different results.  
Due to the process of constant improvement and revision of household saving data, the 
datasets differ substantially – the new and old data overlap with only 48 observations with 
the coefficient of correlation less than 0.8. Consequently, if the ‘Disney (2005)’ dataset, 
including both pension design variables and controls, is applied to the new set of household 

'4opulation instead of civilian employment, which was in Disney (2005). One reason for using population is 
data availability and more importantly, for saving relationship it is more  appropriate to weight with 
population (or overall employment rather than civilian). 
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saving data (for 1970s, 1980s and 1990s) using the same estimation methodology, results 
are not significant. 
In addition, the approaches for pension design variables construction differ, the major 
difference being the construction of the effective contribution rate and RR, which is in turn 
used for IRR construction. That is the reason why the correlation between the variables 
from ‘Disney’ dataset and the one constructed as explained in Chapter III stems from less 
than 0.6 for IRRs, 0.7449 for effective contribution rate and 0.8827 for pension tax. If 
pension design variables constructed in Chapter III are applied to ‘Disney’ household saving 
dataset, together with ‘Disney` set of control variables and using same estimation methods, 
the results are again not significant. Consequently, the reason for different results cannot 
be the inclusion of 2000s data, but rather the difference in pension design variables and 
household saving data.  
Furthermore, the descriptive analysis already indicated counter-intuitive results, with the 
household saving rates being higher for ‘Bismarck countries’. The explanation may lie in the 
complexity of household saving behaviour with the influence of many determinants 
exerting opposite effects. All those effects may drastically blur the relationship between a 
pension system and saving.  
In particular, one may argue that in Anglo-Saxon countries, which are the exponents of the 
‘Beveridge’ pension model, wealth effects associated with the holding of stocks appear 
much more important than in continental Europe, and the shocks affecting asset prices 
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have a greater effect on household consumption (Oddonat and Reiu, 2003). Ludvig and Slok 
(2002: 29) suggest that ‘there is a clear evidence that the impact from changes in stock 
prices is bigger in economies with market-based financial systems than in economies with 
bank-based financial systems’. 
In addition, mortgage markets tend to be larger and more ﬂexible in the Anglo-Saxon 
economies than in Japan and continental Europe, with the exception of the Netherlands, 
again a ‘Beveridge’ country (Calza et al., 2007). ‘In continental Europe re-financing of 
mortgages is more costly and home ownership is often much lower’ (Gros, 2007: 10). In 
relation to that, the role of housing wealth could be very important in explaining the 
differences in saving patterns between countries, and partly within time. Countries that 
experiences housing market booms are those where financial market and mortgage market 
deregulation occurred (Agnello and Schuknecht (2011)). Housing wealth, in turn, can have 
significant impact on savings. Skiner (1989) suggested that housing prices have an important 
impact on long-run capital accumulation, though the saving effects are moderated in the 
presence of a bequest motive. Klyuev and Mills (2006) show that U.S. households react to 
an increase in their net worth by reducing their saving rate. They also showed that ‘home 
equity withdrawal’ has a negative impact on household saving, at least in the short run. 
Therefore, it can be argued that ‘Beveridge’ countries that typically experienced housing 
market booms and hence the wealth gains due, which themselves have origins in mortgage 
market deregulation, exhibited declines in saving. On the other side, ‘Bismarck’ (continental 
Europe) countries typically have lower home ownership rates and have not experiences 
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booms in housing markets, which might in part explain higher level of private savings along 
with public.  
Admittedly, above explained factors can primarily explain the cross-section variation in 
savings patterns. Within–country variation in mortgage markets should be condition with 
time dummies, and therefore one could argue that the above explanation does not hold for 
fixed-effect estimators. Still, since pension design variables` variation is mainly cross-
country, and changes in pension design in the country does not happen too often, and 
when it does takes a long time to shows its effect, within (fixed)effects estimators are in 
generally not ideal to investigate saving-pension design relationship.  
5.3.2. Private pensions and saving  
In this section, the effect of private pension component on saving, proxied by private 
pension assets (stock as a share of GDP) will be estimated, again using a few estimation 
methods. 
The findings are not significant, and even when they are as in case of GLS weighted with 
population, they are counter-intuitive. Estimates in column 3 imply a significant, though not 
large, negative effect of increase in private pension funds on the household saving rate, 
suggesting that an increase in private pension assets as a share of GDP by 1 "	%
"
	 would lead to a decrease in the household saving rate by 0.08 "	%"
	. 
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Table IV-6 Effect of private pensions on household saving 
Dependent variable:  
Household Saving (%GDI) 
FE RE  GLS GMM 
Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
t ratio  
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
Z ratio  
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
Z ratio  
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
Z ratio  
(p-value) 
HSR lagged (t-1)     
  0.34 
(0.28) 
  1.21  
(0.225)    
Private pension 
component 
    
  
  
Private pension assets 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.45 
(0.651) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.72 
(0.009) 
-0.08 
 (0.01) 
  -6.64 
(0.000) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.53 
(0.596) 
Control variables         
GDP per capita 
9e
-5 
(1e
-4
) 
0.55   
(0.584) 
8e
-5 
(1e
-4
) 
0.56  
(0.575)    
4e
-6
   
(1e
-4
) 
   0.04 
(0.972)   
-2e
-4
   
(4e
-4
) 
  -0.55  
(0.580)   
GDP growth 
0.02 
(0.56) 
0.03 
(0.891) 
-0.52 
(0.54) 
-0.95   
(0.340)    
-1.29 
(0.61) 
-2.11 
(0.035) 
2.30 
(1.37) 
1.68 
(0.093) 
Old-age dependency 
-0.82  
(0.20) 
-4.15 
(0.000) 
-0.66  
(0.18) 
-3.73 
(0.000) 
-0.67  
(0.14) 
-4.75 
(0.000) 
-0.34 
(0.38) 
-0.89 
(0.375) 
Financial liquidity 
-0.05 
(0.02) 
-2.85 
(0.007) 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-2.35   
(0.019) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.98   
(0.326) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.26 
(0.792) 
Government  
consumption 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.49  
(0.626) 
-0.24  
(0.26) 
-0.93 
(0.353) 
-0.39  
(0.21) 
-1.89 
(0.059) 
-0.54 
(0.70) 
-0.78 
(0.436) 
Number of observations 69 69 69 28 
F/Wald-test (Prob>F/chi2) 10.98 (0.0000) 53.89 (0.0000) 133.37(0.0000) ... 
Hausman /Sargan (Prob>chi2) ... 0.61 (0.9963) ... 9.32 (0.3162) 
NOTE: GLS weighted by population, country effect not included. When country dummy is included, the coefficient on private pension 
assets remains negative and statistically significant, financial liquidity variable becomes significant; GMM Arellano-Bond (1991) 
procedure controls for private pension funds and GDP growth endogeneity. 
One of the possible specification problems – the reverse causality between private pension 
assets and saving, via the income growth channel – is controlled for by the GMM 
estimation. Nonetheless, the results are neither significant nor positive.   
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The regressions on other saving measures – such as gross domestic saving and gross and net 
national saving, do not shed any more light on the analysis. In particular, the results are not 
significant for fixed effects (or random effects) estimators for any of the listed variables, 
while they  become negative and significant for the population-weighted GLS and Arellano-
Bond GMM specification.  
A similar explanation used for public pension design regressions could also be applied here. 
The correlation between financial liquidity variable and private pension assets suggests that 
the countries with developed private pensions are those with developed financial markets, 
in which households are more inclined to take on debt and therefore save less. In addition, 
the wealth effect is not controlled for, and the countries with large pension assets are very 
likely to be the ones that are experiencing housing and stock market wealth effects, hence 
this may distort the results.  
5.3.3.  Bismarck vs. Beveridge systems and saving  
Due to the high correlation between a number of pension variables required to model the 
overall pension system design and saving, in particular between the ‘pension variation’ or 
‘pension tax’ variables and the ‘private pension assets’, the effects of private pensions and 
the public pension component were estimated separately. In the following analysis, I will try 
to estimate the overall effect of a pension design on saving. To solve the problem of 
multicollinearity, the saving will be regressed on the PCA composite indices . 
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The principal component analysis was performed on a number of pension system variables 
such as RR, IRR, pension variation, pension tax private pension funds, pension expenditures 
and couple/single ratio. Two indices – Bismarck and Beveridge were extracted (for details 
see Chapter III).  
Table IV-7 Principal component ‘Bismarck index’ on household saving 
Dependent variable: 
Household Saving (%GDI) 
FE RE GLS  
Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
t-ratio  
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
z-ratio  
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
z-ratio  
(p-value) 
Pension design variables       
‘Bismarck index’  
1.93 
(1.41) 
1.36 
(0.180)   
1.28  
(0.60) 
2.14 
(0.033) 
2.30 
(0.41) 
5.58 
(0.000) 
Control variables       
GDP per capita 
1e
-4 
(1e
-4
) 
  1.06 
  (0.296) 
1e
-4 
(1e
-4
) 
0.99 
(0.321) 
2e
-5 
(1e
-4
) 
0.21 
  (0.835) 
GDP growth 
0.38  
(0.60) 
0.64 
(0.528)   
-0.12  
(0.55) 
-0.22  
(0.823) 
-0.18 
(0.72) 
-0.25 
(0.801) 
Government consumption  
-0.05 
(0.43) 
-1.07   
(0.292) 
-0.27 
(0.25) 
-1.09   
(0.277) 
-0.25 
(0.23) 
-1.08   
(0.278) 
Dependency 
-0.89 
(0.19) 
-4.49 
(0.000) 
-0.84 
(0.19) 
-4.38   
(0.000) 
 -0.90 
(0.17) 
-5.43 
( 0.000) 
Financial liquidity 
-0.05 
 (0.02) 
-2.51 
(0.016)   
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-2.72 
(0.006) 
 -0.03 
(0.02)   
-1.54 
 (0.124) 
Number of observations 69 69 69 
Wald test 11.68 (0.0000) 62.72 (0.0000)    110.28 (0.0000) 
NOTE: GLS weighted by population. 
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I present findings for the ‘Bismarck index’ in Table IV-7. The results are in line with the 
results obtained in the previous section – they are not convincing though there is an 
indication of higher household saving in countries with the Bismarck pension model.  
When the ‘Beveridge index’ is employed, the results are the mirror image – negative signs 
and the same significance as with the ‘Bismarck index’. Though not intuitive, these results 
are in line with the findings obtained in the previous sections.  
The results change when the PCA indices are regressed on the overall economy aggregates, 
such as domestic and national saving. In Table IV-8, the fixed effects estimation is reported 
for ‘Bismarck index’ regressed on gross domestic and national saving, as well as net national 
saving aggregate. The coefficient for the ‘Bismarck index’ is negative for all three dependent 
variables, while statistically significant only for gross domestic saving as dependent variable.  
Coefficients obtained by random effects estimation are also negative, though not 
significant. Since the Hausman test suggested that it is not safe to use the random effect in 
these regressions, these results are not reported.  
These somewhat more intuitive results could be interpreted as in line with the issues 
explained in the previous sections – methodological problems concerning household saving 
data, which do not exist on the higher aggregate levels, as well as the problem of 
inadequately controlling for borrowing constraints and wealth effect, again more 
pronounced at household level.  
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Table IV-8 Principal component index on saving, fixed effect estimation 
Dependent variable  
Gross domestic 
saving 
Gross national  
saving 
Net national  
saving 
 Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
z-ratio  
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
z-ratio  
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(standard 
errors) 
z-ratio  
(p-value) 
Pension design variables       
‘Bismarck index’  
-3.83  
(1.46) 
-2.62 
(0.011) 
-0.52 
(0.87) 
-0.59 
(0.555) 
-0.06 
(0.92) 
 -0.07   
(0.942) 
Control variables       
GDP per capita 
3e
-4 
(1e
-4
) 
1.92 
(0.060) 
2e
-4 
(8e
-5
) 
2.63 
(0.011) 
1e
-4 
(1e
-4
) 
1.04 
(0.304) 
GDP growth  
0.32 
(0.59) 
 0.54 
 0.593 
0.20 
(0.32) 
0.61 
(0.542) 
0.10 
(0.38) 
0.28 
 (0.782) 
Government consumption  
-0.28 
(0.49) 
-0.58   
0.565 
-0.84 
(0.26) 
-3.16 
(0.003) 
-0.93 
(0.31) 
-2.96 
(0.005) 
Old-age dependency 
-0.39 
(0.27) 
-1.48 
(0.145) 
-0.27 
(0.13) 
-2.07 
(0.044) 
-0.44 
(0.16) 
-2.70 
(0.009) 
Financial liquidity 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.88 
(0.384) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-1.42 
(0.162) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.58 
(0.565) 
Number of observations 84 80 82 
Wald test 5.79 (0.000) 9.91 (0.0000) 9.59 (0.0000) 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have attempted to empirically test the relationship between the pension 
system design and household saving. In particular, I wanted to test the theoretical model 
derived in Chapter II that predicts higher household saving for countries with a lower 
contribution rate, higher redistribution within the public system and greater importance of 
private pension savings i.e. systems that could be classified as ‘Beveridge’; and lower 
 )
household saving for countries with a public system that mimics private systems - meaning 
higher contribution rate and lower private pension assets, i.e. those that can be classified as 
‘Bismarck’. 
The empirical strategy regarding the impact of public pension design on household saving 
closely follows work in Disney (2005), with somewhat differently calculated public pension 
design variables and with data for the 2000s. I also tested the impact of private pension 
component on household saving. Finally, the overall design of the pension system was 
estimated using composite indices obtained with the principal component analysis.  
The findings were acquired using a number of estimation methods, such as fixed, two-way 
fixed and random effects, GLS estimators weighted with population (both with and without 
time dummies), as well as the dynamic panel specification estimated by Arellano Bond 
(1991) GMM procedure, have not confirmed the predictions of the theoretical model. 
Moreover, the findings are counter-intuitive and opposite to the results obtained by Disney 
– the study I have tried to replicate in one part of the analysis.  
Namely, the results are not significant, and often opposite to the model predictions. The 
coefficient of the contribution rate is surprisingly positive, while the pension variation and 
pension tax appear to have a negative effect on household saving, contrary to the model 
predictions. The results from the private component analysis are also insignificant, but even 
when significant they are counter-intuitive. Finally, the analysis of the overall pension 
system design on saving, using the ‘Bismarck index’ is in line with the previous results – 
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findings are not convincing, though there is an indication of higher household saving in 
countries with the Bismarck pension model.  
As regards the difference in result in Disney (2005), a few factors can explain the disparity – 
the revision of the household saving data, differently constructed pension design variables, 
the different set of control variables, as well as different ‘weighting’ variable in GLS 
specification. Inclusion of 2000s data does not seem as the reason for different results.  
In addition, the explanation for the obtained results may lie in the complexity of household 
saving behaviour characterised by the influence of many determinants exerting opposite 
effects. Those effects may drastically blur the relationship between a pension system and 
saving. In particular, one may argue that in Anglo-Saxon countries, which are the exponents 
of the ‘Beveridge’ pension model, wealth effects associated with the holding of stocks 
appear much more important than in continental Europe, and the shocks affecting asset 
prices have a greater effect on household consumption (Oddonat and Reiu, 2003). 
Furthermore, mortgage markets tend to be larger and more ﬂexible in the Anglo-Saxon 
economies than in Japan and continental Europe, with the exception of the Netherlands, 
again a ‘Beveridge’ country (Calza et al., 2007). In continental Europe re-financing of 
mortgages is more costly and home ownership is often much lower’ (Gros, 2007: 10). In 
relation to that, the role of housing wealth could be very important in explaining the 
differences in saving patterns between countries, and partly within time. Countries that 
experiences housing market booms are those where financial market and mortgage market 
deregulation occurred (Agnello and Schuknecht (2011)). Housing wealth, in turn, can have 
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significant impact on savings. Therefore, it can be argued that ‘Beveridge’ countries that 
typically experienced housing market booms and hence the wealth gains due, which 
themselves have origins in mortgage market deregulation, exhibited declines in saving. On 
the other side, ‘Bismarck’ (continental Europe) countries typically have lower home 
ownership rates and have not experiences booms in housing markets, which might in part 
explain higher level of private savings along with public.  
Admittedly, above explained factors can primarily explain the cross-section variation in 
savings patterns. Within–country variation in mortgage markets should be condition with 
time dummies that are included in analysis as well, and therefore one could argue that the 
above explanation does not hold for fixed-effect estimators. Still, since pension design 
variables` variation is mainly cross-country, and changes in pension designs does not 
happen very often, and when it does it takes a long time for effects to become evident, 
within (fixed) effects estimators are generally not ideal estimators to investigate saving-
pension design relationship.  
In addition, household saving data – despite the constant improvement in quality, may still 
have measurement problems.  
All of these point out that, despite the importance of the effect of pension system design on 
saving for policy makers, due to the number of problems with modelling household saving – 
measurement issues, complexity of saving behaviour and various saving determinants 
 )3
exerting opposing effects – it is still not trustworthy to rely on the empirical analysis of 
saving behaviour.  
Appendix 
Table IV-9 Variable List and Sources 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE 
Dependent variables   
Household Saving Rate 
Net household saving rate as % of 
household disposable income 
OECD statistics (Economic Outlook 
database); AMECO database 
Alternative dependent var:   
Gross Domestic Saving 
GDP less final consumption 
expenditure (total consumption)as 
a % of GDP 
World Development Indicators (WB) 
Gross National Saving 
Gross savings are the difference 
between gross national income and 
public and private consumption, 
plus net current transfers (% of 
GDI) 
World Development Indicators (WB) 
    Net National Saving (% of GDP) OECD statistics (National Accounts 
Pension Design Variable   
Effective pension 
contribution  
Effective contribution rate for old-
age pension, calculated as the ratio 
of the ratio of old age pension 
expenditure and wage bill in the 
economy. 
Own calculations based pension 
expenditures and Compensation of 
employees: total economy from National 
Accounts, drawn from an AMECO 
database 
Pension variation 
Coefficient of variation between 
RRs for 4 household levels:  67% 
and average, single and couple. 
 
Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) and 
European Commission 
Pension tax 
Pension variation multiplied by the 
average effective contribution rate 
Effective contribution rate and pension 
variation variables 
 
 
 
 
IRR-Internal rate of return 
Actual internal rate of return  
Own calculation based on, effective 
contributions, RR (Chapter 1), AMECO 
database for earnings growth, UN for life 
expectancy 
Assumption of no wage growth 
during employment 
Actual wage growth during 
employment , assumption that first 
cohort started contributing in the 
1950s 
Assumption of no wage growth 
during employment, assumption 
that first cohort started 
contributing in the 1950s 
Private pension assets Total private pension assets Own compilation/calculation based on 
 )
Global Pension Statistics, extended with 
Institutional Investors data, cross 
validating the data for the years where 
both sources are available. For historical 
data additional sources – Davis (1993), 
country papers, and information on 
countries’ pension systems 
Control variables   
GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2000 
US$) ( 
World Bank (WDI database) 
GDP growth GDP growth (annual %) ( 
Budget balance General government final 
consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
Dependency ratio Age dependency ratio, old (% of 
working-age population) 
Financial liquidity 
Domestic credit to private sector 
(% of GDP) 
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Table IV-10 Summary statistics – between and within variation 
   
 
  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Household saving rate overall 8.15 6.55 N =  69
between 5.60 n =  21
within 3.67 T-bar = 3.28
Old-age contribution rate overall 12.30 6.04 N =  84
between 5.34 n =  21
within 3.00 T =   4
Pension Variation overall 0.18 0.14 n =  21
between 0.14 T =   4
within 0.03 N =  84
Pension Tax overall 1.63 1.21 T =   4
between 1.17 N =  84
within 0.39 n =  21
IRR1 overall 5.14 2.25 N =  84
between 1.79 n =  21
within 1.41 T =   4
IRR2 overall 3.09 1.64 n =  21
between 1.45 T =   4
within 0.82 N =  84
IRR3 overall 5.92 2.77 T =   4
between 1.87 N =  84
within 2.08 n =  21
IRR4 overall 3.69 1.91 N =  84
between 1.50 n =  21
within 1.21 T =   4
Private Pension Assets overall 34.68 37.4 N =  84
between 30.7 n =  21
within 22.1 T =   4
 )'
Table IV-11 Correlation matrix 
 
 
Table IV-12 Fixed effect estimation of the effect of public pension variables                                               on gross domestic saving 
(variant 1) 

HSR IRR2 IRR3 Contr. rate PV Pension Tax Assets GDPpc GDP growth Private cred Depend. GovCons
Household Saving (HSR) 1
IRR2 0.27 1
IRR3 0.37 0.81 1
Contribution rate 0.04 -0.14 -0.24 1
Pension variation (PV) -0.28 -0.27 -0.29 -0.67 1
Pension Tax -0.36 -0.34 -0.39 -0.46 0.89 1
Private pension assets -0.36 -0.21 -0.43 -0.45 0.64 0.57 1
GDPpc -0.22 -0.03 -0.30 -0.22 0.23 0.25 0.58 1
GDP growth -0.18 0.16 0.23 -0.44 0.34 0.18 0.17 0.03 1
Private credit -0.20 0.07 -0.25 -0.16 0.19 0.17 0.52 0.65 -0.06 1
Dependency -0.20 -0.24 -0.37 0.59 -0.45 -0.23 -0.13 0.23 -0.40 0.11 1
Government Consump -0.17 -0.11 -0.09 -0.02 0.05 0.16 0.04 -0.04 -0.13 -0.26 0.32 1
GrossDom5 Coef. Std. Err. t    P>t
IRR3 0.0752 0.5246 0.14 0.887
CV2 -31.6678 17.0021 -1.86 0.068
OldAgeContr -1.3099 0.2899 -4.52 0.000
GDPpc5 0.0006 0.0002 2.92 0.005
GDPgrowth5 0.0072 0.5514 0.01 0.99
CreditPriv5 -0.0243 0.0212 -1.15 0.256
Dependency5 0.2175 0.3197 0.68 0.499
GovConsump5 -0.2986 0.4353 -0.69 0.496
_cons 36.5357 12.1579 3.01 0.004
No. of observations 82
 F(8,53)  7.5
Prob > F 0

Table IV-13 Public pension variables and household saving in OECD countries – Variant 2 
(with time dummies)  
Dependent variable:  
Household Saving (%GDI) 
FE  RE  GLS  
Coefficient 
(standard errors) 
t- ratio  
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(standard errors) 
Z ratio  
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(standard errors) 
Z ratio  
(p-value) 
Pension variables       
IRR 
-0.33  
(0.67) 
-0.50 
(0.619) 
-0.24 
(0.49) 
-0.51 
(0.612) 
-0.91  
(0.47) 
-1.92 
(0.055) 
Pension tax 
-0.45 
(1.08) 
-0.42 
(0.679) 
-1.79 
(0.76) 
-2.35 
(0.019) 
-0.98 
(0.67) 
-1.46 
(0.143) 
Control variables       
GDP per capita 
-2e
-4 
(3e
-4 
) 
0.74 
  (0.461) 
-2e
-4 
(1e
-4 
) 
1.71 
(0.088) 
-2e
-5 
(1e
-4 
) 
0.17 
(0.866) 
GDP growth 
 0.15  
(0.57) 
0.28   
(0.783) 
-0.65 
(0.57) 
-1.15 
(0.249) 
0.74 
(0.41) 
1.80 
(0.072) 
Old-age dependency 
-0.88 
(0.23) 
-3.71 
(0.001) 
-0.51 
(0.19) 
-2.56 
(0.011) 
-0.91 
(0.15) 
-5.87 
(0.000) 
Financial liquidity 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-1.97 
(0.056) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-1.26 
(0.208) 
-0.05 
(0.01) 
-3.06 
(0.002) 
Government consumption 
0.09 
(0.41) 
0.22 
(0.824) 
-0.09 
( 0.26) 
-0.37 
(0.709) 
-0.33 
(0.27) 
-1.23 
(0.218) 
Time dummies        
1980s 
-2.00 
(1.68) 
-1.19 
(0.241) 
-2.62 
(1.45) 
-1.81 
  (0.071) 
-1.35 
(0.86) 
-1.56 
(0.119) 
1990s 
-1.69 
(2.99) 
-0.56 
(0.576) 
-3.35 
(2.29) 
-1.46 
(0.144) 
-1.79 
(1.81) 
 -0.99 
(0.323) 
2000s 
-3.78 
(4.53) 
-0.83 
  (0.409) 
-6.68 
(3.22) 
-2.07 
(0.038) 
-2.358 
(2.469) 
-0.95 
(0.340) 
Number of observations 69 69 69 
F(Wald)-test 7.81 (0.0000)   59.91 (0.0000) 943.61 (0.0000) 
Hausman - chi2 (Prob>chi2) ...   19.39 (0.0221) ... 
NOTE: GLS weighted by population; country effects included; for internal rate of return variable IRR3 (see Appendix and Chapter III 
for details).  
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V CONCLUSION 
1. OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS  
The objective of this thesis has been to examine the effect of pension system design on 
saving. This relationship is of great interest to policy makers, since in the era of ongoing 
pension system reform around the world, the impact of particular pension models on saving 
has usually been one of the arguments for choosing a particular reform model.  
I started the investigation of the pension design – saving relationship analytically. In Chapter 
II PENSION SYSTEM DESIGN AND SAVING: TWO-PERIOD PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL, I 
examined the relationship using the two-period two-generation partial equilibrium 
household sector Samuelson-type of OLG mode. The contribution of this Chapter is a 
derivation of the household saving rate using risk-aversion logarithmic utility function, 
based on the two-period budget constraints problem set in Disney (2005), and further 
augmenting it by the mandatory funded pension programme and displacement coefficient. 
Additional contribution is numerical simulations of the model. 
The model predicts that household saving as a share of income is unambiguously negatively 
affected by the size of the PAYG public pension system – the higher the payroll tax for 
financing it, the lower the savings. Household saving also depends on design of a public 
pension system. In particular, the closer is the internal rate of return from the earnings 
related component to the market interest rate, implying the public pension system more 
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closely mimics private pension programmes, the lower is the savings ratio. Furthermore, the 
higher the ‘intragenerational redistribution’ in the system, the system is on average 
expected to have a positive effect on household saving. 
When it comes to a mandatory funded programme, the effect of this component on private 
saving is expected to be positive, but the magnitude depends on the displacement 
coefficient – the higher the displacement coefficient, the lower the effect of a funded 
programme and vice versa. In the case of restricted pension fund investment policies, 
displacement is reduced.  
I illustrated the model predictions with numerical simulations, using ‘reasonable’ general 
parameters – a 5% market interest rate and 4% discount rate. For the baseline scenario the 
contribution rate for the PAYG programme is set at 16% of gross wage; the contribution rate 
for the mandatory individual account component to 2.5%, with the rate of return slightly 
lower than the market interest rate (due to conservative investment policies of pension 
funds), and displacement coefficient of 0.3 as in Samwick (1998).  
Varying the level of the contribution rate for the PAYG programme, simulations showed the 
significant effect of the scale of the PAYG system on the saving ratio – with a contribution 
rate of 22%, the saving ratio is as low as 27% compared to 33% with the ‘baseline’ 
contribution rate and a 49% saving ratio in case where the PAYG system does not exist.  
Variations of the internal rate of return in the earnings related component show that the 
magnitude of the impact is actually rather small – with a 3.5 percentage point decrease in 
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the IRR, the increase in the saving ratio is only 0.2 percentage points. When it comes to 
‘intragenerational redistribution’, simulations again show a very small effect – for example, 
in a highly redistributive system (with the ‘Bismarckian factor’ 0.2), the saving ratio is only 
0.0015 percentage points higher than it would be in the earnings-related system that 
provides the IRR of 4% to its beneficiaries. Nonetheless, assuming the contribution rate is a 
positive direct proportional function of the ‘Bismarckian factor’, the effect of 
‘intragenerational redistribution’ becomes significant – the saving ratio increases from 
around 31% in a ‘Bismarck-style’ programme, to almost 47% in a highly redistributive 
‘Beveridge-style’ programme. 
Prior to getting on the empirical analysis of the effect of the pension system design on 
saving, it was important to define a set of measures of the design of a pension system, and 
to test empirically whether it still makes sense to regard pension models as Beveridge vs. 
Bismarck, as it has been done in the analytical Chapter II, following Disney (2005; 2006a), 
Lindbeck and Persson (2003), Pestieau (1998; 1999), Casamatta et al. (2000). 
Chapter III PENSION SYSTEM DESIGN: MEASUREMENT AND CONVERGENCE first deals with 
the measurement issue. There are various indicators of ‘pension system design’ measured 
in the literature, though there are no ready available datasets. Section 2 of this Chapter 
describes and measures various pension indicators and explains in detail what the pension 
indicators are, how they are calculated and what are the data sources. This set of indicators 
is later used in the empirical analysis of pension system design and saving.  
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As the proposed indicators overlap and correlate, I have also performed the factor and 
principal component analysis to identify commonalities on indicators in line with typology of 
pension programmes – Beveridge vs. Bismarck, and to create composite indices that can be 
later used in the empirical analysis.   
The focus of the empirical analysis of this Chapter is to answer the question whether there 
have been convergences in the design of pension systems around the world or are pension 
models still influenced by their historical paths. 
Pension systems around the world originated with the choice between two models – 
Bismarck, with the aim to provide income maintenance, or Beveridge, aiming to alleviate 
poverty across the whole old-age population. At the end of the 1950s, countries could be 
quite easily classified according to the original pension policy that prevailed at the time into 
‘Bismarck’ or ‘Beveridge. However, further evolution of pension systems and the latest 
developments – the retrenchment policies caused by growing pension deficits and by the 
issue of aging population, as well as the European Union’s ‘Open Method of Coordination’ – 
all these together brought the question whether the convergence in pension models 
occurred, or historical origins are still important.  
I have tested empirically the ‘convergence hypothesis’ in section 3 of Chapter III, using a 
number of estimation methods. Firstly, I have pursued a Disney (2000a) type of Tobit 
estimation to test whether ‘Bismarckian’ countries tend to hinder the development of 
private pension arrangements – a form of ‘crowding out’ hypothesis, using a longer data 
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series and a slightly different set of variables. The results of the Tobit modelling of private 
pension assets on a ‘Bismarck dummy’ and control variables suggested a strong impact of 
historical origins on the volume of private assets in a country. The results were robust to 
choice of sample and to specification – whether on cross-section or panel data.  
Then I used Bonoli`s (1997) ‘two-dimensional approach’, who classifies welfare regimes 
according to two dimensions of social policy, and apply it to the pension models. I looked if 
countries still tend to group as ‘Bismarck’ and ‘Beveridge’ according to the pairs of pension 
policy dimensions. This approach, matching combinations of series of pension indicators 
such as pension variation and private assets, or pension variation and RR, suggests that 
countries still broadly cluster as ‘Bismarck’ and ‘Beveridge’, notwithstanding policy 
pressures towards uniformity. An analysis of difference in means between the two groups 
of countries – Bismarck and Beveridge - confirms this conclusion. 
I have also used Johnson`s (1999) approach to investigate whether there has been a 
convergence, looking at the coefficient of variation of pension indicators across countries 
over time – if the coefficient decrease, a convergence happened. This procedure is 
analogous to that used to capture ‘sigma convergence’ stemming from the Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995) growth literature. I have looked at the coefficient of variation of all pension 
indicators described in section 2 of Chapter III. The only variable where one could see 
significant decrease in the CV of an indicator across countries over time was private pension 
assets. Nonetheless, this is still the variable with the greatest variation between countries, 
since in the 1960s, the differences between countries regarding private pension were 
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enormous with some countries having near-zero assets. Many indicators, after the initial 
decrease in variation that happened in the 1970s, have seen a steady increase in variation, 
for example, in effective contributions and pension expenditure. Thus, using this approach, 
the conclusion again was that no overall convergence occurred for pension design 
parameters.  
Finally, to give a statistical underpinning to these findings, I formally test the ‘convergence 
hypothesis’ by testing the stationarity of the difference of selected pension indicators for 
the ‘Bismarck’ and ‘Beveridge’ groups. This is a method that has been used in the literature 
testing convergence of various topics, for example by Harvey (2002) for economic growth, 
Affinito and De Bonis (2008) for convergence of the banking sector, etc. 
I chose to test two long time series – private pension assets and pension expenditure, for 
two reasons: the first is data availability and the second is that these two series depict well 
the private-public mix in models of pension provision. Just by visual inspection of the both 
data series, it was already obvious that series do not converge. The formal ADF test for 
private pension assets series confirms no convergence – since the computed ADF test-
statistics (65.74481) for are greater than the critical value ‘tau’ (1.60). A similar result stands 
for the series of public expenditure on old-age pensions. The ADF test confirms no 
convergence, i.e. slight divergence given the coefficient of 1.0085. The ADF test-statistic 
(108.5666) is greater than the critical value ‘tau’ (0.92), hence the null cannot be rejected. 
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Consequently, despite a convergence in pension policy goals and in an outcome as reflected 
by the total or average replacement rate, no convergence in pension models could be 
found. The results from this Chapter suggest that pension systems around the world are still 
very diverse and influenced by the original policy choice i.e. historical paths.  
Findings of this Chapter have a few important implications. Firstly, the analysis shows how 
the pension policy work is hampered by the lack of consistent pension variables dataset. It is 
of great importance to improve pension data and build longer series. Admittedly, this is very 
difficult task since pension systems are complex, aiming at various goals that need to be 
measured. There has been significant endeavour recently both by European Commission 
and OECD to build the pension data series, but there is still scope for further improvements.  
When it comes to the lack of measured convergence, these findings have important policy 
implications. Despite the increased possibilities to exchange knowledge and disseminate 
policy ides across national boundaries, pension systems are still heavily influenced by their 
historical origins, which are in turn often related to some other factors, such as type of 
financial system, level of financial market development, labour market flexibility, etc. This 
means that ‘one size fits all’ policy recommendations are not suited for pension reform 
policies, which especially needs to be born in mind when considering radical changes such 
as moving to completely new type of pension system.  
Finally, finding from this Chapter confirms that  any analysis of household behaviour, such 
as retirement saving behaviour, which gives a primary role of program design, still makes a 
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lot of sense. In particular, analysis of different behaviour between ‘Bismarck’ and 
‘Beveridge’ countries are, despite policy transfers, still applicable. This analysis of 
retirement saving was pursued in the forthcoming chapter.  
In Chapter IV PENSION SYSTEM DESIGN AND SAVING: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE I have 
empirically investigated the effect of pension system design on saving rates. The empirical 
strategy regarding the impact of public pension design on household saving closely followed 
work in Disney (2005), with somewhat differently calculated public pension design variables 
and with data for the 2000s. I also tested the impact of private pension component on 
household saving. Finally, the overall design of pension system was estimated using 
composite indices obtained with the principal component analysis.  
The findings obtained using a number of estimation methods, such as fixed, two-way fixed 
and random effects, GLS estimators weighted with population (all without and including 
time dummies), as well as the dynamic panel specification estimated by Arellano Bond 
(1991) GMM procedure, have not confirmed the predictions of the theoretical model. 
Moreover, the findings are counter-intuitive and do not confirm the results obtained by 
Disney – the study I have tried to replicate in one part of the analysis.  
Namely, the results are not significant, and often opposite to the model predictions. The 
coefficient of the contribution rate is surprisingly positive, while the ‘pension variation’ and 
‘pension tax’ appear to have a negative effect on household saving, contrary to the model 
predictions. The results from the private component analysis are also insignificant, but even 
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when significant they are counter-intuitive. Finally, the analysis of the overall pension 
system design on saving, using the ‘Bismarck index’ is in line with the previous results – the 
findings are not convincing, though there is an indication of higher household saving in 
countries with the Bismarck pension model.  
This certainly does not mean that the pension system design is not important for saving 
behaviour. As regards the difference in result in Disney (2005), a few factors can explain the 
disparity – the revision of the household saving data, differently constructed pension design 
variables, the different set of control variables, as well as different ‘weighting’ variable in 
GLS specification. Inclusion of 2000s data does not seem as the reason for different results.  
The explanation for the obtained results may lie in the complexity of household saving 
behaviour characterised by the influence of many determinants exerting opposite effects. 
Those effects may drastically blur the relationship between a pension system and saving. In 
particular, one may argue that in Anglo-Saxon countries, which are the exponents of the 
‘Beveridge’ pension model, wealth effects associated with the holding of stocks appear 
much more important than in continental Europe, and the shocks affecting asset prices 
have a greater effect on household consumption (Oddonat and Reiu, 2003). In addition, 
mortgage markets tend to be larger and more ﬂexible in the Anglo-Saxon economies than in 
Japan and continental Europe, with the exception of the Netherlands, again a ‘Beveridge’ 
country (Calza et al., 2007). In relation to that, the role of housing wealth could be very 
important in explaining the differences in saving patterns between countries, and partly 
within time. Countries that experiences housing market booms are those where financial 
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market and mortgage market deregulation occurred (Agnello and Schuknecht (2011)). 
Housing wealth, in turn, can have significant impact on savings. Therefore, it can be argued 
that ‘Beveridge’ countries that typically experienced housing market booms and hence the 
wealth gains due, which themselves have origins in mortgage market deregulation, 
exhibited declines in saving. On the other side, ‘Bismarck’ (continental Europe) countries 
typically have lower home ownership rates and have not experiences booms in housing 
markets, which might in part explain higher level of private savings along with public.  
Admittedly, above explained factors can primarily explain the cross-section variation in 
savings patterns. Within–country variation in mortgage markets should be condition with 
time dummies, and therefore one could argue that the above explanation does not hold for 
fixed-effect estimators. Still, since pension design variables` variation is mainly cross-
country, and changes in pension design in the country does not happen too often, and 
when it does takes a long time to shows its effect, within (fixed)effects estimators are in 
generally not ideal to investigate saving-pension design relationship.  
Finally, household saving data – despite the constant improvement in quality, may still have 
measurement problems.  
All of these point out that, despite the importance of the effect of pension system design on 
saving for policy makers, due to the number of problems with modelling household saving – 
measurement issues, complexity of saving behaviour and various saving determinants 
exerting opposing effects – it is still not trustworthy to rely on the empirical analysis of 
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saving behaviour. This may be seen as a support of the belief that pension policy should 
focus on its, already multiple, primary objectives rather than secondary objectives such as 
increased saving and financial market development as a channels for economic growth.  
2. LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
The greatest set of limitations in this thesis concerns the empirical investigation of the 
effect of pension system design on saving in Chapter IV. As explained in section 4 of this 
Chapter, the empirical analysis of saving is challenging due to the problems of saving data 
availability and quality. Additionally, saving modelling is hampered by endogeneity 
problems, saving inertia, and the complexity of saving behaviour.  
First of all, there is a large number of saving motives that affect household saving. The 
effect of some variables is even ambiguous from the theoretical viewpoint. Accordingly, 
there are a great number of variables that can impact on saving behaviour, such as a 
number of household characteristics, as well as public policies and institutions. 
Consequently, modelling saving behaviour is quite complex as there are many of potentially 
important determinants of saving, for some of which it is often difficult to find proxies and 
available data, especially for the ‘70s and ‘80s and for a larger set of countries. In relation to 
that, multicollinearity issues will usually plague a saving model with a great number of 
explanatory variables, which are needed to understand saving behaviour.  
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Some authors point to the complexity of household saving behaviour and to the influence of 
‘many opposing effects’. For example, Börsch-Supan and Lusardi (2002: 26) show how the 
down-payment ratio exerts a conflicting effect on household saving compared to the public 
pension system replacement rate, which may lead to misunderstanding of the relationships. 
Similarly, Horioka and Yin (2010) argue that borrowing constraints are more important than 
social safety nets as a determinant of household saving. 
In addition, saving data generally suffer from low quality since they are defined as a 
residual. Household saving rates suffer from some additional measurement issues, such as 
the treatment of durable goods, treatment of pensions, issue of household consumption of 
public services, the problem of capital gains and losses. Moreover, there are problems of 
sector disaggregation, such as the fact that not all countries distinguish non-profit 
institutions serving households (NPISH) that should be included in the household sector; the 
scale of unincorporated enterprises, which are by definition included in the household 
sector but vary significantly across countries, etc.  
Despite constant improvement in household saving data, they are still plagued with 
problems. This is a reason why many authors suggest using whole economy aggregates. 
However, since the theory explains how pension programmes affect households’ decisions, 
the household saving rate for the dependent variable is by far the most preferable measure. 
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Indeed, the results of the empirical analysis of pension system design on household saving 
rates are rather confusing. They do not confirm the theoretical model, and are actually 
counter-intuitive.  
The reason might be the complexity of saving behaviour and the multiple factors affecting 
saving decisions that need to be controlled for. In particular, it is essential to isolate the 
effects of financial market development and borrowing constraints, as well as the wealth 
effect on household saving, which are presumably the factors that blur the relationship 
between social security and saving.  
However, it is quite challenging to find adequate proxies, in particular longer time series 
across countries. Moreover, a major shortcoming of the following empirical analysis is the 
inability to control for wealth effects on saving. A desirable proxy for household wealth 
could be, for example, ‘household financial assets from balance sheets’ that can be found at 
the EUROSTAT, yet the data are available only from the mid ‘90s and for EU countries68. 
Another possible proxy could be share prices as a measure of unrealised stock market 
wealth, but this variable is available only for most recent decades. In a nutshell, a proxy for 
households` unrealised gains i.e. wealth effect, for such a long time frame and a 
considerable number of countries, is to my knowledge not possible to obtain.   
Jappelli and Pagano (1994) investigate the relationship between household saving and 
liquidity constraints using a measure specifically designed to capture liquidity of the 

68
 Even for the most recent decade, data for the UK are missing.
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household sector, such as the maximum loan to value ratio and consumer credit (as % of net 
national product). These controls seem to be most appropriate when it comes to household 
saving, nonetheless, such data are not available for the sample of 21-OECD countries 
spanning four decades.  
The scope of potential further research mainly lies in the attempt to model the wealth 
effect and borrowing constraints more appropriately. As the data are not available, 
developing a dataset of ‘saving control indicators’ that would include adequate indicators 
for borrowing constraints and wealth, would complement the set of pension design 
indicators developed in this thesis and be of great value added for modelling household 
saving behaviour and its response to pension design more appropriately.  
In addition, modelling household saving behaviour and the effect of pension design using a 
cross-country cross-section dataset may improve the analysis. That way, both heterogeneity 
of households as well as public policies and institutions can be captured.  


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VIIAPPENDIX 
»Pillar« and »Tier« Terminology 
Pillar terminology is typically used for pension classifications, but the meanings may differ, 
depending on the institution using it.  
The commonly used three-pillar terminology by the World Bank terminology: 1st pillar - a 
relatively small, publicly managed, pay-as-you-go, defined benefit pillar; 2nd pillar - a 
mandatory, funded, defined-contribution (individual account), privately managed pillar; 3rd -
voluntary, privately managed pillar. 
The ILO suggests ‘tier’, instead of ‘pillar’ terminology: 1st tier –  a minimum anti-poverty 
pension, universally available but means tested, financed directly from general revenues; 
2nd tier – a mandatory public PAYG social insurance pension providing an adequate 
replacement rate; 3rd – a fully funded defined contribution scheme, privately managed, 
supplementing the public scheme (includes both occupational and individual schemes).  
OECD terminology
69
: 1st pillar - publicly managed pension schemes with defined benefits 
and pay-as-you-go finance, usually based on a payroll tax; 2nd pillar - privately managed 
pension schemes which are provided as part of an employment contract; 3rd pillar - personal 
pension plans in the form of saving and annuity schemes.  

69
 „REVISED TAXONOMY FOR PENSION PLANS, PENSION FUNDS AND PENSION ENTITIES’, OECD (2002), AS IN MAINTAINING 
PROSPERITY IN AN AGEING SOCIETY. 
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The European Commission (EC) has endorsed a similar terminology to the OECD:70 1st pillar 
- basic public mandatory program, usually financed on a PAYG basis; 2nd pillar - occupational 
schemes; 3rd pillar - individual savings and insurance for old-age based on an individual 
contract between a person and institution (e.g. life insurance companies, banks, etc). 
The recent evolution of pension systems in Europe has further complicated the existing 
classification, introducing the ‘tier’, but with a different meaning than in ILO classification.  
Zero tier: means-tested social assistance for the elderly in need (social pension); 1st tier - 
traditional PAYG programs within the first pillar; 2nd tier – funded mandatory schemes, 
financed through contributions within 1st pillar. 
This classification somewhat differs from the OECD terminology used in Whitehouse’s 
publications71. Such framework consists of only two mandatory (statutory) tiers: 1st tier – 
redistributive part, designed to ensure that pensioners achieve some absolute, minimum 
standard of living;  2nd tier – pension insurance component is designed to achieve income 
replacement.  
  

70
 Natali, D., Basic Glossary for the Analysis of Pension System, Observatoire social europeen, 2004. 
71
 OECD (2005) and (2007), Pensions at a Glance: Public Policies across OECD Countries; WHITEHOUSE, E. 
(2007), Pension Panorama, World Bank.
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Different data sources and methodology for average replacement rates: 
further analysis and description  
A. BLöNDAL AND SCARPETTA - 26 OECD COUNTRIES: 1961-1995 
Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) provide historical replacement rates for OECD countries for 
1961, 1975 and 1995. They constructed the expected gross RR at the age of 55 – the RR that 
a 55-year-old, who started working aged 20, could expect to receive on retiring at the 
standard retirement age. As the statutory retirement age differs considerably among 
countries, it means that career profiles vary as well. In the 1990s, for more than half of the 
observed countries, the standard retirement age was 65 for males, meaning that RRs were 
calculated most often for 45 years service72. However, normal retirement age ranged from a 
low of 60 in a few countries to a high of 67 in some Nordic countries.  
In addition to a single average worker, Blöndal and Scarpetta calculated replacement rates 
for low income earners (66% of average earnings) and for couples. 
 They used the publication Social Security Programs around the World as the main source 
for pension rules. They did not use the actual information on revalorisation – that is, how 
nominal earnings were uprated in the pension calculation. They assumed that all countries 
revalue previous earnings in line with changes in average earnings. This is mostly a realistic 

72
 Assuming first age of receipt of pension equals retirement age.  Of course, this is not always the case, 
especially where there is no ‘retirement test’; see for example the analysis of Disney and Smith (2002).  ’The 
Labour Supply Effect of the Abolition of the Earnings Rule for Older Workers in the United Kingdom,’ Economic 
Journal,  vol. 112(478), pages C136-C152 
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assumption, however, in the case where this is not the actual situation, Blöndal and 
Scarpetta`s RRs are overestimated. Pension income taken into account for their calculations 
includes public pension benefits and mandatory occupational pensions.  
Table VII-1 Gross replacement rate for average earner (single and with dependent couple), 
OECD: 1961-95 
 
Source: Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999); Disney (2004). 
Single Couple Single Couple Single Couple Single Couple
High-income OECD countries
Australia 12 18 20 33 22 37 24 41
Canada 17 33 38 40 38 44 39 49
Japan 26 26 48 49 46 49 44 49
New Zealand 18 33 26 43 32 51 39 58
Norway 16 24 52 61 51 60 51 60
Switzerland 19 30 37 55 36 54 35 52
United States 28 43 35 52 38 58 42 63
Average 19 30 37 48 38 50 39 53
Ratio couple/single
EU-15
Austria 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Belgium 60 75 60 75 60 75 60 75
Denmark 23 34 27 41 32 46 36 54
Finland 24 31 56 60 58 60 60 60
France 40 60 50 75 58 70 65 65
Germany 60 60 55 55 55 55 54 54
Greece .. .. 78 80 98 100 117 120
Ireland 23 39 17 29 21 34 24 39
Italy 37 40 62 62 71 71 80 80
Luxembourg .. .. 79 69 85 85 91 91
Netherlands 20 31 31 45 30 44 30 42
Portugal 80 80 70 84 75 84 80 84
Spain .. .. 50 50 75 75 100 100
Sweden 44 55 67 80 67 78 66 77
United Kingdom 20 33 21 33 30 41 39 50
EU-15 average 43 52 54 61 60 67 65 71
Ratio couple/single
EU-10
Czech Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. 38 50
Estonia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Hungary .. .. .. .. .. .. 51 51
Latvia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Lithuania .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Poland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Slovak Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Slovenia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
1.21 1.12 1.09
1961 1985 1995
1.52 1.34 1.36
1975
1.30
1.14
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Table VII-1 presents RRs for OECD countries from Blöndal and Scarpetta. It shows the overall 
trend, which was an increase until the mid-90s. It also presents RRs for couples, which are 
relatively higher in other high-income OECD countries than in EU-15. In addition, while the 
difference between RRs for couples and singles stays stable in other OECD countries, it is 
diminishing in EU-15 countries. As mentioned, some RRs are overestimated from Blöndal 
and Scarpetta, such as in Belgium, Portugal and Spain, since in these countries valorisation 
is/was actually done with CPI or a combination of CPI and wage growth.  
B. EUROPEAN COMMISSION/SOCIAL PROTECTION COMMITTEE (SPC) AND INDICATORS SUB-GROUP 
(ISG) 
Since 2004, the European Commission (Social Protection Committee and Indicators Sub-
group-ISG) has been publishing its report on Current and Prospective Theoretical Pension 
Replacement Rates. Thus far, three reports have been published: in 2004, 2006 and 2009.  
According to SPC-ISG, the replacement rate is defined as the ratio of pre-retirement income 
(benefit in the first year of retirement/income) to earned income during the year preceding 
retirement.  
In a number of EU member states, there are several statutory pension schemes for different 
groups of employees (civil servants, private sector, farmers, self-employed, etc.). 
Calculations were conducted for the most prevalent scheme (EC/SPC-ISG, 2004).  
Under the SPC-ISG methodology, replacement rates are calculated at the moment of 
pension take-up, i.e. current replacement rates. This means that, for example, the RR for 
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2005 is the replacement of income for someone who is exiting the labour market in 2005 
and becoming a pensioner. Reports also provide calculations of the prospective RR (for 
those retiring in 2010, 2030 and 2050, and in the latest Report for those retiring in 2046). 
The prospective RR indicates the pension outcome under current legislation, which includes 
announced changes that will be implemented at some time in the future.  
The RR is calculated for a base hypothetical worker, a single person with 40 years’ career 
length (i.e. he/she started to work at 25 and retired at 65) with constant average earnings. 
In addition to this base case, replacement rates for alternative hypothetical cases of a 
worker characterised by a low earnings profile (a constant 67% of average earnings) are 
calculated. Both reports provide two additional rising age-earnings profiles – one starting at 
100% rising to an average of 200% earnings at the end of career, and the other with 
earnings rising from 80% to 120%.  
The pension income taken into account for the calculations includes pension benefits from 
the first pillar (in EU terminology meaning statutory, i.e. mandatory schemes, regardless of 
whether the system is PAYG or funded, private or public) and the second pillar (in EU 
terminology = private occupational schemes). Gross replacement rates for the first and 
second pillar are available separately, while net replacement rates are presented only for 
the total amount – both 1st and 2nd pillar altogether. 
Macroeconomic assumptions are specific to each country. The unique common assumption 
as regards the rate of returns on private funded pension, which was conservatively assumed 
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at 2% (net of charges) in 2004 calculations, but it was changed to 2.5% in the 2006 report. 
Hence, an increase in the anticipated real rate of return causes a reported increase in the 
RR from 2004 to 2006 reports in countries where funded schemes exist. This again 
complicates to a certain extent the comparison between two time points. Nonetheless, the 
portion of mandatory funded components within the first-pillar is rather small – only 
recently (since the second half of the 1990s) have some EU accession countries, as well as 
Sweden, introduced mandatory funded components into their pension systems. That 
reform will significantly affect the prospective RR (in around 20 years’ time). 
Table VII-2 presents gross current and prospective RRs for EU-25 countries. It shows that 
overall there is a declining trend in RRs by 2046. Among EU-15 countries, the largest 
decreases can be seen in Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal. The 
decline in RRs is less pronounced in EU-8 (and EU-10). This is due to the introduction of 
mandatory private pension systems, which are envisaged to replace partly the benefits from 
social security73. Hence, the decrease would be even more evident if mandatory funded 
components introduced in most of EU-8 countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia) during the 1990s were not included in RR calculations. 
  

73
 This type of reform was typically led by the World Bank and other international financial institutions. 

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Table VII-2 Current and prospective gross replacement rates for EU-25: 2002-2050 
(average earner, I pillar) 
 
     Source: EC/SCP-ISG report 2004, 2006, 2009. 
a) EC/SPC-ISG report 2004 
b) EC/SPC-ISG report 2006 
c) EC/SPC-ISG report 2009 
NOTES: RR=income during the first year of retirement/income during the year preceding retirement. A 
worker covered by the most general scheme, 40 years career length, single male. 
In some of the countries, the decline in prospective RR is due to the introduction of life 
expectancy into the pension formula. On the other side, the EC methodology fixes the 
2006c) 2046c) 2046/2006c)
EU-15
Austria 74.3 64.1 68.0 68.6 0.9
Belgium 36.5 39.0 39.8 39.5 -0.8
Denmark 41.7 45.1 45.1 34.7 -23.1
Finland 57.6 56.6 63.8 51.5 -19.3
France 65.0 66.2 66.2 50.2 -24.2
Germany 44.6 43.0 43.0 34.0 -20.9
Greece 108.0 105.0 105.0 92.9 -11.5
Ireland 31.4 31.0 36.0 34.2 -5.0
Italy 79.6 78.9 80.2 63.0 -21.4
Luxembourg 89.5 90.8 90.8 90.1 -0.8
Netherlands 32.6 29.6 29.6 31.2 5.4
Portugal 72.3 74.8 74.8 54.7 -26.9
Spain 88.6 90.5 90.5 82.0 -9.4
Sweden 57.0 53.0 50.5 39.5 -21.8
United Kingdom 16.6 17.0 35.9 33.1 -7.8
EU-15 average 59.7 59 .0 61.3 53.3 -13.1
EU 10 
Czech Republic .. 61.0 60.7 45.0 -25.9
Hungary .. 65.8 63.5 76.5 20.5
Poland .. 63.2 63.2 47.5 -24.8
Slovak Republic .. 49.4 49.4 50.4 2.0
Slovenia .. 64.0 64.0 59.7 -6.7
Latvia .. 60.8 60.8 49.7 -18.3
Estonia .. 32.7 33.0 41.6 26.1
Lithuania .. 40.0 41.0 41.6 1.5
EU-8 ave rage 54 .6 54.5 51.5 -5.4
Cyprus .. 46.0 54.0 60.1 11.3
Malta .. 72.2 65.3 57.8 -11.5
EU-10 average 55 .5 55.5 53.0 -4.5
2002/03a) 2004/05b)
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number of years in service to 40 and hypothetical RRs appear to be decreasing, even though 
the intention of policy makers is actually to prolong the working years.  
C. APEX METHODOLOGY (OECD PENSIONS AT A GLANCE AND WB PENSIONS PANORAMA) 
The second source of data is a tool recently developed by Edward Whitehouse – the APEX 
model (Analysis of Pension Entitlements across Countries). Data on various earnings levels 
calculated by the APEX methodology are published in the OECD publication ‘Pensions at a 
Glance’ (2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011), as well as in the World Bank`s ‘Pensions Panorama’ 
(2006).  
The replacement rate is defined by Whitehouse as the ratio of pension benefit as a share of 
individual lifetime-average earnings (re-valued in line with economy-wide earnings growth). 
Since under the baseline assumptions workers earn the same percentage of economy-wide 
average earnings throughout their career, lifetime average re-valued earnings and 
individual final earnings are identical. Therefore, there is no difference between the OECD 
and EC definition for the baseline case – flat lifetime earnings. The difference in definitions 
is apparent in rising career profiles, which are not used in this thesis.  
The APEX methodology provides only prospective (expected) RRs, reflecting future 
entitlements under today’s parameters and rules for current workers just entering the 
labour market at the age of 20 and retiring after a full career i.e. at the statutory retirement 
age. Hence, the replacement rates may be dubbed the ‘expected RR at the age of 20’.  
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Since the statutory retirement age varies across countries, the length of full career varies as 
well (40 years for retirement at 60; 45 years for retirement at 65); though in most cases it is 
45 years of service). The Pensions at a Glance 2005 publication, as well as the Pensions 
Panorama (2007) study, report RRs for those entering the labour market in 2002; Pensions 
at a Glance 2007 reports RRs for those entering the labour market in 2004, and so on. 
Pensions at a Glance 2007 provides also a version of an RR at 25, which can be considered 
more realistic bearing in mind that nowadays workers get longer education. The RR at 25 is 
therefore comparable to the ISG methodology (in most cases it is 40 years of service). 
In addition to the single average earner, RRs are calculated for various earnings levels – at 
0.5, 0.75, 1.5 and 2 times average (mean) earnings. These provide rich information in order 
to analyse whether the pension system is of the Bismarck/Beveridge type. 
In addition, since the latest 2011 issues, Pensions at a Glance has been providing 
single/couple RRs. 
Replacement rates include all mandatory pension schemes for private sector workers, 
regardless of whether they are public or private. This includes mandatory private personal 
DC pensions, recently introduced in some countries (such as Hungary, Sweden, Poland, 
etc.), since these schemes are mandatory for all new labour-market entrants. This is 
equivalent to 1st pillar in the EC-ISG terminology. Systems with near-universal coverage are 
also included, provided they cover at least 90% of employees. For example, such a degree of 
coverage of occupational plans is achieved through centralised collective bargaining in the 
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Netherlands and Sweden. In Canada, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
there is a broad coverage of voluntary occupational pensions and these play an important 
role in providing retirement incomes. However, coverage is significantly below 90%, so they 
have not been included in the main results (OECD, 2005). The Denmark occupational 
scheme is included in the 2007 report; as it is thought that coverage increased to above 
90%. That is the reason why the RR for Denmark is significantly higher in the 2007 report 
than in 2005. The latest issues of the publication (2009 and 2011) provide separate RRs for 
both public and private mandatory schemes.  
Both gross and net RRs are calculated and presented in Pensions at a Glance, as well as in 
Pensions Panorama. 
Unlike in EC-ISG, the calculation of the RR for all countries is based upon a single set of 
economic assumptions. Although it is not a realistic assumption, it ensures that the 
outcomes of different pension regimes are unaffected by different economic conditions 
(OECD, 2005). Real earnings are assumed to grow 2% in real terms, while the real rate of 
return on DC schemes (net of administrative fees) is assumed at 3.5 percent per year. These 
assumptions are the same for both years (2002 and 2004). 
 
* presents prospective RRs for EU-25 and other developed OECD countries from 
the APEX source. 
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Table VII-3 Gross Prospective Replacement Rate 
2002 2004 2008
Total Total Total Public Private Total Public Private
High-income OECD countries
Australia 40.0 43.1 41.5 14.6 26.9 47.2 11.8 35.4
Canada 42.5 43.9 44.5 44.5 .. 38.9 38.9 ..
Japan 50.3 34.4 33.9 33.9 .. 34.5 34.5 ..
New Zealand 37.6 39.7 38.7 38.7 .. 38.7 38.7 ..
Norway 52.6 59.3 59.3 51.9 7.4 53.1 46.1 7.0
Switzerland 58.2 58.4 58.3 35.6 22.7 57.9 34.5 23.4
US 40.3 41.2 38.7 38.7 .. 39.4 39.4 ..
Average 45.9 45.7 45.0 36.8 19.0 44.2 34.8 21.9
EU-15
Austria 78.3 80.1 80.1 80.1 .. 76.6 76.6 ..
Belgium 37.3 40.4 42.0 42.0 .. 42.0 42.0 ..
Denmark
a)
43.3 75.8 80.3 22.9 57.4 79.6 28.9 50.7
Finland 71.5 63.4 56.2 56.2 .. 57.8 57.8 ..
France 49.4 51.2 53.3 53.3 .. 49.1 49.1 ..
Germany 45.8 39.9 43.0 43.0 .. 42.0 42.0 ..
Greece 84.0 95.7 95.7 95.7 .. 95.7 95.7 ..
Ireland 30.6 32.5 34.2 34.2 .. 29.0 29.0 ..
Italy 78.8 67.9 67.9 67.9 .. 64.5 64.5 ..
Luxembourg 101.9 88.3 88.1 88.1 .. 87.4 87.4 ..
Netherlands 68.3 81.9 89.3 30.2 59.1 88.1 29.2 58.9
Portugal 66.7 54.1 53.9 53.9 .. 53.9 53.9 ..
Spain 80.1 81.2 81.2 81.2 .. 81.2 81.2 ..
Sweden 64.8 62.1 61.5 37.8 23.7 53.8 31.1 22.7
United Kingdom 37.1 30.8 30.8 30.8 .. 31.9 .. ..
Average 62.5 63.0 63.8 54.5 46.7 62.2 54.9 44.1
EU-8
Czech Republic 44.4 49.1 49.7 49.7 .. 50.2 50.2 ..
Estonia 51.6 .. .. .. .. 45.0 22.5 22.5
Hungary 75.4 76.9 76.9 50.7 26.2 75.8 44.4 31.4
Latvia 58.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Lithuania 53.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Poland 56.9 61.2 61.3 30.0 31.3 58.9 28.7 30.2
Slovak Republic 48.6 56.7 56.4 24.0 32.4 57.6 26.0 31.6
Slovenia .. .. .. .. .. 62.4 62.4 ..
Average 55.5 61.0 61.1 38.6 30.0 58.3 39.0 28.9
2006
 
                Source: OECD pension model (APEX). 
a) Data not comparable – in 2002 occupational scheme not included. 
b)Data for Malta and Cyprus not available.   
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D. CWE DATASET OF 18 OECD COUNTRIES: 1971–2003 
This dataset is a part of the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED) developed 
under the project ‘Welfare State Entitlements: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of 
Eighteen Welfare States’ conducted by Lyle Scruggs (2004). The dataset covers 18 OECD 
countries spanning from 1960 for gross RR and 1971 for net RR74.  
The replacement rate is defined as the first (entry) pension as a share of the average 
national wage in the same year. This differs from previous sources where the first pension is 
compared to the last wage. However, it is possible to calculate RRs according to the usual 
definition based on the available dataset.  
The CWED provides the current gross and net RR at the year of statutory retirement – 
usually these are for 65 years olds who started working aged 21. Since the statutory 
retirement age differs considerably among countries, the length of career varies as well.  
This source provides two types of the replacement rate: the ‘minimum’ pension, payable 
regardless of work history; and the ‘standard’ pension, payable to someone earning the 
APW wage in each year of their working life. 
Data are provided for RRs for single earners and couples, for one type of earner – the 
worker on average earnings. Only public pensions are included, while private, mandated 
saving plans and occupational plans are excluded. 

74
 Net RR data are not calculated, however data on net pension benefit and net wages are available since 
1961, and therefore one can calculate net RR. Gross RRs are calculated by the author.  
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Table VII-4 Gross RR, OECD-18 countries (1970-2002) 
Single Couple Single Couple Single Couple Single Couple Single Couple
High-income OECD countries
Australia 0.19 0.34 0.20 0.34 0.24 0.39 0.24 0.41 0.23 0.38
Canada 0.22 0.37 0.29 0.50 0.39 0.58 0.42 0.61 0.39 0.57
Japan 0.14 0.20 0.29 0.40 0.47 0.68 0.44 0.70 0.41 0.65
New Zealand 0.21 0.39 0.26 0.44 0.31 0.52 0.32 0.49 0.31 0.48
Norway 0.29 0.42 0.31 0.41 0.47 0.56 0.50 0.58 0.52 0.61
Switzerland 0.18 0.29 0.36 0.53 0.34 0.50 0.36 0.54 0.35 0.52
United States 0.33 0.50 0.35 0.53 0.37 0.55 0.44 0.66 0.47 0.70
Average 0.22 0.36 0.30 0.45 0.37 0.54 0.39 0.57 0.38 0.56
Ratio couple/single
of which EU-15
Austria 0.74 0.74 0.67 0.67 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78
Belgium 0.60 0.75 0.54 0.68 0.61 0.76 0.58 0.73 0.53 0.66
Denmark 0.31 0.42 0.25 0.39 0.29 0.52 0.42 0.59 0.41 0.58
Finland 0.30 0.37 0.27 0.33 0.45 0.50 0.56 0.60 0.58 0.58
France 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.62 0.48 0.64 0.46 0.60 0.41 0.53
Germany 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.46
Ireland 0.21 0.36 0.23 0.40 0.30 0.48 0.29 0.46 0.32 0.53
Italy 0.59 0.62 0.56 0.56 0.62 0.62 0.70 0.70 0.81 0.81
Netherlands 0.31 0.44 0.31 0.44 0.36 0.51 0.31 0.42 0.34 0.47
Sweden 0.37 0.49 0.44 0.56 0.65 0.78 0.61 0.72 0.57 0.67
United Kingdom 0.21 0.33 0.24 0.36 0.31 0.44 0.40 0.52 0.45 0.58
Average 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.50 0.49 0.59 0.51 0.60 0.52 0.60
Ratio couple/single 1.19 1.22 1.18
1.59 1.52 1.47
1970 1975 19951885 2002
1.47
1.17
1.46
1.22
Source:CWED 
Data quality and comparability/compatibility of sources 
Macroeconomic assumptions, which are only relevant for prospective (expected) RRs, are in 
the APEX (OECD) model are fixed for all countries. Although this is not realistic, it is 
convenient from the point of view of the pension system design analysis since it isolates 
only the effect of the pension system. On the other side, outcomes of different pension 
system solutions, such as valorisation, are very sensitive to the average macroeconomic 
environment – wage growth in particular, so from that perspective, fixed assumptions for all 
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countries can be considered a limitation. Conversely, the assumptions used in EC 
calculations differ significantly across member states, which reflect reality, though reducing 
international comparability though and blurring effects of the pension system design.  
The real rate of return is assumed higher in the APEX methodology (3.5% net of charges) 
compared to EC (2-2.5%); due to this difference, RRs in countries with funded parts of 
pension systems could be higher in APEX reports. Furthermore, for countries that have a 
funded component, a minor increase in RRs in the EC 2006 report are due to the increase in 
the assumed rate of return (from 2% to 2.5%). 
In addition, prospective RR calculations are sensitive to the projections of life expectancies.  
Career lengths are different – EC replacement rates are based on fixed 40 years’ career 
length for every country; in the APEX methodology, as well as Blöndal and Scarpetta and the 
CDEW, the career length varies from country to country (span from 40-47 for various 
countries, most often being 45). Thus, according to APEX methodology, countries that have 
a lower statutory retirement age may appear as less generous (France for example). On the 
other side, for countries with a lower statutory retirement age, in case they apply bonus for 
those working longer, RR is overestimated according to the EC methodology (for example, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic).  
Table VII-5 sums up all differences in methodologies of these four sources. 
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Table VII-5 Comparison of methodology for RR calculations, various sources 
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Ceiling on contributions 
Most countries do not require high-income workers to contribute to the pension system on 
their entire earnings. The rationale for ceiling is the view that higher-income earners can 
save individually if they want to reach a higher replacement rate (Whitehouse, 2006). Limits 
are usually set on both the contribution base and pension benefits (Whitehouse, 2005). If 
these limits are not matched, there is redistribution.   
Table VII-6 Ceiling on pensionable earnings to public scheme                                                      
(% of average earnings) 
 
            Source: Pension at Glance, various issues 
  
               
H i g h - i n c o m e  O E C D
A u s t r a l i a n o n o n o n o
A u s t r i a 1 6 4 1 4 7 1 4 6 1 4 2
B e l g i u m 1 2 9 1 1 7 1 1 8 1 1 8
C a n a d a 1 0 0 1 0 4 1 0 4 1 0 4
D e n m a r k n o n o n o n o
F i n l a n d n o n o n o n o
F r a n c e 1 2 8 1 0 1 9 9 1 0 2
G e r m a n y 1 6 4 1 5 1 1 4 9 1 5 4
G r e e c e 3 2 5 2 7 5 3 2 5 3 0 9
I r e l a n d n o n o n o n o
I t a l y 3 5 7 3 7 0 3 6 7 3 3 7
J a p a n 1 7 5 1 5 0 1 4 9 1 4 9
L u x e m b o u r g 2 4 0 2 1 5 2 3 1 1 9 5
N e t h e r l a n d s n o n o n o n o
N e w  Z e a l a n d n o n o n o n o
N o r w a y 2 1 9 2 1 9 1 8 8 1 1 1
P o r t u g a l n o n o n o n o
S p a i n 1 8 9 1 6 5 1 6 4 1 5 9
S w e d e n 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 0
S w i t z e r l a n d 1 1 6 1 0 8 1 0 6 1 0 4
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m 1 5 6 1 1 5 1 0 5 1 1 9
U n i t e d  S t a t e s 2 6 2 1 9 0 2 4 0 2 5 3
A v e r a g e 1 9 0 1 7 1 1 7 3 1 6 4
E U - 8
C z e c h  R e p u b l i c n o n o n o n o n e
E s t o n i a 1 0 0 0 . . . . n o n e
H u n g a r y 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 1 7
L a t v i a 7 0 0 . . . . . .
L i t h u a n i a 5 0 0 . . . . . .
P o l a n d 2 4 5 2 3 0 2 5 0 2 5 0
S l o v a k  R e p u b l i c 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
S l o v e n i a . . . . . . 1 5 7
A v e r a g e 2 5 0 2 5 7 2 3 1
 )
Table VII-6 presents the ceilings on pensionable earnings in OECD-22 and EU-8 countries, 
during the 2000s. In general, one may say that there is a decreasing trend in pensionable 
ceilings. There is no ceiling on public pension programmes in typical Beveridge systems, 
such as Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, the Netherlands. In EU-8 countries, the ceiling is 
slightly higher. This is probably because earnings are on average quite lower in EU-8 
countries, so it is hard to expect even from a relatively higher income earner to voluntarily 
save enough for old age.  
Pension variation with ‘Pension at Glance’ data 
Table VII-7 presents the coefficient of variation for four and three income levels. The 
coefficient of variation for three income levels (50%, 75% and average) seems the best 
choice for comparative analysis, since the CV based on four income levels is not adequate 
for a number of countries being below 150% of average earnings.  
Countries like the UK, Ireland, Denmark, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia – typical 
Beveridge countries – are characterised with a high coefficient of variation. There was a 
decrease in redistribution among some EU-15 countries such as Belgium, Denmark, France, 
and Portugal during the 2000s75. New EU member states do not have redistributive systems, 
except for the Czech Republic.  
 

75
 It just needs to be noted that CV is sensitive to very small variations in RR, which sometimes may occur due 
to errors in RR calculations. Therefore, small increases/decreases, of a few percentage points, should not be 
taken into account (for example, an increase in CV in the Netherlands, Switzerland etc).  
 ))
Table VII-7 Coefficient of variation, OECD data 
 
   Source: Own calculations based on Pensions at a Glance (2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011). 
When only public pension system is analysed, we can see that redistribution of public 
systems in countries such as Denmark and Australia and the Netherlands is even higher, and 
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in Switzerland and Sweden considerable76. Figure VII-1 shows pension variation for both 
public and total mandatory pension programs, in countries where there is a difference. 
Figure VII-1 Coefficient of variation - 3 income levels, for total 
mandatory and social security programmes (where different) 
 
               Source: Own calculations based on Pensions at a Glance (2009; 2011). 
Private pension data 
There are a few ways how pension assets may be administered. According to the OECD 
classification (OECD 2005b and 2007b), in view of financing vehicles, private pension plans 
can be classified in the following way:  
Pension funds (autonomous) are the pool of assets forming an independent legal entity with 
the exclusive purpose of financing pension benefits. Pension funds take the form of either a 

76
This is possible since the 2009 Pensions at a Glance issue separates RRs for public and private pension 
component. In the first issues of Pension at Glance, replacement rates included pension benefit from all 
mandatory pension schemes, regardless of whether they are public or private. 
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 )3
special purpose entity with legal personality (trust, foundation, corporate entity) or a legally 
separated fund without legal personality, managed by pension fund management company.  
Book reserves (non-autonomous) are sums entered in the balance sheet of the plan sponsor 
as reserves or provisions for pension benefits. Some assets may be held in separate 
accounts with the purpose of financing benefits, but are not legally separated. All of the 
assets, liabilities, transactions, and other events of the pension fund are combined with the 
corresponding items of the employer operating the scheme (IMF, GFS). 
Pension insurance contracts – An insurance contract that specifies pension plan 
contributions for which the pension plan benefits will be paid when the members reach a 
specified retirement age or on earlier exit of members from the plan. 
Other type of financing vehicle could be institutions such as investment companies, banks, 
etc. Personal pension plans, like individual retirement accounts (IRAs) in the US, personal 
registered retirement saving plans in Canada, personal pension trusts in Korea, mutual 
funds like the Mutual Pension Provident entities in Spain, and bank managed pension plans, 
as in Denmark and Iceland, are included in this category. 
 
 
 
 )
Table VII-8 Pension fund assets (% of GDP), decade averages 
Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
High-income OECD countries
Australia 13.8 18.8 27.8 59.4 92.2
Canada 11.2 22.4 41.2 89.7 100.0
Japan 0.1 4.5 16.2 20.1 18.9
New Zealand 7.8 11.6 15.4 15.5 12.2
Norway 12.4 19.9 35.1 45.2 43.4
Switzerland 36.6 46.1 64.7 92.5 119.8
United States 22.2 32.3 54.9 104.0 124.4
Average 14.8 22.2 36.5 60.9 73.0
EU15
Austria 0.0 0.8 4.1 9.8 15.4
Belgium 0.0 1.7 4.6 8.5 13.8
Denmark 12.7 20.3 42.1 81.8 125.2
Finland 3.6 10.4 17.6 41.0 66.3
France 0.0 0.3 2.1 5.1 8.3
Germany 2.9 6.9 10.1 14.2 15.7
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ireland 9.3 26.6 47.8 74.2 81.3
Italy 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.5 4.6
Luxembourg 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
Netherlands 21.3 38.0 67.7 99.9 128.3
Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.3 7.5 18.1
Spain 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 9.6
Sweden 1.8 5.6 11.5 22.2 43.6
United Kingdom 15.0 21.1 52.6 82.5 84.7
Average 4.4 8.8 17.4 30.2 41.0
EU-8
Czech Republic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 6.9
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0
Slovak Republic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Average 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.7  
Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics, OECD Institutional Investors Statistics,  
Davis (1994), OECD (1998). 
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such as US, Japan, Switzerland, it is not straightforward to assign dummy variable. 
Therefore, we use three variations – ‘Bismarck 1’, ‘Bismarck 2’ and ‘Bismarck 3’ dummy. In 
general, Bismarck 2 gives strongest results.  
Table VII-9 Bismarck dummy - countries assigned value 1  
Bismarck 1 Bismarck 2 Bismarck 3 
Austria  
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Portugal  
Spain 
Japan  
US 
Austria 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Portugal  
Spain 
Japan  
 
Austria 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Portugal  
Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
